University of Rhode Island

DigitalCommons@URI
Theses and Major Papers

Marine Affairs

4-1974

The Port of Boston: Perspective on a Maritime Dilemma
Louis Edward Cellineri
University of Rhode Island

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/ma_etds
Part of the Oceanography and Atmospheric Sciences and Meteorology Commons, and the United
States History Commons

Recommended Citation
Cellineri, Louis Edward, "The Port of Boston: Perspective on a Maritime Dilemma" (1974). Theses and
Major Papers. Paper 44.
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/ma_etds/44

This Major Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Marine Affairs at DigitalCommons@URI. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Major Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI.
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.

THE PORT OF BOSTON: PERSPECTIVE ON A MARITIME DILEMMA

by
Louis E. Cellineri

MASTER OF Mf~R'NE f\FFflJRS
UNIV. ·OF RHODE ISLAND

THE UNIVERSITY OF REODE ISLAND
THE PORT OF BOSTON: PERSPECTlVE ON A MARITIME DILEMMA

A RESEARCH PAPER SUBMITTED

TO

THE FACULTY OF THE GAADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
"MASTER OF MARINE AFFAIRS

MARINE AFFAIRS PROGRAM

by

Louis Edward Cellineri
Kingston, Rhode Island
April 1974

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction • • .
Chapter I.
Chapter II.
Chapter III.

Chapter

IV.

~istory

.

.

.

.. .

1

of the Port . . . .

5
56

Administration of the Port . .

..

Constitution of the Port.

77

Part l.

Trade Imbalance .

.

77

Part 2.

Petroleum .

.

'94

Part 3.

Facilities.

· 127

Part 4.

Cost Structure. .

· 136

Part 5.

Labor • .

Part 6.

New York. .

Part 7.

Containerization. • •

Part 8.

Massp.ort.

Future of the Port.

Selected Bibliography

• • .

. • • • • 142
. . 156
• 163

. . • . • 180
.

.

. • • 200

215

1.

INTRODUCTION
'1l0 u tside, of the Eighteenth lu.nendment, port development
is about as dry a subject as you can think of."

So would

Alfred E. Smith begin meetings with business and civic groups
back in 1921 when he was a Commissioner of the newly formed
Port of New York Authority.

With theatrical, as well as poli-

tical flair, however, would belie his oWn words and impress
upon his
seaport.

aud~ence

the vitality, complexity and utility of a

The same approach could be adapted to any port that

is, or once was, a major commercial center.

Most New

E~gland

erS are curiously conscious and proud of their legacy of a
unique maritime heritage.

Yet for most, this manifests itself

in regattas off Marblehead or faded daguerreotypes of a long
removed romantic era.

Few in Massachusetts, or even in th,e

metropolitan Boston area, however, understand their Port's
past, and few still appreciate its present contributions and
sympathize with its

struggl~s

and problematic future.

Ask a

Bostonian about the Seaport, and he will just nostalgically
sign that the Port is not what it used to be.

Nonetheless,

he cannot be faulted for lack of concern about container
cranes, dernmurage charges and pension funds,.
However, if the saga of the Port of Boston were a required course in the public school system, as are civ,ics and
American history, it would effectively span many academic
disciplines.

It would entail not just over 300 years of the
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Seaport's evolution, but also the historical development of
the

r~gion

be vividly

commerce.

and even the nation.

Its economic concepts would

presented against the backdrop of international
It would

~hed

light upon various approaches, tra-

ditional and innovative, suC'cessful and unsuccessful, of
public administration and 'business management.

It could

focus on governmental mechanisms and dissensions, and political processes and infighting.

It could. highlight the necessit.y

and methods of effective public relations and advertising
schemes.

It could expose the practical workings of unsightly

labor-management relations, feuds and resolutions.

It could

trace the development and often inept application of new
technologies.

Lastly, but not least, it could provide psycho-

logical insights as to mercantile titans, calculating politicians and frustrated and irate community leaders.

The Port

of Boston could educationally provide oonstructive and destructive illustrations in all theSe fields.
Ports, as their handmaidens, ships, often assume

charac~

ters of their own and become almost humanized participants in
their own chronicles.

The Port of Boston has enjoyed and

suffered most of the vicissitudes offered by maritime commerce,
from an internationally

glo~ious

inglorious insignificance.

significance to a nationally

It has been a versatile Thespian,

dramatic and melodramatic, tragic and burlesque.

Above all,

it has faithfully served and reflected its assigned hinterland,
from an initial national expanse to a constrained local market.
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It was the vital link in

~he

early flow of European settlers,

most of lifets necessities and all communication with

~he

outside world; later it was the gateway for the raw materials
of rapid and extensive industrialization.

Now it has been

reduced to solely the terminus of a troublesome energy life
line.

It once accomodated an endless variety of offerings and

demands, and now, with singular dependenoe, receives but one
predominant import.

It has attracted and lost those water-

front industries that impart so much to the dynamism of a
past Boston or a present Rotterdam.

It once supported a

thriving and integrated maritime economic structure only to
witness its gradual erosion and the alien expropriation of
its ownership and control.

:from a premier distribution center

that generated revenues for all Port interests, it has declined to a status at which its very economic viability has
been questioned.
Whatever its past fame or present indignities, the excitement of a vibrant, profitable waterfront does not enter into
the advocacy and implementation of harbor recreational and
residen~ial

development plans, with or without commercial

activi tie,s ~

This near dismissal of the Seaport, I IS present and

potential value in certain circles, only presents another dilemma to those attempting to cope with this veritable maritime
bag of worms.
But despite all these Obstacles, the Port may possibly,
for the first time in many years, face the opportunity of
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resusitation.

In this context, however, with so many contin-

gencies and external. influences, ,the only reasonable under-

taking may be a survey of the Po,rt I s past, a description of
i t.s present, and a modest anticipation of its -future.

Too

presumptuous a hindsight or a prescience would only force upon
the Pandora's box that the Seaport's critics, timbers and
revivalists are endeavoring to seal.

If Governor Smith could

convince his audience of a port I ,S, inherent interest, maybe
sometime in the future the Port of Boston or its spokesmen can
convince its inattentive a.udience of its inherent worth.

History is a cruel stepmother~
and when it retaliates, it
stops at nothing.
v. I. Lenin
History is more or less bunk.
Henry Ford

CHAPTER I
HISTORY OF THE PORT

EXigencies more than natural advantages seemed to have
inaugurated the early emergence of Massachusetts' maritime
eminence.

While Boston is blessed with one of the finest

har~

bors in the world, favorable physical characteristics abounded
elsewhere along the newly :settled seaboard.
l

The Canadian

Maritimes were nearer to both the Grand Banks
Europe.
harbors.

and northern

Maine's coastline offered numerous and equally fine
Chesapeake Bay, with its adjacent agricultural

wealth and milder climate, was much more centrally located.
Furthermore, Boston enj,oyed no great tributary such as the St.
Lawrence, the Hudson or the Delaware, to quarantee it a natural concentration of goods to and from the interior.

Finally,

its hinterland, constrained by a northern political frontie.r
and a western mountain barrier in the Berkshires, produced
no staple to compare with those of the middle and southern
colonies.
Nonethele9s, necessity and ingenuity skirted these handicaps and engender·ed Massachusetts' initial and

pre~eminent
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maritime orientation.

Though the first settlers intended to

farm the land, the inhospitable soil of the new colony forced
many of them to 100.k to the sea: for sustenance.

By 1630,

fishing, shipbuilding and sea...borne commerce ,were we'!l on
their way to becoming the. dominant industries.

It was early

and perceptively recognized that distribution could contribute as much to a successful economy as product.ion, and soon
trade

amongst the settlements and with the local Indians

soon flourished.

Distant coastal commerce with Virginia,

Maryland, the Dutch colonies of Manhattan and Long Island and
the French colonies in Canada quickly followed.

Fish.,. liquor

and linen cloth were the principal exports, with corn, tobacco, sugar, brass pieces, beaver skins and sheep the major
imports.
With increased maritime activity,

wa~er-front

facilities

were improved and a -gradual filling of marshes and swamps
pushed Bos.ton' s water mark
harbor.

Bounties were

out to the deepe.r waters of the

o~fered

to public spirited citizens

who would extend the shoreline, and by the early 1630's t.he
first town dock·was constructed.

In 1631, John Winthrop's

"Blessing of the Bay", the first sizable ship built in Massachusetts was launched at Medford and signalled the birth of
a famed and lucrative shipbuilding tradition.
From these early limited trade patterns, Massachusetts
developed a true maritime commerce by th'e 164'0' s. S'everal
factors made this possible.

The Civil WaE in England increased
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the scarcity of foreign commodities and led to

e~panded

col-

onial trade with new and far-flung, parts in the Western World.
Export deficiencies, destined to forever plague Boston,
furthe~

contributed to an increase in distant commerce.

Well

supplied with fish, beef and lumber, Mother E:ngland afforded
little market for the only staples Massachusetts could pvovide.
A new a.nd more receptive marketplace was required and sOOn
discovered in the West Indies.
The plantation eco·nomy of the "sugar islands" had to
import every ne.ces·si i:.y of life and readily absQrbed New England offerings.

Boston soon dominated a triangular trade

route, the ingredients of which were local rum, African slaves
and West Indian mOlasses.

This successful adjustment to the

abs,ence of a directly saleable export medium allowed New
England distilleries to profitably meet the growing domestic
demand for rUIn.

Since sales to the islands exceeded purchases,

this scheme was central to counter the imbalance of imports
Qv,er exports that had already reared its nasty head in the
trade with England.

FurthermQre, through bills of exchange,

specie and native produce obtained in the

isla~ds,

Boston ship-

masters obtained the cargoes needed for a more equalized British trade.

Soon, the West Indies trade became the keystone

of Massachusetts' maritime commerce and was largely responsible
for the s.t,eady growth of the P0rt of Boston.

By the late

Sev.enteenth Century, ov,er 60% of the traffic in the Harbor
was working this route.

A trade had been established that

was to last: over 250 years and Boston had surely become "the
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mart town of the West Indies".
Bos~onts

expanding trade was not limited to the West

Indies, however.

Although this route continued to be the

most profitable and engaged more than one-half of the POIt's
foreign shipping up to the Revolution, the range and diversity
of Boston's commerce was also increasing elsewhere.

Trades

begun in the late Seventeenth Century flourished in the prosperity that followed the Peace 0'£ Utrecht in 1713'.

Reliance

upon England for imports decreased and a wide variety of' goods
was brought in from European, Mediterranean and South American
ports.

From 1714 to 1717, a total of 1,267 vessels, totalling

63,000 tons and employing B to 9,000 seamen sailed from Boston
for distant foreign ports. 1
Behind this trade expansion was a growing export base
that consisted of a varied mix of goods including dried codfish, which by 1700 had become the mainstay of Boston's
out-bound cargoes.

Also composing this melange were whale-

bone, whale and cod oil, pickled mackerel and shad, masts,
boards, staves, shingles, naval stores, potash, horses and
livestock, pickled beef and pork, beeswax, and other
"sundries fi

•

On the liquid side, in 1773, New England as a

whole exported 911,000 gallons of rum, 419,000 gallons of
which went to Africa, 361,000 gallons to Quebec, and 111,000
gallons to Newfoundland. 2
Supplementing this foreign trade, numerous small vessels
out of Boston d.eveloped a varied and prosperQus coastal trade

9.
with the other North American coastal colonies.

This "mos-

quito fleet exchanged a variety of loc:a1. goods for tobaccO,
grains, naval stores of pitch and tar, and beaver and seal
skins.

With rapid development, Boston coastwise traffic

entailed about 800 voyages a year by Mid-Century.
As a result of its growing ocean-borne commerce, Boston
was the largest town in the English colonies until 1755, when
passed

b~

Philadelphia, and the major trade center in North

America for much longer.

Within this commercial ambiance,

merchants even rUled the social and political life of the
oolonial metropolis.

Two factors were critically important

to Boston's supremacy.

First, it was able to draw on local

resources for export products which were in demand in many
domestic and

fo~ign

markets.

Secondly, Boston had evolved as

the major distribution center for the numerous and varied
imports and exports of the North American colonies, and as
such, it served an area much larger than its immediate hinterland.

Consequently, as the marketability and volume of New

England's export mediums fell and competi.tion from other
ports reduced Boston's service region, the

~rt

would be pro-

foundly affected.
Tho,ugh Boston became the headquarters of the American
:Revolution largely because the policy of George III threatened
her maritime interests"

the war destroyed the city's trade,

indus,try and commerce.

In 1789, however, t:.he first Congress

immediately adopted customs regulations designed to make
Boston the leading port of the United States.

Once again,
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maritime ,ascendancy rescued the local economy and as Boston's
commerce expanded, both the seaboard and

~he

interior entered

a period of prosperity.
Expansion was not limited to the European and coastal
trades, however.

Hampered by new trade restrictions in the

West Indies, Boston turned to newer and safer markets.

An

eastern Mediterranean trade in fruit, oil and wine proved
profitable and opened a larger number of ports to Boston
vessels.

More important, by the early 19th

Cen~ury,

a new

Sal tic trade t.ad become extremely lucrative for Bo'ston merch-

ants, with Russ,ian hemp, iron and duck linen exchanged for
New England rum, Virginia flour and tobacco, and imported tea
and coffee. Surpassing even the profitable Russian business,
however, was the China trade begun in 1793. Again the pattern
was unfolding to reveal Boston's prone weakness, that of lacking a suitable export medium for the Far

Eas~.

Yankee inven-

tiveness, however, cultivated another prosperous, indirect
trade scheme.

Local ships carried cutlery, Lronware, clothing,

blankets, beads and molasses to the Pacific Northwest where
they were bartered with the Indians for sea otter furs.
These beautiful black furs, prized in the Orient, were in
turn shipped to China, where they were traded for chinaware,
sugar, curios and tea.

By the early 1800 1 5, Boston vessels

monopolized nearly nine-tenths of the China trade.
Although New York surpassed Boston in

~otal

1800, the city en10yed unprecedented prosperity.

tonnage by
Much of this

11.
resulted from

~he

increased demand for American provisions

prec·ipitated by military activities in E,urope.

Boston vessels

were the chief carriers of these foodstuf'fs, and by 1807,.
Massachusetts waS the largest shipowning state in the Union.
Massachusetts' commercial strength had come to rest on a
complex interlocking sys.tern of maritime industries, none of
which was self-sufficient.

Protected by the policies of the

federal government, this imposing
founded upon,

economic structure was

amongst other components"

a. successful fishery,

a pre-eminent shipbuilding industry, a vast and proven fleet,
venturesome merchants and clever traders.

Profits were based

not so much on Massachusetts' limited exports, but rather on
Boston r s status as an empo.rium

of world trade.

Even by this

time, Boston had little to directly offer the major trade
routes.

Yankee ingenuity and skillful trading, concocting

delicate, multi-cornered trade patterns, could overcome this
handicap only temporarily.

Extensive and prosperous as this

conunercial edifice was, it proved peculiarly sus.ceptible.
The preceeding embargo and resultant blockade of the War
0'.£

1812 almost destroyed Massachusetts I maritime conuner'ce.

It was asserted, " ..• with some plausibility that (President)
~efferson's

ultimate object was to destroy New England's

wealth qnd power".3

Although prosperity did return after the

war, the conflict materially altered the economic structure
of

Massach~setts

history.

and began a new era in Boston's maritime

Concisely stated, nA toilsome advance in the eigh-

teen-twent.ies was followed by perceptible speeding-up in the
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~hirties,

full-tide prosperity in the forties, and a glorious

culmination in the fifties, with t.he clipper ship.u4
In

~he

ensuing peace, Europe recovered its own carrying

trade and beoame less reliant on American produce.

Boston,

subsequently, lost much of its former export traffic.,
over,

a westward migration in the United States left

More~ssachu

setts, isolated in the northeastern extremity of the country,
more r,emQte from the shifting centers of population, cons,llmption and agricul'tural production.

As conduits between Europe

and the West, ports nearer the growing interior such as Philadelphia, Baltimore and New Orleans threatened Boston's commercial base.

Most important, however, New York emerged as the

preeminent United States port on the North Atlantic and offered
insurmountable competition to Boston.

In 1825, the Erie Canal

was opened and. tapped the interior, west of the Alle,ghanies,
for traffic through ,the Port of New York.

The Canal extended

from Albany to Buffalo and linked the Hudson River with take
Erie.

It established New York as the entrep8t of Western com-

merce and was instrumental in creating an agricultural boom in
the West.

Boston's future was looking dim, as the port first

recognized the dire consequences of an inexorable attrition of
its hinterland: "'A sullen pessimism was the prevailing attitude
on State Street.

The decline of Boston to a fourth-rate sea-

port •.• (wa,s) confidently predicted • .,5
Though this prognos.i.s eventually proved prophetic, at the
time, just as the port was to most need a strong export base,
it was granted a wondrous respite.

During the war, the manu-
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factures the young Nation had
land were cut oif.

traditional~y

This instigated some shrewd, prescient

Yankees to divert capital into industry.
complete

acquired from Eng-

co~ton fac~ory

In 1814, the first

in the United States was establishe.d

at Waltham, Massachusetts.

New Englanders found in the factory

the assured wealth the soil had initially denied them.
wave of industrialization followed.
iron foundries, tanneries and shoe

A

Textile and paper mills,
factor~es

soon turned

Lowell, Lawrence, Chicopee and Manchester into manufacturing
cities.

By 1840, Massachusetts was predominantly a manufac-

turing state and Boston's maritime prosperity depended on these
new enterprises.
Port activity gradually became oriented around the functional prLority of supplying food for the region's growing
popu~ation

tries.

and fuel and raw materials for its growing indus-

Boston's coastwise trade kept pace with this increasing

reliance On imports.

Cotton and cOal were the necessary

ingredients for the new economy.

The port's cotton imports

from the South leaped from 25,000 bales in 1832 to 270,000 in
1849. 6
~ries,

Anthracite coal imports from Philadelphia for indusstoves and furnaces went from 63,000 tons in 1830 to

more thqn a million in 1850. 7

These two commodities account

for America"s coastal tonnage exceeding its foreign tonnage
for the first time in 1831 and the continuance of this trend
despite the increasing rivalry that the railrQads were offering sea-borne transport.
New England sent Qut everything its limited export base
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would allow in exchange for these domestic receipts.

Lumber,

apples and fish were sent to Philadelphia and Norfa1k for
coal, and. boots, shoes, cotton and granite were converted into
Southern corn and cotton.

Yankee imagination even concocted

means of loading ships with ice and sailing it
mint juleps.

~o

Dixie for

This burgeoning domestic trade nearly doubled

Boston's coastwise shipping from 5,000 arrivaLs and departures
in 1830 to 9,300 in 1848. 8
Up to the Civil War, Boston's foreign commerce also expanded, but at a slower rate.

Its increment also resulted

from the need for imported raw materials and food.

The. North-

west fur trade decli,ned and i.ncreasingly more of the China
trade went to New York.

ThePort's

Mediterranean trade in-

creased tremendously, however; exporting cotto,n and rum,
Boston led New York in imports of wine and fruit until 1850.
Industrial demands sent local ships along new trade routes
to the Baltic, exchanging western grains and manufactured goods
for Swedish steel and Russian hemp.

A South American trade

grew to be as important for Mass,achusetts ,J commerce as the
,West Indies trade of colonial days.

From Buenos Aries and

Montevideo, hides were hauled for New England tanneries and
shoe factories along with Brazilian coffee and River Plate
wool for local looms.

FO.r these goods, Boston shipped lumber,

ice, boots, cotton and woolen cloth, shovels and machines.
Even the prestigious East-India trade supplied New England
with its needed raw

ma~erials

such as buffalo hides, indigo,
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linseed, shellac and salt peter.

All these imports were des-

tined io,r the New England area except gunny-bags for Western
corn growers and gunny-cloth for Southern cotton growers.
All total, in 1857 there were 3,012 foreign arrivals in Boston
amounting to 714,821 tons. 9
Despite the prosperity this volume of foreign trade
brought to Boston, however, an important fact cannot be overlooked.

Though the' export of local manufaG'tured goods in-

creased r at no time during the 1850 ' s did Boston's total
exports amount to even one-half of its imports from the established trade routes.

Industrialization was an illusory anti-

dote for New Englahd's export deficiency.

The vast majority of

local manufactured goods, were absorbed by the domestic market.
Furthermore, the shoes, boots and textiles of New England's
factories, while of high value, were of small bulk.
shipping was gradually wrested from the

con~ro1

When

of local mer-

chants, the inability of the products of local enterprises to
fill out-going ship bottoms became a critical handicap.
o~der

In

to attract and maintain the regular and frequent service

so vit.al to a port, a somewhat balanced volume of trade is a
prerequisite.

Industrialization would not prove the source

of an export medium adequate for this function.

Boston came

to rely not only on external raw materials but also

O~

non-

indigenous bulk exports from outside its immediate hinterland
to sustain an essential ocean traffic.

This festering dilemma

was now clearly exposing the port's singularly susceptible
maritime foundation.
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The clipper ship era,

b~9inning

in IS50, was considered

by many as the romantic and commercial apogee of Massachusetts'
maritime history. In restrospect, it appears more as a miscalcula~ed

investment.

~hough

a need was long

recogni~ed

in the

China tea trade for faster vessels, the California gold rush
of 1848 gave the real impetus to build and sail ships which
sacrificed camping space for maximum speed.
placed on the rapid transport of men and

The premium

?~ovisions

of all

g·orts to San francisco resulted in some of the fastest sailing
vesse1.s ever built, with Donald McKay cr,eating such legendary
master~pieces

of oak, hemp and canvas as the Sovereign of the

Seas and the Flying Cloud.
however.

The clipper era was short-lived,

San Francisco became flooded with goods and freight

rates dropped to a barely remunerative level.

Clipper ships

'were found too costly to operate even in shorter coastal and
trans-Atlantic voyages and sadly, none were built after 1855.
The passing of the clipper can be said to have ended Boston's
marit:ime history as distinct from the nation"s as a whole ..
At the end of the clipper era, Boston was a metropolis
of refinement and wealth, the richest city for its size in the
wo·rld.

Despite this pr,osperity, Boston was rapidly losing

ground to New York in maritime conune;rce.
has a tendency toward concentration..

Maritime commerce

In the first half of

the 19th Century, Boston, in her struggle to compete with New
York, absorbed the commerce· and shipping of every other
Massachusetts seaport, including famed Ne:wburyport,

G1Qucester
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and Salem.

Concurrently, however, the same process on the

national scale was concentrating much greater
commer.ce through New York.

water~borne

In 1845 New York's fleet surpassed

that of Massachusetts, and by 1860, New York could boast of
1,464,001 tons of. shipping c\ompared to 466,2'13 tons for Boston.

Though in 1857 Boston had 2,842 fore.ign arrivals from the
major trade routes to 2,990 for New York, the fi.gure disgui.ses
the fact that I, 9L3 of Boston I s

arriva~s

were ,small Nova

. sc hOaner,s. 10
.Scotl..a

New York's growth was unpinned by an irresistable concent:.ration of expanding imports and exports for a great hinterland.

Bostonfs

out~bound

cargoes remained stationary for the

lack of a good export base and even its Lmports grew more
slowly than New York's.
Philadelphia and

Boston could still compete with

aal~imore

Lecause local ownership of a large

share of the American merchant fleet guaranteed it cargoes.
Competition with New York, however, was a losing battle.
Geography and a self-aggrandizing concentration afforded New
York a much greater domestic market for both imports and exports.
This allowed it the commerce of a great world trade center and
the profits of a great distribution center.

Boston, meanwhile,

relied primarily on local enterprise for its sustenance and
began its

st~uggle

with the persistent and more and more appar-

ent dilemma of an increasingly imbalanced trade which eventually
relegated it to the status of a second rate aut-port.
This process was hastened by Boston's reaction to the
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steam-ship.

Though it was able in 1840 to lure Samuel Cunard

with an offer of free facilities to use Boston as the U.S.
terminus of his North American Royal Mail ,Steam Packet Company,
the Poxt's over-all adaptation to the new technology was disasterously inept.
~ransatlantic

~ecord

Its

was one of costly failures in

ventures and only a very slow establishment of

coastwise steam packet lines.

In oontrast in New York, the

state government-subsidized Collins Steamship Line to England
quickly deprived Boston
trade.
YOlrk.

~f

much of its share of the European

Eventually, even Cunard transferred its lines to New
Even worse, when New York innaugurated steamship ser-

vice to the far South in the 1830's and IB40's, Boston lost
her former domination over southern commerce.

New York's

supremacy was bolstered as a faster and more efficient

~lo~t

of steamship lines concentrated even more commerce in the leading

port~

Boston's inability to initially exploit the new

technology even led local talent and capital to seek New York
for better opportunities and more assured investments.
Boston" s situation has been aptly summarized:
liThe Civil War merely hastened a process that had
already begun, the substitution of seeam for sail.
It was the ostrich-like attitude of maritime Massac,husetts toward this process, more than the war, by
which she lost her ancient preeminence. Far be~ter
had the brains and energy that produced the clipper
ships been put into the' - iron screw steamer. "II
The Civil War did contribute to the crumbling of Boston's
commercial prestige.
disrupted,

e~Fort

The port's large trade with the South was

cotton for the European trade was cut off and
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freight rates increased due to Confederate raiders.

After the

war, however, despite various trade fluctu-ations, Boston experienced a gradual and general commercial advance between
1865 and 1900.

It was the raiLroad that rescued Boston.

The complexion of Boston's foeign trade did not change
greatly except for an inevitably increasing emphasis on imported
good and raw

The trans-Atlantic trade with England

materi~ls.

and the Continent was still paramount and Boston continued to
hold the dominant position in dealings with the Mediterranean.
Though New York supplanted Boston as the terminus of the Far
East trade and

comme~ce

with India and Africa decreased after

1_860, these losses were compensated for by expanded trade with

South America and a new trade with Australia.

The goods

carried back to New England on these routes were the familiar
industrial necessities; hides and skins for tanneries, boot
and shoe factories; eotton and wool for textile mills; jute
for bagging

factorie~;

hemp for linen thread mills; sisal for

cordage works; sugar for refineries; and chemicals, drugs and
dyes for chemical and fertilizer

wo~ks.

It was the domestic trade, however, on whiCh the port
relied for the bulk of its total tonnage.

The growth of

domestic imports continued to reflect the steady industrial
expansion of New England.

This growth was more marked than

that of any of Boston's leading

out~port

competitors.

From

Maine to the Gulf OE Mexico flowed the goods so imperative fOr
the

region's industri'al economy.

Prinoipal inbound carqoes
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included sugar, molasses, sand, lumber and vast amounts o£
coal, raw cotton and somestic wool.

Coal was the most impor-

tant tonnage commodity in. this coas.tal trade,. and the Chesapeake Bay offered an endless supply of this .IIblack dirt" for
the furnaces of northern factories.
The key to Boston's success during this period, however,
was the great exports which the port was able to muster to
CQunter-balance the huge volume of imported fuel and raw materials.

By the end of the century, in fact, Boston experienced

an unusual excess of out-bound over in-bound cargoes.
resulted primarily from two processes.

This

First was the develop-

ment of the great New England t.ext:ile centers af·ter 1880.
cat~pulted

These

rna~ket

the port into the position of a world wool

second only to London.

Even this, however, while de-

manding increased imports, did not give Boston a sufficient
export base.

Increased textiles supplemented the Port's other

,exports, and out-going cargoes of manufactured goods increased.
These increases, however, while adding value to Boston's
export traffic, did not supply the much needed bulk to fill
ships.

The Port's dilemma of high value-low bulk exports was

e~acerbated

by the fact that most of the area's manufactured

prOducts continued to be absorbed domestically.

This condition

has plagued Boston up to the present.
The bulk exports the Port of Boston could not find in its
immediate

hin~erland,

the Midwest.

it discovered in the fecund farms of

The trunk lines of the great ~merican railroads

buil~

were
not.

~o

21to transport western produce, especially gra1n,

the still relatively sparsely popUlated East, but rather

to voracious .Europe.

All the major North Atlantic ports

came to rely On carloads of Midwestern grain for needed bulk
exports.

Only New York,

a~mQst

embarrassed by the amount of

varied freight seeking its port, escaped this singular dependence.
a~ong

Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore, however, fought

'"'"
themselves to serve as entrepots
for the

great American interior.
ation of a basic axiom:

t~ade

The situation was a slight

of the
exagger~

"A port is not the origin or destin-

ation of the bulk of trattic carried by its water lines.

It

is a concentration point or gateway, in severe competitio,n with
other gateways for the bu.siness of a cornman hinterland.,,12
The North Atlantic ports were the combatants, Midwestern
grain was the

pri~e

and the railroads were the lances.

The major railroads had
their respective ports.

~ed

great efforts to build up

.Nor-falk was served by t-he Norfalk &

Western and Newport NewS by the Chesapeake & Ohio.

Baltimore

was the home port of the Baltimore & Ohio, but was also served

by the Pennsylvania and the Western Maryland.
the Pennsylvania and also the

Bal~imore

Philadelphia had

& Ohio and the neadin9.

New York, in a class by itself, was served by all the home
roads of its competitors plus three direct routes of its own
to Chicago, the Erie and two lines of the New
and had two additional

s~rong

Yo~k

Central,

roads to Buffalo, the Delaware,

Lackawanna and Western and the Lehigh Valley.

Boston was
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se~ved

by the Boston & Maine, the Boston & Albany, and the

New York, New Haven & Hartford.

All these roads attempted to establish European steamship lines and thus be able to haul import and export traffic
for the interior.

In some cases, if independent carriers c-ould

not be convinced to enter its port, a railroad would establish
its own steamship services .

More often, however

j'

a steamship

line was attracted on the unders,tanding that railroad and
steamship lines would work together for their mutu·al intere,sts
and b¥ the offer of a free pier, a practice to which only New
Yor~

did not need to resort.

in Boston.

This was the general method used

The Port's railroads were able to entice steamship

lines with offers of free piers, guaranteed cargoes and new
~erminal

facilities such as warehouses and grain elevators.

Only the

ra~lroads

couLd afford thls sales

progr~,

for only

they had the lucrative compensation of the rail haul freights
which the steamship lines generated.
So it was western grain, produce

and livestock, supple-

mented by local manufactured goods, that dramatically increased
Boston's export trade.

Though the steamship had a late start

in Boston, by 1880, 322 steamers carried merchandi,se to European ports and in 1900, only 2,686 of the 10,436 ships entering
Boston depended on sail. 13 By 1900, BostOn waS still the nation's second largest port in foreign trade wieh $192,609,000
of overseas commerce, 50% more than its nearest rival, Baltimore.
Surpassed only by New York with $1,068,700,000, Boston handled
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approximately one-fifth of the coun.try's ag,gregate foreign
tonnage. 14

The portis status, however, was shaky, and its

vulnerable commercial trade base proved unreliable.
After the turn of the Century, Boston suffered a serious
dislocation of its trade that, while not apparent on the surface
at first, resulted in a seemingly irreversible trend of deterioration.

By 1920, the earlier predictions af the Port's

inescapable fall from glory were realized and Boston faced a
dismal future.

The artificial stimulation of

brought unparalleled activity
dented

~rts

~o

Wo~ld

the port of Boston.

War I
Unprece-

of meat, dairy products, breadstuffs, cotton,

leather, iron, a,teel and munitions were shipped to warring Europe.

This was, however, only an aberration from a persistent

pattern that eroded Boston's stature in

wo~ld

commerce and only

allowed the port to maintain a parcel of dignity as the seaborne transportation center for New England.
Though the value of Boston's foreign commerce increased
impre'ssively between 1900 and 1920, it did not match the gains
of the other

u.

S. North Atlantic ports and

mar~ed

a prepon-

derance of imports ov,er exports that was destined to 'be magnified.

(Table 1). Boston's over-all tonnage gain compared

favorably with that of its rival ports, but these figures were
even
which

mo~e

deceptive.

beca~e

(see Table 2). Thei>ort's coastal trade,

the dominant activity in its commercial traffic,

belabored under a more severe

i~balance

than its foreign

~rade.

(see Table 3).
The stimulus behind Bostonls increased ocean-borne traffic
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TABLE 1

FOREIGN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
1919, 1929

(short tons)

1929

1919

Imports

I

Exports

Imports

Exports
I

I
I

Total

u.S.

Atlantic
Coastal
!Ports

19,882,693

48,240,771

57,975,796

69,534,481

30,101,45.9

40,401,769

19,372,216

3,261,301

303,120

I
13,167,893

I

laoston

1,465,251

.

1,366,708
I

SOURCE:
u.S. Army, Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1920,
Part 3, (Washington, D.. C.: Government Printing Of{Tce, 1921).

u.s. Army Corps of Engineers, Waterborne Commerce of
the United States, Calender Year 1929, Part 2, Waterways and
Harbors, Atlantic Coast, and Part 5, National Sumrnaries~
(washingt~n, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1930).

I

TABLE 2

WATERBORNE COMMERCE OF THE U.S.
AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC PORTS
1919,1929

(short tons)

Year

Total
U.S.

1919

319,762,727

(29

Boston
8,680,243

New York

Philadelphia

140,354,096
estimate

Baltimore

Hampton
Roads

23,895,976

14,055,906

21,618,071

30,252,422

20,264,165

25,116,481

I

519,870,279

19,065,050

182,988,041

SOURCE:
Report of the Cheif of Engineers, 1920, Part 3.
Corps of Engineers, 1929, Part 2.

l\,)

U1
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TABLE 3

WATERBORNE COMMERCE THROUGH
THE PORT OF BOSTON 1905 - 1929

(short tons)
Year

I
"

I

I

1905
1910
1920
1925
1928
1929

Foreign
Import
974,712
765,500
1,673,899
2,586,065
2,'964,876
3,261,301

Domestic

Total*

Export

I

1,294,615
1,256,89'2
573,489
338,779
403,486
303,120

5,289,764
5,304,453
7,023,605
11,187,691
12,734,997
14,444,765

7,559,291
7,326,8459,270,993
14,112,535
16,103,359
19,065,050

I

SOURCE:
Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1920, Part 3.
Corps of Engineers, 1929, Part 2.

*

Total includes "Other Domestic".

TABLE 4

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH OF if{EW ENGLAND STATES, 1889, 1904, 1909

~

I

No. of
Plants

Year

Capital
Employed

i

Raw Material
Used

Sale of
Product

Workmen
Employed

I

'$2,503,854,000

1,101,290

I $1,476,297,000

$2,670,650,000

1,870,995,000

940,752

1,116,273,000

2,025,999,000

994,037,000

1,660,348,000

I

[

II

1909

23,351

1904

22,279

1899

22,576

I

I
I

IV

1,507,630,000

-

....,J

I
[

I

SOURCE:
U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Bulletin of
the Census Bureau on Manufactures in the United States, 1910
(Washington, b.C~: Government Printing Otfice, 1911).
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during this period was, predictably, the deve'lopment of new and
expanded manufacturing industries and their unquenchable
appetite for raw materials.

(Table 4).

The port continued to

receive a mass of these necessities from foreign trade,.

Vast

quantities of grain materials from the East Indies, Australia,
Egypt, Argentina and more· than 40 other countries were included
among the port's in-bound cargoes.

It remained the second

largest foreign import center behind New York and the leading
wool market in the United States.

By 1929, Boston's foreign

import tonnage had risen to a record 3,261,301 tons.

IS

It was the portIs domestic trade, however r which occupied
an inc.reasingly larger proportion of its mar.itime activities.
(Table 5).

Throughout the early twentieth Century, Boston's

coastal trade ranked second only to New York and through the
1920 ' s constituted oVer 2/3 of the Port's entire business.
Unfortunately, coastal receipts greatly
shipments with vast and growing

amoun~s

outnumbered coastal
of raw materials

arriving from the Gulf of Mexico, other North Atlantic ports
and later even

~he

West Coast.

With no indigenous natural

resources of its own, New England was still forced to rely on
imports to feed its population and sustain its industrial
growth.

Coal became the leading import product, doubling to

3,000,000 tons from 1902 to 1916 and comprised over 60% of the

coastal receipts through the 1920's.

The character of Boston's

foreign and domestic imports is reflected in Table 6.
It was the fbrt' s reduced export base, however, 'which
dealt the death blow.

While New England tool and machinery

TABLE 5

TOTAL WATERBORNE COMMERCE THROUGH
THE PORT OF BOSTON 19J.9" 1929

(short tons)
I

Year

FOREIGN
Imports

-

,

Exports

DOMESTIC
Coastwi,se
Receipts

rCoastwl.se
IShipments

I

,
~

Other
Domestic

Total

-

1919:

1,465,25-1

1,366,708

1929

3,261,30Jl.

303,120

5,075,399

I

772,885

l2,742,708 11.,712,057

-

8,68 10,2.43
19,065,050

1,045,.864

I
I

-

SOURCE:
Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1'920, Part 3.
Corps of Engineers, 1930, Part 2.

N
\D

'TJ\.BLE 6
LEADING FREIGHT THROUGH THE PORT OF BOSTON

1910;1929
(Short tons)

10

FOREI~

r.a-msTIC

- Inports

COastwiSe Recel.pts

Exp:>rts

~ and \..o:xi

manufactures

-

fibres, grasses
& nanufactures

Breadstuffs
267,563
Iron and stell
nanufactures
88,031
r-mt and
sBi-rY products 77,745

29~,923

204,482
119,532

Fruits aIrl
nuts·
chemicals, drugs,
dyes
-

manu-

94,3~2

W:x:xi

67,004

factures
Hides arrl
skins
'w:x>l
cotton

1929

crwe

-

petroleum

Su;]ar
Fuel oil
I coal.

WJodpulp
&

cellulose

Ore
ILurri::>er

'I

56,293

~

7,151,629
221,594
157,000
64,711

s::avel

2,7,592

Coal

Oil

sam

&

I, CoastwiseSfiipne.nts

*
w
o

54,015
4Q,586
29,535

'I

I

520,823' I Wheat
431,884 Wheat floUr
384,957 Barley
307,229
Iron & steel
serap
237,531 Paper
1.52,089
103,582
I

56,563
34,247
45,759
38,485 ,
10,725

6,905,464 I Refined
Crude oil 2,437,948 I petrolean
products
iRefined
•
Fuel oil
petroleum
641,528' Pig iron
products
577,413 'Fertill.zer
fuel oil

Coal

sam.

&

g;-avel
Lunber &
logs
Fish
Gasoline
WDol

371,676
J65,327
85,864

40,900

I

551,939
379,302
127,861
~l)7, 752
35,526

I

Re!,X)rt of 'the Chief Engineer, 1'920, Part 3. COrps of Engineers, :1.930, Part. :2
* Cbmbined d::xtestic cx::mterce for 1910. Not diferentiated as. coastwise receipts and shiprents until
1929. Vast najority of this canbined total, however, was made up of cx::>astwise receipts.
scx.mcE:
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production had developed extensively, it presented the familiar dilemma ot high value-low bulk goods, unable to fill
departing ships and, in any case, primarily absorbed domestically.

More critical to Boston's commercial traffic was the

loss of grain from the Midwest on which the port had become
dependent for bulk exports.

The

~ature

export medium is seen in Table 6.

of Boston's deficient

The fiet result of this

situation was that the portis foreign export
rapid decline.

t~ade

suffered a

Its share of total national foreign exports

dropped from

8~2%

in 1882 to 2.3% in 1920 and to less than

1% in 1929.

In 1905, Baltimore surpassed Boston in foreign

exports and Philadelphia did likewise three years later.

By

1929, with only 303,120 tons of overseas exports, Boston

ranked 18th amopg all U.S. ports.. 16

Domestic receipts of bulk

imports continued to sustain the Port's activity, and Boston's
coastal arrivals soon exceeded those of both New York and
Philadelphia.
Although imports were greater than exports along almost
~he

at

entire North Atlantic seaboard, the disparity was greatest

130 s ton,

where the ratio o,f imports to exports wa s 4 t.o 1

in 1920 and 10 to 1 in 1929.

While this, traffic allowed sUb-

stantial growth in overall tonnage, it became increasingly
damaging to the Portis actual commercial state.
A number of interrelated factors exposed the Port of

Bo,ston's vulnerability and paved the way for an era of stagnation.

One national trend during this period affected all
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North Atlantic ports.
agricultural

The United States began to consume the

p~oduction

for bulk exports.

upon which all these ports had relied

This led to increased competition for the

remaining Midwest produce.

Other developments, however,

hurt Boseon in particular.

In the early' Twentieth Century,

Canada became increasingly sea-conscious and diverted much of
its previous business through Boston to its own ports at St.
John's and
over

fa~

Halifa~.

Boston came to handle only the spill-

produce from these ports.

Furthermore, Boston's

thriving export trade with Liverpool, the' gateway to the North
English industrial area, at the

t~me

the world's largest con-

surner of imported food-stuffs, effectively disappeared.

Saston,

with its northerly latitude and cool adj,acent water, had always been a favored port for the export of livestock and provisions and in the late Nineteenth Century had been the
country's, leading port in the European cattle trade.

Dwind-

ling farm exports, however, and a growing British preferenoe
for Canadian and Argentine cattle reduced the Port's export
of cattle from 16,620 head in 1897 to practically none by
- 1Lastly,
7,
,
M'ercant1.'1 e Marl.TIe
.
1929.
1n 1902, the Internatl.onal

was formed, consolidating t:he major U.S. lines to the United
Kingdom, and established its headquarters in New York.

It

absorbed the three major Boston lines to England, the Leyland
L~ne,

the Dominion Line and the Wilson-Furness-Leyland Line,

and the city lost its independent management of these services.
Local management had tended to fill ships at any cost, but
these lines would not get western exports if they did

no~
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corne

thro~gh

Boston.

Under the new, consolidated control,

cargoes would be available at New York, Philadelphia or
Baltimore, and Boston lost much of the frequency and regularity of its North Atlantic service.
tion of Boston-Owned vessels.

This hastened the attri-

'By 192.9, except for a few

vessels in the Canada trade and some locally owned tankers
and colliers, Boston did not have a single ship o£ its own
engaged in foreign commerce.

The once

g~eat

shipowner-merchant

community had been displaced by fleets under outside control.
The loc'al employment, revenues and preferential treatment
generated by the earlier maritime structure were lost forever.
Though these events contributed to Boston's decline;
the major villainE in the Port's drama were the railroads,
the heroes of an earlier age.

Boston had been at a disad-

vantage since the development of the great American rail
systems.

For years, North Atlantic ports have been of two

types, New York and all the others.

Since the completion of

the Erie Canal, western traffic has naturally sought New York.
The railroads accomodated themselves to New York's pre-eminence and

a~l

trunk lines were concentrated at the port,

perpetuating its monopoly of the western export trade.

In

the competition for a share of the total western volume of
exports, Boston was distinctly handicapped among the North
Atlantic outports.

It was the only port without a line west

of the Hudson River, and, hence, no western export traffic
naturally came through Boston.

The Boston railroads were
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dependent upon the traffic handed over to them at switching
points by carriers who were primarily interested in taking
these exports to their horne ports, giving them the longest
hauls and the' largest earnings.

Not only did the Boston

railroads have to absorb these switching chaJ:ges, but the
POrt was forced to rely on the northern trunk lines located
in New York which, in effect, controlled the local lines.
Since the interests of these trunk lines always centered about
another port; Boston got very little business funneled to it
frem the interior hinterland.
The local structure and operations of Boston's railroads aggravated these disadvantages.

The three Boston lines

owned and maintained three separate piers.

!his diversified

ownership of the waterfront resulted i'n an utter confus1on of
wharfage and dockage rates which hampered traffic movement
through the port.

More harmful, however, were the mutually

exclusive relationships between the railroads and their respective steamship lines.

Having supplied a steamship line

with a free pier, a Boston rail carrier saw the line as an
e;){tension of the railroad and attempbed to roonopoli'ze the
traffic moving by means of that extension.

It would be estab-

lished under contract that the steamship line, wholely or to
the greatest possible extent, would only do ita export and
import business with one particular railroad.

Each steamship

line became preferentially bound to a single rail carrier.
Instead of having all Boston railroads working for every
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steamship line, each line was committed to a single road. No
steamship line could berth at the' terminal of mor,e than one
railraod.

Competition for freight was thus stifled and

operations became inflexible.

This inflexibility was further

sustained by a system of switching charges.

1f a railroad

carried freight for a steamship line other than one of its
own, it suffered a switching charge to moVe that freight over
the pier of the railroad to which the line was contracted.
This practice was common to all North Atlantic ports without
a pUblic belt line serving all terminals.

New York; however,

had the distinct advantage of an extensive lighterage system
which could transport export freight from any railroad to any
steamer in the harbor.

through these lighters, all piers

could be easily reached by all railroads.
capacity,

fle~ibility,

This system's

convenience and ease of expansion were

far super10r to any belt line.
Thougb all these elements contributed to Boston's decline, they were minor compared to the loss of western grain
exports due to a discriminatory railroad rate differential.
In the intense competition for Midwest exports, the major
trunk lines had waged a series of disasterous rate wars.
Several unsuccessful attempts were made to divide this traffic
and establish compensatory rates for carrying it.

Finally,

the railroads reached an agreement on import-export commerce
in 1877 that bore some relation to relative distance and cost
of servioe. Philadelphia was allowed an export rate 3¢ per
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hundred weight (40¢ per ton) lower than New York and Baltimore
was allowed one 2¢ lower (60¢ per ton)

~han

New York.

Boston

was assigned the same rate as New York.
In 1880, dissatisfied with this arrangement, New YO.rk
withdrew from the agreement and the worst rate war of all
soon followed.

In 1882, the dispute was submitted to a pres-

tigious Arbitration Commission.

The Commission reaffirmed

the 1877 agreement and further extended the preferential rates
of Philadelphia and Baltimore to imports.

this decision was

accepted, and, with minor modifications, remained the basis
of the relative rate structure until 1963.

The primary

justi~

fication for these port differentials was the principle of
competi.tion.

Because Boston was nearest to Europe and the

channels of Philadelphia and Baltimore were not as deep as
those of both Boston and New York, these southern ports had
traditionally had higher ocean rates to Great Britain and the
Continent.

Tramp steamers, handling most of the grain cargo

at the time, charged Philadelphia and Baltimore rates 2¢ and
3¢ per hundred-weight higher, respectively, than those at
Boston and New York.

It was felt, therefore, that unless

throughrates from the Midwest were equalized, no traffic would
flow through the higher cost southern ports_

By compensating

for this with an exact cDunter·balance of inland rates, all
North Atlantic ports were

theoreti~ally

put on an equal footing

to attract competitive freight.
At first, Boston did not feel the full effects of this
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preferential rate system.

Export and import rates were not

rigidly maintained and when the Boston roads needed western
traffic for their steamship lines they cut their rates and got
the business.

In 1903, howeve_r, the enactment of the Elkins

Law, which required strict adherence to prescribed freight
rates, put an end to this practice.

From then on! Boston

began to realize the full impact of port differentials (Table
7) •

'Exacerbating this situation was the increasing competition of New Orleans and Montreal for import freight.

These

two ports recognized that to attract regular steamer service
to carry cotton from the Gulf and grain from Canada they had
to generate imports for ships returning from Europe.

To do

so, the railroads of both ports offered extraordinarily low
import rail rates at least to the lower level of B,a_l timore.
In 19·09, another rate war ensued.
In 1911, it was decided to submit both import and
disputes to the, Interstate Commerce Commission.
sian the following year, the Commission

orde~ed

e~port

In its deci ....
the status

quo maintained for all ports, on both imports and exports.
Boston's foreign commerce was not really threatened.
Four years later, the Port's fate was sealed.

In 1916,

the North Atlantic Conference of steamship lines operating in
the overseas trade, equalized ocean rates to all North Atlantic
ports.

This decision deprived Boston of its only competitive

advantage in relation to through inland-ocean rates, namely

38.
TABLE 7

FULL CARGOES OF GRAIN SHIPPED
THROUGH SPECIFIED PORTS

1908

1909

1910
-

Baltimore
IPhiladelphia
I
IINew
York
- Boston

5

9

1.2

0

5

0

0

1
19

I

1908 - 1913

1.911
I

1912

1913
1

18

66

130

1

16

34

34

a
a

4

26

.45

0

1

6

. SOURCE:.
Edwin J. Clapp,
The Port of Boston,
Haven: Yale University Press, 1916), p. 120.

(New

39.
the lower ocean tariffs whi-ch naturally accrued to the Port
as the closest U.S. North Atlantic port to Europe.

Boston

s.till remained 194 miles closer to Liv:erpoo1 than New York,
337 miles

clo~er

than Philadelphia, and 493 miles eloser than

Baltimore, but: these distances would no longer be a.n asset.
These developments forced upon Boston a crippling

handi~

cap in the inbense competition among Atlantic coast ports for
the critical traf£ic of the western

hinterland~

Import rates

to the designaterl Control Freight Association Territory were
lower via St. John's, Halifax, Montreal, Portland, Philadelphia,
Baltimore and Norfolk.

More importantly, export rates from

the west were lower via Montreal, Philadelphia, Saltimore and
Norfolk.

Boston's dependence on this area was such that in

1911, nearly 78% of the port's export tonnage originated outside New England.

(Table 8).

This

lI

un ique form of torture",

as ex-Governor Thomas E. Dewey described it to the Supreme
Court, was to persist for Qver 50 years despite constant legal
efforts by both New York and Boston to abate it.
While Boston 1 s rival North Atlantic outports were formally
granted this decided advantage, Boston was theoretically
allotted equality with New York.

This parity, grounded upon

a myopic consideration of only equal rail rates, was illusory.
New York enjoyed advqntagres and a'fforded inducements which
attracted to it a large portion of the interior commerce which
might otherwise have gone through Boston.

The New York State

Barge Canal System gave the city the most extensive arrangement of inland waterways.

Its harbor was connected to Lake
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TABLE 8

PERCENTAGE DIVISION OF EXPORT
TONNAGE VIA BOSTON, YEAR ENDING
JUNE 30, 1911

F.:r;om New
England
Roads

%
I

From U.S. Points other
than New England
Grain

Other Traffic

Total

Boston

&

Albany

15.1

44.6 %

40.. 3 %

100%

Boston

&

Main,e

26.4

25.5

4'8.1

100

---

--

-

22.,1

32.7

45.2

Average

~

100
II

SOURCE:

Export Exhibit 25 of Boston Chambe,r Of Commerce
in 1912 Differential Cases.
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Erie, Lalce Ontario and Lake Champlain by all"'water routes.
By 1937, over 5,000,000 tons of cargo was carried over these
waterways..

The historical concentration of we,stern traffic

in the largest port continued, further enhanced by expanding
facilities and a superlative lighterage system.

With the

great number of ships calling on New York, it could offer
shippers of g-rain opportunities absent in Boston.

A parcel

of gr,ain sent to New York for Shipment several weeks ahead
of time, would have a chance to get I1distress room" on anThis "'distress room l1

other steamer sailing immediately.

diversion meant a lower freight rate to the shipper because
the departing ship, unable to acquire a full cargo, would
carry the grain for next to nothing rather than sail half
empty.

Storing grain in New York while awaiting sale fo,r ex-

port was also more advantageous.

Such grain had a choice of

shipment on amy of New York's numerous steamship lines.

At

Boston, on the other hand, with its inflexible terminal arrangement, a shipment had the choice of only about one-third of
the few lines serving the port.
More determinant, however, was New York's ability to
absor.b charges for accessory services that Boston and other
outports had to assess the shipper ox consignee.

Since the

city owned all covered piers, New York did not levy wharfage
charges fOE merchandise using such a pier.

"Side-wharfage l1

for handling goods between Ship and lighter was also free,
as was the entire lighterage system.

The New York railroads,

moreover, offered free grain elevators and low wharehouse
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rates..

In Boston, with its dispersed and privately owned

waterfront, the three local railroads charged for all these
services..

Along with the switching charges cited earlier,

this high cost structure for shipments through Boston gave
New York an even greater' competi ti-ve advantage.
Boston Port interests perceived that the Port was further impeded in the contest for freight traffic by the absence
of independent control over its carriers.

As noted earlier"

the port's three railroads were at the mercy of trunk lines
whose primary allegiance was to rival ports and its majo,r
steamship lines had fallen under New York control.

Boston's

traditional xenophobia, especially regarding New York,
aroused suspicions that the local rail lines were being manipulated to the benefit of other ports and the detriment of
Boston.

Eventually, the Portis three rail carriers came

9xadually "under the domination if not actual control of
foreign railroads ll • 18 The Pennsylvania Railroad owned con~
trolling stock in the Boston & 'Maine and the New York, New
Haven & Hartford.

Boston's di.strust, however, was vented

most toward New York.

The leasing of the Boston & Albany to

the New York Central, aroused the conviction that the local
line was not allowed by its mother line to

gran~

the valuable

induc'ements or free s.ervices to attract traffic that was the
practice of all New York rail carriers.

The Boston shipping

community f,elt that such 'policies were deliberately followed
to minimize competition from the pOrt and assure its status
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as a secondary transportation unit.
All of these development, severing Boston from the
common Midwest hinterland, had dire consequences for the POrtis
maritime commerce.

Since the majority of imports at the time

were coarse commodities such a-.s clay,

fish, ores, brewers rice

and burlap, their transport was influenced by slight differenceS in through rates.

Ocean rates

be~ng

equal, Boston's

outport competitors could attract most of this traffic because
their lower rail import rates gave them a lower through rate
from foreign ports to the American interior.

~his

lack of

western imports, however, was primarily a railroad problem.
The Port had never had such trouble since great amounts of
imports were readily absorbed by New England itself.
roads, without sufficient imports,

we~e

The rail-

forced to send back

west empty box cars that had brought food and raw materials
east.
Unfortunately, the loss of Midwest exports was much more
severely damaging for Boston.

The Portis total foreign exports

of grains dropped from 267,563 tons in 1910 to 136,183 tons in
1929 and to 7,863 tons by 1938.
~t

impossible to load with

carried bulk

impor~

19

grai~

The rate differential made
the tramp steamers which

cargo to the Port.

Since they had to make

an extra moVe to another port for export cargo,

charte~

for imports to Boston were Set higher than those to
phia or Baltimore.

Philadel~

New England manufacturers, reliant upon

imported raw materials, were burdened
expense.

rates

wi~h

this additional

44.
The eff,ect of the differential on liners using BOston
was even more serious.

The' large and constant t.raffic between

U.S. North Atlantic ports and Europe resulted in regular liner
schedules with lowe'r ocean rat,es than t.ramps.
servLce is crucial for any port.

Such liner

T'he essence of a great sea-

port was aptly stated fifty years ago as
" ••. the number and frequency of its wat.er connec~
tion, particularly its over-seas lines. The traffic
that feeds these lines consists of exports and lmports for an extensive hinterland; the port is merely
a gabe t;;hrough which this traffLc passes. 1120

The same holds true today.

Boston, then as now, was a rusty

gate, unappealing to most cargo traffic.
The regular steamship lines out of Boston were forced to
quote lower ocean rates for western cargo in order to compete
wit.h Philadelphia and Baltimore which had lower through rates
based on lower rail rates.

Thus, the differential led steam-

ship companies to load export oargo at ports other than Boston.
The los,s of western grain and Boston IS 'compari ti vely small
amount o'f forei.gn shipments unbalanced the Port's foreign trade
even further.

(Table 9).

A debilitating shipping pattern with

Boston as the first port of call was established and continues
to the present,.

With its great demand for imports, Boston

became the first port a ship would visit to unload much of its
,cargo.

Without sufficient Qutbound cargo available in Boston,

the ship would proceed to New York and then to one or several
of the other North

~tlantic

cargo and take on exports.

outports to unload its remaining
Finally, it would xeturn to New

TABLE 9

PORT OF BOSTON FREIGHT TRAFFIC
(short tons)

1929

"

I

Forei"gn

Classes of Commodities

Domestic, coa'stwise

II

Local

Total

JI_

I
~

...

~~

. ;- -=- __ ;:.a.-.

--

~.~~~--.:

ImfOrts

I
-----"

I

l

Shipren1:s II

Receipts

Exp>rts

I

AnInaIs and animal
~u:ts

96,696

16,939

116,435

743~1578

151,585

76,575

29,229 I

35,72'6

3,465
18,388
22,099

42,052
131,055
422,"671

12,623
55,189

1,449,746

3,714

11,301,764

200,821
5,676
33,.578
27,226

50,659
4,693
28,273
3,305

8,453
4,207
131,194

I

458,302

J

3,261,301

303,120

:12,742,708

I

35,179

36

I

I

315,285

Vegetable food
products

],1,535

1,012,502

other vegetable

prcduct.s
Textiles
I

I

'I

Vbx1 and paper

I

N:::mmstallic
Jlli.ner,als
Ores ,. matals,
manufactures of

I

Machinery

I

Chemical~

UnClassif"ied

I

'TOTAL

253,676
414.,578

I
:

I

OOURCE:

Corps of Engineers, 1929, Part 2.

40,566
913,953
106,540
I

3,682
78,326
436,770

I

:...

93,866

I

-

458,308
938,647

I

38,733

1 549,510 114; 218,687
688
60
8,783
436,-539

3'67,.141
18,318
280,154
1,362,142

1,712,051 1,045,864 19,065,050

~

lJl
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York to complete its export cargo before sailing.
This pattern made Boston a favorable in-bound port but
a horrid

Once this indirect export service

out~bound por~.

from Boston was

e~tablished,

it diverted shipments which

would have naturally used the Port.

The prime reason was the

long delay between when a ship left. Boston, called on New York
and a differential port or two and eventually sailed for
Europe.

Gradually, this unfavorable export service waS extend-

ed to include not just European ports, but most other world
ports likely to r,eceive shipments, from Boston.
This bad situation was made even worse by a vicious cycle
which resulted in a mass defect-ion of local shippers ·to New
York.'

Attracted by the frequency, multiplicity and. direct-

ness of the major port's steamship services, increasingly
larger amounts of New England commodities were exported through
New York.

By the

'19~O's,

about 65% by value of New England

manufactures intended for export moved through New York, while
only about 14% by value moved through Bost.on.
was self-perpetuating.

As Boston

gene~ated

This process

fewer out-bound

shipments, the frequency and regularity of liner service was
further reduced.

This in turn caused more local exports to

sail from New York, diminishing further Boston's abilit.y to
supply oversecas .shipments.

And so it went.

This procedur,e

continues today, despite the higher cost of transporting New
England export products to New York by rail or

~ruck.

So the once great Fort of Boston was redu.ced to the hurni-
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liation of a port of call rather than a majoir terminus of
world trade.

Natural conditions no longer governed the vol-

ume of traffic thaE might be expected geographically to flow
through the port..

This tenacious dilemma was summarized with

foresight when the downward spiral was just becoming obvious:
liThe determining factor is not nearness to
European ports, but inland rates, speed and
frequency of railroad service from the interior
to the seaboard, inter-railroad alliances and
feuds, the relative strength and zeal of soliciting forces in the interior, deep-rooted prejudices
on the part of shippers, rates of ocean carriers,
relative frequency of ocean service, coastwise
services feeding ocean lines, and other such
factors ..• Certain charges and practices at the
seaboard, on the part of rail carriers, have an
influence on traffic moving via the port they
serve. Such matters are mo~e intangible than
geographical location and be beneath the sUIface
of things.,,2l
By 1920, these diverse factors had established the pattern that was to dominate the rest of the port's development,
or lack thereof.

!t seemed that all the historical flaws of

Bostonfs maritime commerce converged, with a little assistance
from the Interstate Commerce Commission, to seal the port's
fate.

This period marked a watershed in Boston's history,

just as the passing of the clipper ships ended Massachuset'ts'
independent maritime development..

Only then, the transition

brought Boston into the mainstream of America's commercial
growth.

Now, it segregated Boston as a languid port wieh an

insignificant foreign trade and a consumptive reliance on
imported bulk materials for its survival.
distinctive -

cha~acter,

It regained a

but this time it was the distinctioB
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of exclusion from ehe gen.eral t';rend of expansion of United
States water-borne commerce.
Though total tonnage increased impressively to a reoord
19,065,050 tons in 1929 1 it masked the unhealthy nature of

p

the portts business.

This growth was due solely to increased

imports of raw materials, especially coastal receipts of coal.
With the loss of western grain and the

moun~ing

desertion a£

New England shippers to New York, Boston's foreign trade deteriorated.

The ruinous texture of the portIs commercial

condition is reflected in Table 9.
After 1929,

u.

S~

total tonnage grew and maintained

an acceptable balance of trade, given the almost inevitable
disequilibrium of modern world shipping.

Boston's total

tonnage, however, remained static, consistently hovering
around 20,000, 000 tons.

Until very r,ecently, it e}Cperienced

only minor fluctuations and the temporary disruptions of the
Depression and World War II.

(Table 10).

Boston's competitive position was further weakened by
labor problems, deteriorating facilities, a rising cost structure and community lethargy.

Burdened with this reputation,

it has lost ground to its competitors.

All other North At-

lantio' ports have shared in the national progress, although
their combined
declining.

~ercent~ge

share of total

u.s.

~onnage

has been

Tho.ugh they have experienced trade imbalances of

about 3 to 1, they are not nearly so acute as Boston's 10 to
1 disequilibrium.

The Port has made substantial gains in

49.
TABLE 10
NE~

WArERBORNE COMMERCE THROUGH

THE U.S. AND THE PORT OF BOSTON 1919 - 1972
(short tons)'
Net Total Waterborne
Commerce of the U.S.

1919'
1929
1932
1939
1941
1943
1945
1947
1950
l 9S1
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
195 9
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
C

c

319[762,727
519,810.,000
2.86,494,000
526,684', 000
623,837,000
546,719,000
605,594,000
766,816,730
820,583,571
924,128,411
887,721,984
923,547,693
867,640,207
1,016,135,785
1,092,912,924
1,131,401,434
1,004,515,776
1,052,40'2,102
1,099,850,431
1,062,155,182
1,129,404,375
1,173,766,964
1,238,093,573
1,272,896,243
1,334,116,078
1,336,606,078
1,395,839,450
1,448,711,541
1,531,696,507
1,512,583,690
1,616,792,605

SOUECE=

Net total Waterborne
Commerce of the Port of
Boston
S,680,243
19,065,050
14,012,172
17,842,212
18,826,770
8,471,046
12,850,522
18(502,902
19,446,897
19,804,814
19,961,128
18,076,260
17,878,336
19,051,715
20,977,834
20,326,258
19,275,022
20,464,817
19,019,567
19,505,936
18,984,380
19,792,076
20,011,441
19,854,695
20,287,217
21,549,086
22,610,760
24,818,746
26,867,918
26,156,517
26,483,438

Report of the Ch~ef of Engineers, 1920, PaTt 3.
Corps of Engineers, 1930 - 1972, Parts 1,2.,
and 5.
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tonn~ge

only recently, but still suffers its abnormally

large excess of imports over exports.
;'

./

'Boston's s'tatus vis-a-vis the ot.her North Atlantic ports
is seen in Table 11.

These comparisons are valid indicators

of the Port's perennial troubles: a reliance on imported raw
materials, especially domestic receipts, and ah insufficient
base for. either bulk or general cargo exports.
The character of Boston' 5 conunodi ty trade has, chang'ed
little. (Table 12).

Petroluem has displaced coal as the

pre~

dominant import, in latter years amounting to 85% of t.he
Ibrt's total traffic.

Scrap iron and tallow have

demean-

ingly replaced the once prestigious grain shipments as the
major bulk exports.

In 1972, of 757,707 tons of foreign

exports, iron and steel scrap accounted for 603,372 tons and
tallow and animal fat for 63,959 tons. 22 Moreover, a~l this
type of import and export freight is handled over private
facilities and generates minimal port revenues. Foreign commerce has also remained depressingly familiar.

General cargo

imports, principally food products, have come to constitute
about 85% of the Port's total general cargo trade.

New England

manufactu.res continue 'to deprive Boston of an adequate o.verseas export medium.
The Port's suspended condition has felt the winds of
change just reoently.

Whether, as with wars and depressions,

this is only a temporary deviation from its deep-rooted,
spiritless doldrums is uncertain.

The Boston Seaport has,

TABLE 12

LEADING FREIGHT THROUGH THE PORT OF BOS'TO:N, 1972

(Short t.ons)

Fore·ign
,

,

Coastwise

Imports
Crude petroleun

I Linestone

salt

, Sugar
II Lumber

Gasoline
Kerosene

Exports

128,195
152,616
212,951
487,691
88,392
91,724
372,204

Oil
Liquified

Gases

Tallow, Aninal
Fats and Oils

63,959

Iron and Steel

Scrap

Gasoline

5,048 , 306

Jet Fuel

610,549

Kerosene

603,372

125,777

Shipments

~I

Distillate
Fuel Oil

982,282

I

!

Distillate
6,429,000
Fuel Oil

Residual
Fuel Oil

residual

Fuel Oil

Kerosene

286,1'62
134;485

Gasoline

lJl

"->

204,612

1-,504,674

I

I,

Residual Fuel

i

I

Receipbs

5,539,538
89,881

COke, Pet Asphalts
and Solvents
105,685
I

I
I

i

SOURCE.:

Corps of Engineers, .1'972, Part l!..
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TABLE 11
TOTAL COMMERCE THROUGH MAJOR NORTH

ATLANTIC PORTS 1938,1948, 1959, 1972
(Short tons)

Foreign

Domestic

I

Port

I

E>q:orts

Inp>rts

I

---

'Ibtal*

1

r

I

1938

Coastwise coastwise
Receipts ShiJ,mmts

I

1 ,798,064
321,445, 11,594,091
Boston
998,674 15,881,487
New'York
11,063,421 6,663,303 30,911,3531 7,074,593 147,655,675
Philadelphia
3,879,817 1,2,08,922 16,471,433 4,598,977
32,265,869
4,821,509
1,310,537 4,959,186 1,712,318
I Bal tirrore
20,451,730
Hampton !bam
826,739 1,992,564
2,332,159 15,888,456 24,083,019

I

1

1948

I

I

I~ton

2,833,9'89
319,772 12,691,170
810,407 18,317,356 II
New York
19,678,027 10,259,918 42,364,833 8,952,384 180,884,287
Phi1delphia 12,712,376 3,863,839 21,389,260 3,370,121
69,471,635
Baltirrore
10,325,399 6,269,976
6,581,868 1,009,617
35,038,546 I
Hampton !bads I 2,144,251 14,360,954
4,405,620 17,067,5,10 40,915,938
I

I

119~_

I

5,975,048
752,234 11,341,538 , 1,179,136
20,464,817
Boston
39,108,306 6,808,863 43,643,002 13,58.2,417 154,155,873
New York
Philadelphia 1 40 ,222,850 2,098,483' 23,457,182 6,598,147
72,376,662
I Ba1tinDre
18,985,569 4,216,912 7,062,026 1,499,726 40,223,607
48,817,998
Hampton
4,600,379 25,172,376
5,79·5,782 6,185,794
I

1

1

1972

~

757,707 14,597,257 1,775,863 I 26,483,438
7,872,977
10,243,429 13,537,963 20,106,413 9,467,539 117,865,396
New York
48,356,885
6,517,654 2,336,433
Philadelphia 21,813,714 2,933,411
45,798,776
18,442,952 8,177,096
6,063,983 1,614,256
Ba1tirrore
Hanpton 58,356,932
169,154
8,743,743 35,647,419
2,481,445

I Boston

1

I

-

9:XJRCE:

*

Corps of Engineers, 1938, 1948, 1959, 1972, Part 1.

Total includes "Intenla1 Receipts curl Shipnents'l curl "U>cal".

II
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however, ,a heritage as glorious as its later repute has been
inglorious.

Its

prese~t

dilemma is obviously not a novelty

in hist'orical perspective.'

But tbe Port's history certainly

offers it numerous instances of stubborn

Yank~e

determination

and proud eraS of commergial supremacy which it could more
profitably emulate rather than resign itself to the more
recent syndrome of frustration and inertia.
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All authorit~ is quite
degrading.
Oscar Wilde
CHAPTER II
ADMINISTRAT!ON OF THE PORT
Introduction
From the mid-nineteenth century on, various administrative
structures were established to arrest the decline and fosteI the
development of the Boston Seaport.

The organization of these

agencies varied, as did t.he administrative power vested in them
and the financial base afforded them.

Eventually the continual

stagnation of Boston's maritime commerce and the insufficient effectiveness of these administrative, experiments instigated the
creation of a modern, independent and powerful Port Authority t.o
guide the fortunes of

~he

Seaport.

Under Chapter 149 of the Acts of 1866, Massachusetts' first
Board of Harbor Commissioners was estabLished.

It consisted of

five unsalaried and part-time persons appointed by the Governor for
five year terms.
done up to $5 a

They were reimbursed expenses for actual work
day~

They were entrusted with the care and super-

vision of all harbors in the Commonwealth.

All work to be done in

these harbors, such as the' construction of bridges, wharves and.
darns, required the approval of the Board.

The Board was given the

power to order cOurt suits on behalf of the Commonwealth, but was
only allowed appropriation expressly made by the legislature.
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In 1877 the Board was reestablished, along with a neW Board of
Land Comrniss ioner,s. 1

'The Board re tai ned its former power and

duties, but was reduced to three persons appointed by the Governor
for three year terms.

In 1879 both of these Boards were combined

into a Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners. 2

Th.e new Board

retained all previous powers and duties and consisted of three
un.salaried persons appointed by the Governor for three year terms.
By 1910 Port interes,ts realized that to ret.ain its competitive
position Boston needed improved and expanded port facilities.

In

that year the legislature appropriated $3 million for the Board of
Harbor and Land Commissioners to purchase land in East Boston
necessary for a railroad line and to construct whatever piers or
wharves were required in the qrea. 3
It was soon apparent, however, that the administration and
development of the Port demanded more attention than t:.he

part~time

commissioners could spare and more statutory power than they could
wield.

Hence, in 1911, "An Act Relative to the Development of the

Port of Boston" established a new boa.rd known as the Directors of
the Port of Boston, the city·s first real Port Authority as now
defined. 4
one

The four members, three appointed by the governor and

appoin~ed

by the mayor of Boston, served for three year terms.

Each Director received an annual salary of $1,000, but the fulltime chairman, designated by the governor, received $15,000 per
year.

The Directors were given unprecedented power.

They were

given charge of all the Commonwealth's harbor proper.ty, and delegated the power to take by purchase or eminent domain, with the
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consent of the governor and council, other property and easements
they considered necessary.

While exemptions from eminent domain

were granted private owne'.rs who planned construction of new port
facilities, the Directors were given broad power to take any land
necessary for connecting rail lines to port terminals.

The impor-

tance of the railroads to port commerce was further reflected in
the provisions to grade and surface railroad locations and provide
track connections serving the piers to any railroad reaching the
area.

The Directors CQuld construct any piers or other public

works and equip them with fireproof shedS, railway tracks, cranes,
mach~nery

and other accommodations.

ister all terminals under state

'They were empowered to admin-

cont~ol,

set rules and regulations

and charge "reasonable" rates for the use of the facilities.

They

were allowed to lease out for up to twenty years, wharves, piers,
sheds, warehouses and other facilities.

The income from these faci-

lities was paid into the general treasury of the Commonwealth.
As important .as these admini.strative functions was the directive
to

~ake·

and execute plans for the comprehensive development of the

harbor, inclUding,
" • . . aoequate piers, capable of acoommodating the
largest vessels, and in connection with such piers,
sui~able highways, waterways, railroad connections
~nd sto~age yards~ and site~ for warehouses and
l.ndustrl.al establlshments."
The Directors were to report to the general court on these plans
and recommend any legislation needed to implement them.

They were

allocated $50,000 for salaries and studies, and $9 million from
the sale of state bonds for other expenses.

Massachusetts had come
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around to the fact that a strong, dynamic well financed administration was necessary for the Port of Boston to compete with the
other North Atlantic ports and develop rather than dissipate its
maritime commerce.
In 1914, the Directors were reduced to three, to be appointed
only by the governor. 6

They all received an annual salary of

$6,000, and all members were required to devote their full time
to Port activities.

Furthermore, the need for solicitation of

exports from the Midwest prompted an appropriation of $10,000 for
a publicity bureau to extoll the virtues of the Port.

This legis-

lative revision increased the powers of the Directors and gave
added impetus for improved port facilities.

By 1915, the Directors

had invested $3.5 million in improvements, including the construction of the 1200 foot long Commonwealth Pier, touted as "the
greatest passenger and freight pier in the world."?

Boston remain-

ed the fifth largest port in the world in total tonnage, behind
only New York, London, Hamburg and Rotterdam, despite rapidly
declining exports.
In 1916, however, port administration was weakened when the
Directorsof the Port of Boston and the Board of Harbor and Land
Commissioners were abolished and a new Massachusetts Commission
on Waterways and Public Lands was established. 8

Though the new

agency assumed the powers, duties and obligations of the previous
boards and superintendents of commerce and engineering were
appointed, the autonomy and effectiveness of the port's administration was subsequently weakened.
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This trend was continued when, in 1919, under a general
reorganization of the Commonwealth's executive and administrative
functions, the Commission on Waterways and Public Lands was transferred to a new Department of Public Works. 9

There, the task of

harbor management was assumed by the Division of Waterways headed
by

two full time associate commissioners with annual salaries of

$6,000.
Wh~le

the steady decline of Boston's relative commercial status

may have been inexorable, diluted port administration did not help
matters.

While Boston's total tonnage did increase, it did so at

a much slower rate than that at competing ports.

Furthermore,

critical exports declined drastically from 1,256,892 tons in 1910
10
to 338,779 tons in 1925.
In reaction to this trend, the autonomous Boston Port Authority
11
It consisted of five unpaid members,
was established in 1929.
two appointed by the governor and three appointed by the mayor of
Boston.

For the first ten years, the expenses of the board were

paid by the City of Boston and were limited to $50,000 per year.
Later the Commonwealth shared these expenses with the city.

The

Authority's powers were severely circumscribed, leaving all management functions in the Division of Waterways.

It's limited role

was to "investigate any and all matters relating to the port of
Boston" and, with the assent and approval of the mayor, to
initiate or participate in any rate proceedings, or any hearings or investigations concerning
12
the port of Boston before any other body or official."
II
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The new Authority was set up as an advisory rather than an
operational body.

Handicapped by lack of funds and power, it

could do little except devise plans and issue reports to combat
the Port's commercial stagnation.

To the persistent dilemma of

an export shortage were added an escalating cost structure,
deteriorating facilities, labor disputes and a general lethargy
towards the port's worsening condition and its likely destiny.
Boston lost an increasing amount of business to its North Atlantic
competitors, especially New York.

Even the trend of increasing

total tonnage was reversed; exacerbated by the Depression, it
dropped from 18,009,186 tons in 1929 to 15,739,926 tons in 1936.
Exports fared even worse, as usual; they dropped from 303,120 tons
in 1929 to 166,090 tons in 1933, and climbed pathetically up to
312,410 tons in 1936. 13

While applauding the Port Authority for

the "splendid work" it had done, such as discovering and calling
attention to the fact that Boston was nearer than Los Angeles to
the Panama Canal, a legislative study commission in 1938 succinctly
summarized the situation:
"This Board up to the present time has been more or
less helpless to correct certain evils which exist
at the Port and concerning which there is a general
opinion that if the Port of Boston is to progress
14
and is to be a thriving port they must be eliminated."
Unfortunately, the study commission felt the Authority would
lose its independence and neutrality if it were given sufficient
operational power and funding to compete with private enterprise.
It concurred with the attitude that the Authority's appropriate
role was advisory and saw salvation only through implementing its
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sole recommendation that two additional members be added to the
Board to stimulate the "port enthusiasm" and "Port s'pirit," the
lack of which it surmised to be the major cause of the Port's
ills.

Although the Board was So enlarged, the study commission

may as

~ell

have recommended a booster

cl~.

In fact, tbough, a new interest in the Port did emerge very
shortlYi World War II, however, waS more responsible for it than
any legislative proposal.

Despite the serious disruption of

steamship services and the

nor~al

flow of commerce, the war y.ears

saw a refurbishment of port facilities and were fairly prosperous
for 8oston.

Under the prevailing emergency conditions, the effi-

cient allocation and routing of ships and coordination of port
activities demonstrated to local leaders the advantages of concentrating certain maritime activities in the hands of a few responsible officials.

Moreover, the unprecedented movement of men and

materials impressed many with the Port of Boston's stature as a
principal national asset during wartime.
This ironicallY parallels the historical United States view,
since the beginning of the nineteenth centtlry, towards i t.s merchant
marine.

Only during wartime has the government recognized the

abgolute requisite for national security of a large and efficient
merchant fleet.

This has always

cons.,truction program.

stimula~ed

a crash, emergency

In the ensuing peace, however, the cycle

begins again and the American merchant marine is allowed to
deteriorate while t.he country's waterborne commerce is carried
in foreign flag vessels.
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Nevertheless, interest in Port was revived, with a view towards
a commensurate commercial role for it in times of 'peace.

This

new attitude was reflected in a legislative report in 1943:
"There is a new interest in the Port in important
transportation circles both abroad and in this
country. Boston is one of the great war ports of
the United States and the United Nations. We believe
it can become one of the great peace-time ports
as well-illS
During the war, various civic groups and maritime interests
devoted serious efforts to Port studies.

They found the Boston

Port Authority, jointly operated by the city and state, with
limited powers, personnel and finances, inadequate if Boston was
to prosper as a seaport.

Their basic recommendation was that it

be replaced by a stronger, more autonomous authority, which, as
a state agency, would be responsible for all phases of port
administration.
As a result, in 1945, the primarily advisory Boston Port
Authority was abolished and a new Port of Boston Authority was
established. l6

The Authority consisted of five unpaid members

appointed solely by the governor for five year terms.

The

operative head was a full time salaried Director with the authority to hire such experts as commerce counsels, traffic solicitors
and rate experts.

The Authority was closely modeled after the

Directors of the Port of Boston, and its extensive powers, duties
and obligations were nearly identical to those of the earlier
body.

It was to investigate all matters related to the port,

plan for port development and exercise the licensing power over
harbor projects previously invested in the Department of Public
Works.
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The only significant differences between the Authority and
the earlier Directors were in the areas of facility, construction
and financing.

The Authority was required to secure a minimum

lease contract for any proposed facility before it was constructed with a bond issue.

Furthermore, bonds issued by the

Commonwealth for port construction were limited to $15 million
and were to be specifically designated as Boston Harbor Facilities
Loans.

Finally, the Authority's finances were further distin-

guished from the state's general fiscal structure by the establishment of a Port of Boston Fund, into which all port revenues were
placed and from which legislative appropriations for port expenses
were derived.
The Authority soon developed an ambitious "Port of Boston
Master Plan" for a coordinated development of port, trucking and
rail facilities into an efficiently integrated transportation
system that would serve an expanded tributary area including
states north of the Ohio River and west of the Mississippi and
the Canadian Provinces.

To implement this plan

by 1950, the

Authority and private enterprises had invested $21,158,857 in
harbor improvements and port facilities, carefully planned along
a functional pattern to allow rapid interchange of cargo between
highway and rail carriers and ships.l?

Hoosac Pier No. 1 was

the first general cargo terminal constructed in Boston in 37 years.
It was followed by the construction of the Mystic Terminal and
East Boston Pier No.1.

A Division for Promotion and Solicitation

was established in 1947 with branch offices in New York, Washington
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and Chicago and successfully acquired for th.e Port significant
food exports under the Foreign Aid program (Marshall Plan)..

An

active Public Relations Division was effective in improving public
opinion of the Port and the Authority helped to maintain sufficiently good labor management relations to avert any major
disruptions.

By 1949, the Port could boast a 25%

in~rease

in

total tonnage' over 1937, the last normal pre-war year.
In 1953, the name of the Boston Port Authority was changed
to the Port of Boston Commission and an advisory council was
' 18
. .
esta bl ~shed.
The counc~l
cons1sted of the mayor of Boston and
20 representatives from industrial, shipping trade, civic, labor
and tr anspor ta tioFi org a,ni zation s .

.A year 1 a ter the legis la t ure

transferred the responsibility for dredging tidelands, shore
protection and other related matters to the Division of Waterways
of the Department of Public Works.
Unfortunately, despite all this attention, the Port of Boston
did not prosper as was hoped.
increase, while the
s~anding

Total tonnage showed no appreciable

import~export

imbalance worsened, not with-

the increased costs of solicitation and publicity.

1949, Boston ranked 37th in exports, among O~S. ports.

In

Meanwhile,

rival North Atlantic Por-ts were increasing both their total and
export tonnage.

General figures for dry cargo exports in 1954

reflect Boston's declining competitive
Boston
Hampton Roads
New York
Baltimore
Philadelphia

posi~ion:

281,000 tons
13,700,000 tons (coal)
4,700,000 tons

3,'500,000 tons
7,000,000 tons 19
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Even minor ports like Toledo, Sandusky and Port Sulphur, Louisiana,
exceeded Boston in tonnage of dry cargo exports.
Boston~s

imports was equally discouraging.

The character of

It was estimated that

the arrival of one general car.go ship represented a total income of
$100,000 to Boston.

Dominated by such bulk

commodities as petro-

leum, coal and sugar, which are handled through private facilities,
the vast majority of vessels arriving at the Port generated only
rninima1 revenues.
By the mid 1950's, there was growing concern about not just
the Seaport, but Boston's entire commercial future.

It was felt

that wi t.hout bold ev,en radical st.eps, Boston never could expect
to assume its proper place as athriving metropolitan center.

A

critical component of this revival was the future expansion and
operation of the areals land, sea and air transportation facilities.
Consolidated administration of these components in a self-sustaining
authority operated on sound business principles was believed to be
the only approach to counter increasing competition and strained
financial resources.

International adoption of various

modifica~

tions of such a system had been expanding for some time:
"The delegation of port administration to a non-stock,
non-profit public corporate agency created by statute
with a legal personality of its own, the right to
hold property, make contracts, adopt budgets, employ
its own personnel, and function with considerable
financial autonomy, is a development of the past
half century which has spread to an increa~~ngly
larger segment of the ports of the world."
In 19aB, the management of the two state owned airports, Logan
International and the much smaller, civil/military Hanscom Field,
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was placed in the State Airport Management Board.

It gradually

became obvious that both the Airport Board and the Port of Boston
Commission were severely handicapped in operating their facilities
as business enterprises by their
ture of the state government.

inclusi~n

in the general struc-

This disadvantageous position seemed

inev'itable if such bodies were subj,ected to competition for funds
during times of scarce resources, jurisdiction divided among several state officers and legislative committees, and the political
requisites of patronage, pork barrels and partisan influence.
Progress was difficul1:: when ,such bodies were enmeshed in
n
•
the intricate and complex web of legislative and executive controls over policYr management, budgeting, financing, personnel and building
construction, all of which are desirable and
necessary for activities of the regular staee
departments and agencies. n21

The consequences of such a situation were manifested in the operation of the state's

t~ansport

facilities: rigid and inflexible

management; constrained decision making and an inability to take
fast action; lack of coordinated and long range planning for an
integrated transportation system; and insufficient funds for
necessary promotion and capital investment.

Boston

cou~d

not com-

pete successfully with such a management and financial structure.
Th,e other major incentive for a self-supporting authority was
the

Commonwealth~s

deplorable fiscal condition.

The state was in

a financial crisis with over an $800 million debt and a recently
lowered credie rating.

While there was a compelling need for an

agressive, forward-looking action program, money was not at hand
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for the required promotion, and expansion of the state's commerce.
Moreover, while the over $100 million public investment in the
two airports and the seaport had to be protected, these facilities
had become an unbearable burden on the taxpayers.

The 1957 dif-

ference between revenues and operating costs for all facilities
was to be $3,890,178.

From 1949 to 1955, the accumulated deficit

for the Port of Boston was $6,372,857.60; that of Logan Airport
was $28,022,105.26; and that of Hanscom Field was $366,667.57. 22
There was mounting pressure to relieve nonusers of this additional
tax burden spearheaded by state legislators from the suburbs and
the western part of the state.
In glaring contrast to this sad state of affairs was the thriving transport system of Boston's nearest competitor.

The self-

sufficient Port of New York Authority, established in 1921, had
already invested $.5 billion dollars in facilities and was
embarked on a development program with another $.5 billion,
$140 million of which was earmarked for marine terminals.

In fact

the Director of the Port of New York Authority defined most clearly the ethos of the international adoption of such bodies:
"A governmental business corporation set up outside of the normal structure of government so that
it can apply continuity, business efficiency and
elastic management to the construction or operation
of a self-supporting or revenue-producing enterprise. 1123
Boston's rival ports had already recognized the value of such
a management scheme and similar authorities were successfully operating in Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, New Orleans and the
St Lawrence Seaway.

Massachusetts had already witnessed the
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effectiveness of such an approach in the construction and operation of the Mystic River Bridge and had subsequently established
the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.
In the process of historical development, institutions
experience

w~dely

different rates of maturation.

~hus,

as

New York was historically ripe for a new method of port management 35 years earlier, Boston's slower evolution resulted in a
much later coincidence of its struggle to relieve its belabored
transportation system and its capacity to adopt a new approach
to this task.

Boston's day, in effect, had arrived.

Despite

heated legislative debate the concept of a Massachusetts Port
Authority had

~he

support of organized labor, civic leaders and,

most importantly, the business community and won the day.

An

emergency bill survived 28 amendments and the Commonwealth had
a new Authority.

An across-the-board administrative, political

and fiscal reform of

Boston~s

transport system was too appealing.

The special legislative commission that studi,ed and recommended
the establishment of the new authority summarized the prevailing
attitude:
"It is a program that envisions large new construction and unlimited job opportunities.
It is a
program which has for its goal the highest and
most efficient uSe of our major traffic, terminal,
transportation, port and airport facilities.
It
is a program of tax relief for the Commonwealth.
It is a proqram that could light the spark for
the economic resurgence of an entire community.lt 24
Under Chapter 465 of the Acts. of 1956, the Massachusetts Port
Authorit:y (Massport) was established, to become effective in 19'59.
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The original legislation was filed in 1955 by Governor Christian
A. Herter, but did not include the Seaport.

Opposed by some

powerful legislators, it was rejected by the Great and General
Court.

A recess study commission was appointed to report on the

matter, and its basic recommendations were embodied in the final
enabling act.

Of the seven members of the Authority appointed by

the governor for seven year terms, one had to be a labor

repre~

sentative,and not more than four could be from the same political
party.

The "body politic and corporate" created was nominally

placed in the Department of Public to-Torks, but was not
" • . • subject to the supervision or regulation of
the department of public-works or of any department,
commission, board, bureau or agency of the Commonweal th. ,,2~.
The Authority constituted a "public instrumentality" and the exercise of its powers was deemed

to be "the performance of an essen-

tial government function."
~ll

state prcrperties in the Port of aoston, Logan International

Airport, Hanscom Field and the Mystic
Memorial Bridge) were

~ransfered

~iver

Bridge (later the Tobin

to the new Authority, and it was

granted expansive general powers, including those formerly held by
the Port of Boston Commission.
operate and maintain all the

It was authorized to control,

proper~ies

given it, and to fix,

revise and collect tolls, rates, fees, rentals and other charges
for their use.

It could establish rules and regulations for these

facilities and construct and acquire new ones.

The Authority was

given the power to acquire by purchase or eminent domain public

and private property, easements or otb.er inter'ests in land.

It

71.

was to devise a plan for the development, improvement and handling of commerce in the metropolitan area, including the construction and operation of a trade and transportation center.

It could

appear in its own behalf before boards, commissions, departments
or agencies, apply for and accept federal grants, enter into
contracts and agreements, sue and be sued, and initiate or participate in rate proceedings or any hearings or investigations
concerning the Port of Boston.
Though these powers were substantial, most pertaining to the
Port had been invested in previous authorities.

The keystone to

Massport's coordinated administration of all Boston's transportation components was the autonomy which only its new fiscal structure could allow.

The Authority's self-sufficiency was intended

to be derived from its power to issue its own revenue bonds, payable solely from user-charges at its facilities, and borrow money
in anticipation of these issues.

Since the Authority's operations

were "essential governmental functions," its bonds as well as its
property were exempt from federal and state taxes, making them
especially attractive and allowing their sale at an interest rate
about 2% lower than' the market rate.

The Authority did not need

the consent of any other state or city body to issue these bonds,
which neither constituted a debt nor pledged the "faith and credit rt
of the Commonwealth or any political subdivision.

The Authority's

financial independence was hoped to stop the drain on the Commonwealth1s treasury, reimburse the state for previous investments
in the Seaport and airports, and generate the money necessary for
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the Authority's operating expenses and future construction and
improvement of transportation facilities.
The Commonwealth transferred to Massport its extensive port
holdings, including Castle Island, the Boston Army Base, the Boston
Fish Pier, Commonwealth Pier, the Mystic Piers, the Hoosac Piers
and the East Boston Piers.

This was not a total giveaway, however,

since the state sought to re-coup some af its losses from these
facilities.

When the airport properties were transferred, the

Authority had to pay the state the aggregate principal amounts
of all previous bonds issued and cash payments made for airport
improvement, ,amounting to $20,972,151.

Furthermore, the state's

earlier .investment in port facilit.ies was to be gradually repaid
by the yearly net revenues from port properties after overhead
and construction expenses and principal and interest requirements.
A total of $17,057,321 was to be paid by the year 2019.
The critical component that allowed the new Authority to meet
these initial obligations was the Mystic River Bridge, a orucial
highway link to Boston's populous North Shore and the entire nor=
theren New E:ngland area" which in 1958, enjoyed the traffic of over
20 million toll paying motor vehicles.

~he

Mystic River Bridge

Authority, established in 19146 to construct and operate the
toll~bridge

was not only self-supporting, but generated an annual

excess of revenues over operating costs of about $3.5 million.
This abundance of user-fees would have retired the Bridge's bonds
and allowed it to become

tol~-free

by the late 1970's.

The esta.-

blishment of Massport, however, altered this arrangement.

The
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Authority was allowed to refinance "the Mystic River Bridge Revenue
Bonds.

It thus acquired the immediate payment for the airport

facilities and the use of the proven, long-range revenue generating abi1itie,s of the Bridge as a secure , initial credit base for
new bond issues to finance the operation and expansion of the other
Port facilities.

In February, 1959, Masspor"t floated its first

revenue bond issue of $71,750,000 at 4-,3/4% interes,t.

From this

it paid for the airport properties, retired $22,160,500 of Mystic
River Bridge Bonds and acquired a comfortable bit of capital with
which to start its operation.

When the other facilities were able

to turn a profit, the "'closed-system'" nature of Massport 's financial structure was strengthened and it had no difficulty floating
additional bonds.
This scheme seemed to satisfy everyone except those Bridge
proponents who had been anticipating the

toll~free

era as a fitting

reward to the Massachusetts taxpayer and a monument to that rare
specie, the efficient public project.
seemed satisfied.

Otherwise, all parties

The Supreme Judicial Court, when asked for its

advisory opinion on the enabling act, found the new body, despite
its corporate appearance, to be in no sense a private or business
corporation:
"It has no stockholders; no person can derive a
profit through its o~era"tion. Only the public
is to be benefited." 6
The Court deemed

that, not only was the bill constitutional,

but its fiscal provisions were
" • . • necessary Farts of the whole enterprise con=
ceived and intended for the maintenance and extension
27
of great improvements whoJLly for the public benefit."
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Everyone seemed to win.

Massport was handed administrative

and financial power and a package of facilities worth about
$237 million; the Commonwealth was rid of a drain on its strained
fiscal resources and could look forward to eventually recovering
at least $38 million of its past investments; and the public,
relieved of a tax burden, could await the commercial renaissance
the vigorous, dynamic, autonomous Port Authority would usher in
through its air terminals, piers and toll booths.
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Between the idea
And the reality

Between the noti.on
And the act
Falls the Shadow
T. S. Eliot
CHAP'l'ER III
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PORT
Introduction
Despite the ministrations of these various boards and authorities, the Port of Boston inexorably declined.

Its economic via-

bility has been questioned and there is uncertainty as to whether
it can emerge from its present state of stagnation.

Behind this

deterioration has been a complex of numerous and interrelated
factors, many of which have origins in the distane past.

The reso-

lution or persistence of these problems will determine the Pore's
future.

Recently, under the aegis of the Massachusetts Port

Authority, there has been a more positive and concerted assault
upon some of the principal dilemmas that impede the Portis progressive development.

This section will deal with some of the chief

components in this process, focusing on their present impact and
the efforts being made to accommodate or alter them.
Part 1 Trade Imbalance
Although the plethora of ailments the Port has ,endured ,are not
unique to Boston, they have peCUliarly combined to exacerbate the
principal malady that has afflicted the Port for most of its history:
77.

78.
a crippling trade imbalance.

Basic economics dictates that no one

makes money ""hen a ship, having discharged its cargo, is forced to
s'ail empty from a port.

A fair balance of trade prevents this to

the greatest possible extent.

Severe imbalances, however, are-a

chronic condition of sea-borne general cargo trades and have
resulted in concentrations of freight movement in large, regional
ports. l
An acceptable trade balance, nevertheless, is a prerequisite
for a heal thy, g.rowing seaport..

It alone can attract majlor ship-

ping; lines which offer the necessary frequent and regular general
cargo service schedules.

This in turn attracts even more freight,

both import and export, as exemplified by the Port of New York, and
also those industries dependent on cheap water-borne transportation.
These scheduled general cargo services not only enhance a port's
competitive stature, but also generate maximum port revenues.

It

has been estimated that North Atlantic ports generate $16 to their
respective state economies for every ton of general cargo handled.

2

The traditional sources of these revenues are the purchases of
stores, water and bunkers, tugboat and harbor pilot fees, pier
charges and stevedore wages.

Even with Boston's small general

cargo traffic, this means about $30,000,000 a year to Massachusetts.
Bulk cargoes, both liquid and dry, usually use private facilities
and so generate only minimal port revenues.
The key to Boston's excess of inbound over outbound traffic
was that the Port was gradually confined to servicing only the
New England economic configuration.

The extent and nature of a
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hinterland served, not limited to just contiguous areas', shapes
the size and char,acter of a Port.

Specialized ports may develop

to handle the predominant product of a large region, as Melbourne,
Capetown and Santos have done for wheat, minerals and coffee.
Great world ports, such as RotterdaJtl, New York and Kawasaki thrive
because of the extent and diversity of the industrial, agricultural
and oommercial needs of their hinterlands.
Boston's initial hinterland was probably artifically large
due to its early establishment as a major port, the physical limit~tions

of the young nation and the manageable competition from

other North Atlantic ports.

-

-

A

It truly served as an entrepot for

the entire country and could draw on the western regions for import
and export traffic.
change, however.

The make-up of this hinterland was destined to

By a gradual but

~exorable

was restricted to a more immediate hinterland.

attrition, The Port
The main forces

behind this process were seen in the Portis history: geographical
disadvantages, increased competition, shifting centers of population, consumption and production, and a discriminatory cost structure.
To appreciate the effects of such a restriction, the waterborne commerce market areas olf Boston can be divided into four
distinct groupings. 3 (see map p.
played a critical role in the

since inland carrier rates

~ort's

criteria for this delimit.ation.

decline, they are appropriate

The four groupings are:

The Bo's;ton port are'a a'nd 'immediate' hi'nte'rland.
This covers R:l1ode Island and Eastern MassaGhus'etts.
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2)' 'The balance 0'£ BbS ton-'s lower inland rate area.

This covers the rest of New England except three
counti.s in connecticut. This and the above area
a're the only areas in which Boston lenjoY$ a rail
and truck rate advantage.
3) The egual ra'te area.
This includes, roughly,
Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and the metropolitan areas,
of Milwaukee, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Buffalo,
. Rochester and Syracuse. No other North Atlantic
port enjoys a rail rate advantage over Boston for
this area, but several have lower truck rates.

4) The balance of the country. In these areas,
Boston's rail and truck rates would be higher than
those of at least one other major port.
As to be expected the vast majority of the Portis import and
export traffic is generated in the port area and immediate

hinter~

land, with a much smaller amount coming from the rest of New England.
The equal rail rate ar,ea and the rest of the country are responsible
for only minimal traffic through Boston.

This is demonstrated by

general cargo import traffic:

Area of Destination

Percentage of All Boston General
Cargo Imports

Port Area and Immediate
Hinterland

79%

Rest of New England

lL4%

Equal Rail Rate Area

4%

Balance of the Country

3%

Source:

R & M (FMC)

~hus,

the limits of the hinterland Boston is able to service

have been closely defined.

The character of this area is more

responsible than its extent for the Port's condition.

Resource
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poor, New England is barren of those bulk exports needed to fill
a ship's hold.

The basic economic structure, determined by nature,

necessity and enterprise, has traditionally demanded huge amounts
of imported food, raw materials and fuel.

With the

ea~ly

excep-

tion of the codfish and the later exception of a biannual apple
crop, the region has o'ffered no consistent, indigenous export base.
Manufactures, in small lot shipments entailing time and profit
consuming excessive handling, did not prove to be the much needed
and long hoped for export medium.
This pattern continues today.

Even dry bulk imports pale

before the complete domination of petroleum products which the
area relies upon to produce its power, feed its factories, heat
its homes, and fuel its motor vehicles and aircraft.

Future indus-

trial development and population growth, the energy crisis notwithstanding, are expected to result in a faster acceleration of
this consumption rate around Boston. 4

The Port's major role a5 a

seaport has become primarily that of a terminus of the life-line
of raw materials from foreign and domestic parts.
The New England states have a s"maller than average proportion
of the basic materials industries, such as petroleum, coal and
primary metals that generate bulk exports.

They do have a far

greater than average proportion of paper, textile, leather and
rubber, and plastic industries which produce expensive but low
volume goods. S

The 'Erend of declining general cargo tonnage in

the Port will continue as, specialized construction of small components, such as the electrical machinery industry becomes an ever

· a3.
more important sector of the local economy.6

It goes without

saying that most of these products a"re consumed domestically and
that of those intended for foreign commerce, 85% are exported
through New York, along with 50% of the area's industrial foreign
import needs.
The question remains: what has been done to alleviate this
dilemma?

Boston's import-export imbalance is an old problem and

efforts to abate it were initiated early.

The thrust of these

efforts has been the solicitation of shippers, industries, railroads and steamship lines., a practice that has become the backbone of most major competitive ports.

Since 1914, solicitation

programs had been executed by the Directors of the Port of Boston,
the Boston Port Authority and the Port of Boston Commissioners.
Notwithstanding increased expenditures, they were generally
ineffective.
The Massachusetts Port Authority inherited a quandary not of
its own making, whose roots--the basic economic structure of
New England--it was powerless to attack directly.

SolicitatiQn r

however, was one of the prime responsibilities assigned it.
Massport" s early policy in attempting to attract new cornroerce,
especially export shipments, fluctuated in seemingly contradictory
fashion.

This apparent inconsistency makes sense, however, if ope

assumes that the way was being prepared, long before public
articulation, for Massport's "master plan'" for the total

container~

ization of the Port, a strategy so intangible, poorly defined and
haphazardly pursued that i~ might be better termed a state of mind.

84.
Massport undertook an initially successful campaign to attract
to 'Boston waterfront industries to increase bulk imports and
hopefully generate some much needed dry bulk exports.

At the time

Boston was seen by many observers to be a potentially important
specialized port for bulk imports. 7

In the early 1960's, progress

was marked by the establishment of the Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates facility for handling molten liquid sulphur, an American
sugar Company plant and three cement companies--Universal Atlas
Cement, Marquette Cement and At:lantic

Cement~-with

coornbined storage

facilities for 222,500 barrels.
Little more was done after this, however, and Massport was
criticized for slackening its pace and not developing and implementing a comprehensive plan for Boston's commercial future.
fac~,

In

in 1973, the Port lost one of its oldest bulk industries

when the Revere Sugar Refinery in Charlestown closed down, deprivin.g Boston of three sugar ships a month. S
Director blamed

th~

The Authority's Port

lack of gains after this initial flush of

success on inadequate site locations and the 7.5% Massachusetts
income tax on busin.ess corpo,rations, the highest in the country. 9
Other ports, however, exhibited more persistent efforts to

a~tain

integrated industrial centers similar to Europort (Rotterdam).
This was evidenced by sueh developments as the Port of Oakland
(Cal.), Industrial Park and the River Gate Industrial District of
the Port of Portland (Oregon).

In retrospect it seemS that Massport's

waning enthusiasm for such industries was as much inspired hy its
vague conviction that the Portis future lay in containers and
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not bulk.

Boston already possessed sufficient bulk traffic and

the Authority correctly recognized that additional cargoes would
generate little revenue for it and most other Port interests.
This reasoning also helps to explain Massport's reaction to
the possibility of renewed grain exports.
was not a panacea.

Boston found parity

In 1956, the Port of Boston Authority, joined

by the local railroads and New York port interests, began a legal
drive to remove the discriminatory rail rate differentials.
effort was carried on by Massport.

The

In 1960, the Interstate

Commerce Commission refused to equalize rates with the "Southern
tier" of North Atlantic ports, citing the greater distances to
Boston and New York. lO

This decision was appealed to the Federal

District Court in Boston, where it was argued that Norfolk was
only 38 miles closer to the Central Freight Association territory
than Boston.

The Court overturned the ICC decision, finding

"the Commission's decision is erroneous in law and lacks the
rational basis to uphold it. ltll

In 1963, the U. S. Supreme Court,

dividing evenly, four to four, on the case affirmed the District
Court's ruling. 12

The eight year struggle had cost Massport

$150,000, but the Port's burden of 86 years had been lifted.
There was understandable jubilation in Boston.

The president

of the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce felt the ruling to mean
"the rejuvenation of Boston's window on the world.,,13
called it

Il

The Mayor

one of the most important judicial decisions in almost

a century, a major victory for Boston which will now have the
opportunity of again taking its position as a major world port."14

The executive director of Massport heralded it as
11 • • • a
pobentially tremendous benefit to Boston
and the entire area and a chance to expand the
Portis marketing area as far west as the
Mississippi. lllS

A $ 25, 00 a sales campai.gn w:as to be fully organized and undertaken
to beat the bushes for Midwest bulk and general cargD.
Feelings were high that for Boston to regain its former
as a grain

expor~er,

sta~us

it needed improved railroad service from the

west based on large, self-discharging freight cars which could
transform a trainload automatically into a shipload, the construction of modern silos and facilities, and the conunitment of a large
exporter.

Nothing materialized, however.

Massport was honestly

unable to find a private investor willing to risk the establishment
of expensive new grain-handling facilities in the Port.

Shortly

afber its invigorating promise of an ambitious grain crusade, the
Authority was roundly criticized for allowing the New York Central
Railroad to prematurely abrogate its lease and shut down the
last grain elevator in East Boston.
of a 3 million

~on

Por~ls

In 1966, Soston lost its share

emergency wheat Shipment to India because it

had no operating grain elevators.

At the time, a Department of

Agriculture spokesman could truthfully say that "Boston is not in
the grain business anymore. 1I16

While established traffic patterns

through other North Atlantic ports were admittedly difficult to
break, Massportls solicitation efforts were miaimal and half-hearted,
inclUding an entertaining but not very productive color-sound movie,
presumptuously entitled, "The Port of Boston-Gateway to the west."17
Massport's actions seemed to belie its earlier words.
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Behind this contradiction seems to haVe been the Authority's
deliberate policy to avoid the futility af a frontal assault on
the St. Lawrence Seaway.

Though grain traffic through all U. S.

Ports, including Boston, had increased substantially in the
post-war period, after its opening in 1959, the Seaway quickly
developed a stranglehold on much of the bulk grain exports from
the Great Lakes region.

u.

S.

Nor~h

While it diverted some trade from all

Atlantic ports, it in effect destroyed Boston and

New Yo,rk, the northernmost, as grain shippers while the I'Sout-hern
tier" continued to ithriv'e,.

('Fable 1)

Massport's assessment of the grain situation proved wise.
Utilizing shipload lots, the Seaway offered lower freight rates
through a longer water-haul.

Not only was the inland carriage

cheaper, but the Canadian Shipping Conference quoted lower ocean
freight tariffs than the American Shipping Conference which governed Boston's traffic.

Moreover, the sUbsidized Canadian National

Railroad quot.ed cheaper rates to St. John's and Halifax than did
the American Lines to U.

s.

coast,al ports, if a full rail carriage

was necessitated by the Seaway's freezing over.

Boston was only

treated to an occasional spill-over from these Canadian ports and
its grain traffic was

red~ced

to a trickle.

Massport recognized the threat this new competitor represented
and filed early protests against the federal promotion of the
Seaway.

In 1962, the Executive Director

sta~ed,

II
• • the
promotion of the St. Lawrence Seaway
is not a responsibility of the Federal government.

TABLE

1

FORE,IGN EXPORTS OF CORN, WHEAT AND SOYBEANS THROUGB U. S. NORTH ATLANTIC PORTS

(short -tons')

co
co

Total Foreign
Exports of Corn,
Wheat and Soybeans,
Th-rough a 11 u. S.
Hampton Roads'
Ports,

Grain Exports
as % of Total
Foreign EXI20rts
Through All
u. S. Ports

Year

Bos,ton'

1959

323,521

420,621

534,642

1,215,914

2,425,37'7

20,442,939

7.5%

1969

10

28,246

365,3.87

451,857

2,666,7'59

37,982,209

6.6%

1972

71

18,248

1,360,667

2,197,008

4,277,551

60,82.8,a.OO

8.9%

New York

PhiladelEhia

Baltimore

Source: U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Waterborne Commerce of the United States, 1959,
1969, 1972.
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The Seaway ports should shoulder their own
responsibl.litief as do o,ther ports of the
United States." 8
This agitation was of no avail.

By 1972, total cargo traffic on

the Seaway reached a record 53.7 milILion tons.
half million tons of grain
ton total bulk traffic.

accoun~ed

Twenty~one

and a

for 47% of the 45.9 million

Windfalls, such as the U. S. - Soviet

Shipping Agreement of 1972 increased the normal flow of wheat,
corn, soybeans and barley through the Seqway.

In the same year,

the Seaway also handled 7.9 million tons of general cargo and 12.6
million tons of iron ore. 19
The Seaway's fUll poten'tial may not yet b'e fully

reali~ed.

The u. S. Congress has funded a three year Navigation Season
sian Demonstration Program.

Exten~

If successful the year-round use of

the Great. Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway through the development:
of sophisticated ice booms seems imminent. 20
Boston's loss of grain shipments meant more than just losing
the $4.24 that each bushel was estimated to contribute to the local
economy_

An industry observer noted that

"
_. the large grain movements, which Boston
former ly had, served to genera t,e other cargoe s •
Sinoe grain needs very rapid movement; the port
which can provide such service aaquires a favorable reputation which helps to attract other
commodities." tl
W~th

just the opposite reputation, the Port has had to hobble along

with exports of scrap iron and tallow.
Besides this pessimism about competing with the St. Lawrence
Seaway, there seem to have been other motives to Mass,port's behavior.
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Besides the differential decision, 1963 also marked the ascendancy of Edward King as the new Executive Director of the Authority.
A strong and dynamic leader, he gave first priority to an immediate
and vigorous development program for Logan Airport; but he also
seems to have been committed to an as yet inchoate design for the
long-term containerizationof the Seaport, which unfortunately had
to be temporarily deferred.

Thus, as with bulk industries, grain

exports may have appeared dispensable and even incompatible with
Bostonls containerized future, barely worth the effort to pry them
from the Seaway's grip.

This notion is supported by the interest-

ing fact that Massport has recently undertaken a small solicitation drive for Midwest grain and even popcorn, now that such
traditional bulk shipments are being increasingly containerized.
Massport's campaign to attract regional shippers of general
cargo presently using New York is part of its total program of
containerization and will be discussed later in a separate section.
Suffice it to say here that its efforts to sell Boston as a cheaper
and faster shipping center than New York, for both containerized
and break-bulk cargo, has been successful in New England and inroads
have even been made in New York state.

The Authority's conviction

that most of the area's high-value, low-bulk manufactures are
ideally suited for containerization must consider, however, the
strength of local shippers' habits to use New York and the increasing competition for this freight from the burgeoning air cargo
business.

Furthermore, Massport should recognize the disadvantage

of delaying intense solicitation efforts in the Midwest, which led
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by Illinois is presently the nation's largest source of both
agricultural and industrial exports.
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Part 2

Petroleum

Most bulk traffic requires specialized, private facilities
and generates only minimal port reve'nues.

Thes'e private vessels

do not necessarily enhance the status of a great common carrier,
conference-liner seaport.

But petroleum imports dominate Boston's

total tonnage and have allowed its only real indispensable function.
The Port could justify itself solely as the terminous of an energy
11f:eline.

Though fuel prices are certainly not low, but C'heap

sea-borne transport and Boston's proximity to the eastern Massachusetts center of consumption, keep them from climbing even higher.
There has been some resentment that New England, especially sensitive to environmental dangers, prefers to use imported petroleum
products and thus preserves its coastline from the threat of crude
terminals"

off-shore oil drilling and refinery-industrial complexes.

The area has not had the best of both world's, however,

During

the peak of the recent energy crisis New England's external souLces
proved expensive and unreliable and the northeast states suffered
the most acute fuel shortages.

This situation could be even worse,

for without immediate and extensive improvements, Boston could be
displaced as a major petroleum por-t.

There is a demand not j'ust

for capital investment, but also for a comprehensive plan that
genuinely considers environmental factors in integrating new facilities ineo an invaluable yet already strained coastal zone.
Though the Port does not have a reputation of facile adaptation to
technological developments and an impulsive st.ampede should be
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avoided, local sentiment of late has been less uncompromising
and there is a possibility of a more realistic accommodation of
progressive conversion.
The New England region has an historical and singular reliance on energy supplies from foreign and domestic sources
inexpensively carried by the bulk trade.

The area has no indigen-

ous resources, relatively cold winters, a high degree of industrialization, a high population density, especially in eas,tern
Massachusetts, and ho pipeline system.

lts imports fall into three

categories of approximately equal size:
1) Gasoline and jet fuel.
2) Distillate fuel 011s--#1 and #2 (horne heating
fuels) oils, kerosene, range oil and diesel fuels.
3) Residual fuel oi1s--#5 and #6 fuel oils for
utilities and industries and bunkers for ships.
In recent years, the market for imported

pe~roleum

products

had growh at an average rate of 1.3% per year,l and indt1!stria.l
development and population growth is expected to result in a faster
acceleration of the consumption rate, especially in the Boston
area.

This pattern of dependence should persist to at least 1985

and more probably till the end of the century, despite recent efforts toward conservation, the discovery of new domestic

sou~ces

and the development of alternative sou:rces.
New England's unique reliance on petroleum products as compared to the

u~

S. as a whole is shown in the following tabulation:
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new England

Unit.ed States

Percentage Residential/Commercial
Energy Needs Met by Oil

76%

Per Capita Consumption of Distillate
and Residual Fuel Oil

12.7 bbl

33%
3.3 bbl

Frederick R. -Harris, Inc., FeasibIlity Investigation: Massport
Out-To-Sea Oil Terminal Syst,-em, Interim Report, (1970), p. 12.
Massachusetts used 52.2% of the entire New Bngland oil consumption.

Seventy-six percent of this or oyer 40,% of the entire

regional supply is consumed within 50 miles of Boston and is distributed from oil brought through the Port.

2

In 1972, Boston

handled 22,838,239 tons of petroleum products. 3

This distribution

arrangement is expected to co,ntinue in the future with increases
in total New England demand and the volume passing through the
Boston Seaport (Table 1).
New England's gasoline and distillate heating fuels originate
in the Gulf of Mexico.

They are processed at the Philadelphia

refinery complex and are carried by u. S. flag vessels to Boston,
where they constitute 2/3 of the Port's total petroleum tonnage.
Since U. S. refineries prefer to use the "cracking process" to
produce the more profitable gasoline and distillate heating fuels,
New England relies upon foreign imports for its residual fuel oils.
Transported ,in foreign ,flag vessels primarily from the Caribbean
basin, it amounts to 1/3 of the Portis petroleum tonnage.
As with most U. S. ports, Boston's oil terminals have been
unfortunately locked into the conveneional Port.

These inner-harbor

TABLE

1

REGIONAL PETROLEUM PROSP..ECTS

%

1968
MST

1975
%

MST

1980
%
MST

1990
%

MST

New Hampshire

5.7

1. 79

5.6

1.92

5.4

2.05

5.1

2.3

Maine

9.6-

2 .. 94

9.5

3.26

9.3

3.46

9.0

4.06

52.2

16.52

53.1

18.2

53.9'

20.4

55.2

25.0

41.1

13.21

42.1

14.4

42.4

15.B

42.7

19.2

Vermont.

3.6

1.13

3.2

1. 23

3.0

1. 25

2.8

1. 27

Rhode Island

6.9

2.17

6.7

2.28

6.6

2.46

6.4

2.9

22.0

6.95

2'1.8

7.42

21. 7

8.07 21. 4

9.5

Massachusetts
Greater Boston

Connecticut

Source: Ab~ Associ.ates, Inc. , The Boston Seaport, 1970-1990,
bridge = Abt Associates, Inc. , 1970) I p. 42.

(Cam-

terminals, located principCilly along the Chelsea Creek and Mystic
River, handle most of the Port's petroleum traffic.

The complex

access routes offer beam and depth restrictions, with mean low
water depths of 35 to 40 feet, and the location of these

facili~ies

presents time consuming turn-around prohlems.
Since petroleum products require special off-loading and storage they are handled by private companies who are responsible for
the redundancy and unsatisfactory condition of the terminals.

At

present 26 facilities c;:Mledby 15 private companies handle 97.5% of
all petroleum tra£fic. 4

Infrequent d~liveries due to such an excess

of facilities have madB oapital investments for improvements
unattractive.

All the terminals are old, lack room for expansion

and will probably be obsolete within ten years.

Though some are

fairly well maintained, they generally lack adequate safety and
oil-pollution prevention .and' abatement equipment.

While the exist-

ing distribution and storage capacity of approximately 13 million
barrels is sufficient at present, with an estimated through-put
increas.e of 2% a year, it will not be a,ble to accommodate all petroleum traffic after 1975.

5

Despite this unsatisfactory situation

and forecast, the large controlling corporations, vertically integrated do not at present need or want public port services.
The character of the tanker fleet currently serving Boston is
equally discouraging.

Boston's facilities were developed to handle

the standa:rd workhorse World War IT vintage T-2 tanker,. of about

16,000 d~t.

Most other U. S. North Atlantic ports did likewise, and

for years their channel depth limitations were no grea1: liabili ty_ (Table 2).
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TABLE 2
PORT AND HARBOR
Port or Harbor Area

C~ABILITIES

Controlling Depth (feet)

Portland, Me.

4S

Boston

40

New York (Ambrose)

45

(Kill Van I<ull)
Delaware Bay to Philadelphia
~hiladelphia,

Pa.

3S

40
40

Baltimore, Md.

42

Hampton Roads, Va.

45

Jacksonville, Fla.

40

Port Everglades, Fla.

40

Tampa, Fla.

34

Mobile, Ala.

40

Pascagoula, Miss.

38

New Orleans, La.

40

Baton Rouge, La.

40

Beaumont, Tex.

40

Galveston, Tex.

36

Houston Ship Channel

40

Corpus Christi, Tex.

45

Los Angeles, Calif.

51

Long Beach, Calif.

52

San Francisco,

50

Bay Entrance, Calif.
Columbia River

42

Entrance
Puget Sound

100-500
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The Federal policy reql:lirement of shipping oil prOducts from U. S.
refineries in tJ. S. built flag vessels has buttressed this unfortunate· pattern for Boston since Philadelphia can only handle
vessels up to 50,000 dwt.

Since only recently have government

construction subsidies been offered for tankers, most; oil companies
have been reluctant; to

bui~d

new U. S. flag tankers. in light of the

fact that it costs. two to three times as much to bl..1,i.ld a tanker in
an American shipyard than it does in a foreign yard.

Even the

foreign trade; with newer and larger vessels, has accommodated
itself to Boston's antiquated facilities by utilizing older and
smaller tankers.

.so the Port's

inner~harbor term~nals

have been

left shackled to approach channels unable to float large tankers
upwards to 35,000 with drafts over 40 feet (Table 3).
The complexion of Boston's present tanker traffic reflects
the· unfortunate size limi.tation and subsequent age necessitated
by its unfavorable terminal sites.

In 1969, approximately 660

tankers called at the Port with the following average

si~es:

Present Tankers Serving Boston
Average American Tanker Size
Average Foreign Tanker Size
Average Size of All Tankers

25,000 cwt
34,000 dwt
29,000 dwt

Source: Frederic R. Harris, lric., Feasibility InvestigatIon:
Massport Out~To-Sea Oil Terminal SY3tem, Interim Report, (1970),
p.

25.
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TABLE 3
TANKER SIZE AND DRAFT
Deadweight
(thousand tons)

Length Overall
(feet)'

Maximum Draft
(feet)

300

1140

80

2.50

1100

62

100

940

50

65

820

42

32

660

34

27

630

32

20

565

30

17

525

30

Source: Frederic R. Harris, Inc., Feasibility Investigation:
Mass~ort Out-To-Sea Oil Terminal ~tudy, Interim Report, (1970),
p. 2 •
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This fleet is composed primarily of converted or jumboized
World War lCI and early 1950's tankers.,
years old. 6

80~

of which are over 20

By 19'80, these ships should all be scrapped and it

is. doubtful that they will be replaced by uneconomic, small

tankers in the 15 to 35,000 dwt range given the low comparative
cost of terminals versus tankers.

Thus Boston finds itself in

a dilemma; presently restricted for the optimum operation of
mode rn tanker tr af f ic, it mus t

somehow accommoda te the,se 1 arge·r

tankers if it is to remain a major petroleum port.

In marked contrast to Boston's situation has been the trend
in world tanker shipping towards increasingly larger ships.
began in the 1950's when prosperity in

Wes~ern

It

Europe and Japan's

post-war industrial recovery brought about an enormous and rapid
growth of demand for petroleum.

In Europe alone from 1957 to

1967, gasoline consumption tripled and consumption of home heating
oil and of industrial fuel almost quadrupled.

As this thirst for

petroleum increased, it became the economic impetus behind the
steady growth in tanker size.

The closing of the Suez Canal in

1956-57, adding 5,000 miles to the voyage from the Middle East to
Eur.ope and the United States hastened this process.

This trend

has accelerated in recent years with further proliferation of the
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automobile·, contihued industrialization and expanding residential
demands, especially in Wes.tern Europe, the U.

s.

and Japan.

The

energy crisis seems only to have made consumption more selfconscious without any significant abatement.
The intense construction

of supertankers during this period

had been predicated on their ability to transport large volumes of
oil cheaply over long dist,ances to meet the growing demand for
petroleum products.

The economies of size intrinsic in these

larger carriers are irresistible.

Since bulk weight doesn't in-

crease proportionately with cargo capacity, the construction cost
per deadwe igh t ton for a 5 a,a0 a dwt tanker is about $ 3 a0, whi 1,e
that for a 500,000 dwt tanker is about $156.

Thus a fleet of

ten 50, 000 dwt ships would cos,t. $150 million while one equal capacity 500,000 dwt vessel would cost $7B million. 7

Furthermore, the

cost per deadweight ton also decreases for manning requirements,
auxiliary equipment, maintenance, power requirements and bunker
fuel.

In consequence of all these factors, the bigger the tanker,

the cheaper it is to transport a barrel of oil (Figure 1).
In response to this economic maxim, the world tanker fleet
has undergone rapid

cha~ges.

It has been occupying an increasingly

larger proportion of the world's total merchant fleet, and the
size of its individl,lal component..s, has swelled incredibly.

Total

tonnage of the tanker fleet is forecast to increase by 4.7 percent
annually until 1990, with large vessels dominating more and more.
In 1971, ther,e were 167 tankers of 200, 000 dwt or over in operation.
In 1975, it has been predicted that 47% of the total tanker tonnage

.
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will be in vessels of 115,000 dwt and over; for 1980 the estimate
is 64% and for 1990 it is 76%.

At present 533 tankers in this

category are under construction around the world. 8

In March, 1973,

Britain's Globetik tankers signed a letter of intent with a
Japanese shipyard for a 706,000 dwt tanker--the largest so fqr in
the world.

Evaluation and preliminary designs have been completed

for a 1,000,000 dwt vessel.

I~

strains the imaginatioh to compare

these- behemoths with Columbus's 60 dwt NINA and the la·ter 180 dwt
MAYFLOWER.

This dramatic and rapid

evolutio~

from supertankers to

Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC's) to Ultra Large Crude

Ca~riers

(ULCC's) is demonstrated in a listing of the periodic record-holders
of .. the world I s largest. tanker"

(Table S).

Since depth limitations in most world ports preclude their
accommodation of these larger vessels, there has necessarily been
a corollary trend towards deep water off-share oil terminals.
Sinc1e 1958., approximately 100

off~shore

have been installed around the world.

mOl"l.obuoy terminal systems

Some are capable of handling

tankers of any size even in severe weather conditions.

There are

about 60 foreign deep water port facilities in operation, under
C'onstruction, or planned which can service 200,000 dwt vessels.

9

A consolidation process is also underway where a single transshipment terminal serves an entire region.

This more developed stage

seems well advanced in the Bantry Bay, Ireland--Western Europe distribution sysbem.
~hese in~ernational

U.

s._

petro leurn scene.

trends have had a profound impact on the

EVlen wi thou t. a modern i zed! , expanded U. S.
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TABLE 5
WORLD'S LARGEST TANKERS

Name

Deadweight

Built

Launched

Sinclair Petrolore

56,089

,Japan

1956

Universe Leader

85,515

Japan

19'57

Univ,erse Apollo

104,520

Japan

1959'

Nissho Maru

.130,250

Japan

19,62

Tokyo Maru

157,290

Japan

1966

Idemitsu ,Maru

206,000

Japan

1966

Universe Ireland

326,000

Japan

1968

Nisse,ki Maru

372,700

Japan

1971

G10btik Tokyo

477,000

Japan

1973

--

Sourc'e: Joseph D. Porricelli and Virgil F. Keith, Tanker's and
the u. S. Energy Situation-=An Economic and Environmental Analysis,
Presented at the Intersocie~y Transportation Conference, Denver,
Colorado, Sept. 24-27, 1973, p. 42.
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tanker fleet, domestic ports will soon be unable to handle the
increasingly larger foreign tankers that seem inevitable.
Predictably, New England is especially ripe for such a system.

In 1970, a study was done to assess possible development

plans for oil proces,sing and distribution in New England ,10

It

found the region1s present system to be in the least developed
phase: a large and growing number of small terminals serving
associated demand centers'.

A more developed phase would utilize

the econQmies of scale of transshipment by consolidation several
individual terminals into larger transshipment terminals, such
aSI Portland and Boston, to serve subregions.

The most mature

phase would be total consolidation in which the entire region
would be served by a single transshipment terminal.
found New England approximately at the

s~age

The study

at which final con=

solidation of its oil distribution system should take place.

A

transshipment center in either Eastport or Searsport, Maine, two
of the few places on the East Coast where drafts of 70 feet can
be accommodated in sheltered waters, was found unfeasible without
a companion

refine~y.

The remoteness of both from the principal

consumption centers would make for prohibitive distribution costs.
Furthermore, later observers have also felt that even a

terminal~

refinery complex in either Maine or New Hampshire, as recently
proposed by Aristotle Onnassis, would initially only sex-vice northern New England, with none of the subsequent benefits of an economic and reliable petroleum supply accruing to the Eastern
Massachusetts population center.
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An alternative off-shore terminal in Boston, however, corresponds to a minimum distribution cost configuration.

Since

transshipment from any terminal location would be by product
tankers and seagoing barges rather than an inflexible pipeline
system, Boston's proximity to the center of consumption would
allow it the least ton-miles to be distributed.

Massachusetts

would thus realize a reliable oil supply with substantial savings
on fuel

cos~s.

The construction of a refinery would further

enhance these advantages.

Besides bare necessity then, there

would be other beneficial reasons to circumvent the limitations
of Boston's existing terminal facilities.
In light of these promising alternatives to counter the
ominous threat world shipping trends posed to Boston, Massport f
in its own inscrutable manner, came to rescue the Port from its
impending downfall as a major petrol,eum distribution Center.
Foreseeing both the future difficulties and opportunities for
the Port, it had commissioned a feasibility study for an off-shore
oil terminal system that was completed in 1970. 11
the projected growth of demand against

Bos~on's

It assessed

physical limita-

tions and also evaluated the area as to the feasibility of a local
refinery.
ma~ket

It found a refinery appropriate since 25% of the local

would support a 100,000 bbl/day minimum size refinery. (rt

took 25% of a market as the maximum that can realistically be a5,signed

~o

anyone company in the intensely competitive oil business.)

Its final reconunendations were for a marine-industrial complex
focused around two off-shore terminals, a pipeline and tank farm
system and a refinery.

The report flatteringly stated that,
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" • • The Massachusetts POt"t Authority, marine
and politically oriented, is considered a practical vehicle to meld and bridge the chasm
between the real needs of the people and indus-

try.

The Massachusetts Port Authority is indeed

in this instance 'catalyst between Commerce and
Industry. ' 11,12
It further believed Massport,
" . . . would be fulfilling the covenant for which
it was established; that is, f~r the benefit of
the people of Massachusetts. Ill,
Subsequent to these heady
two phase,

multiple~user

encomiums , the study offered a

development

scheme~

The first step would

be the construction of a products facility thr,ee miles out to sea
in water deep enough (mean low water of 55 feet)

to accommodate

the largest estimated products delivery vessel (70 - 80,000 dwt).
The two berth island pier would use an expandable pipeline system
to pump the oil to storage tanks leased by the oil companies or
directly to existing

termina~s.

The study saw this project as

economically feasible with Massport constructing it for approximately
$34 million.
tenance~

The total average annual costs (debt service, main-

operations) were estimated at $5.99 million.

By the fifth

year of operation the annual revenues of $6.05 million would be
greater than the annual cost.

By about the tenth year, the deficit

would be paid off and the system would provide a source of income
14
for other improvements.
The second stage was to construct an off-shore crude oil
rec.eiving facility capable of handling tankers in the 300, 000 dwt
class and above.

The proposed two length floating pier would be

located six miles off~shore in 100 feet of water.

The cost, estimated
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be'tween $17 and $23 _million, would be shared by several oil companies and paid for by user charges.

Simultaneously, a private

company would build a $100 to $-150 million, 100, 000 bbl!day refinery.
There were adequate sites for both terminals and land available on
Belle Isle 'for the tank farm and in
refinery.

~he

Lynn Marshes for the

Completing the complex would be the secondary process

industries and the t-ertiary consumer-oriented industries attracted
to the area by the availability of petroleum raw materials from
the refinery.
The pobential benefits from this proposal were

tantali~ing.

The direct delivery of cheap foreign crude, the economics of large
tankers, -the lower distribution costs with a local refinery and
competiti~mong

the increased

oil companies could save the area as

much as $10,500,000 by 1975 in reduced fuel costs. IS
ment in

~he

Direct employ-

refinery and petro-chemical industries could mean 3,000

new jobs with the potential for another 7,500 jobs in spinoff
industries.

Not only would

Masspor~

have another source of revenue,

but the local property tax rolls could be increased several million
dollars.

On top of everything else the entire development would

cost the taxpayers absolutely nothing.

The inherent value of a

reliable supply of fuel, however, was not yet fully

app~eciated

during this carefree, pre-Energy Crisis age.
Massport had seemed to come up with another gem in which all
conoer.ned won.

Its reception, nowever, was less. than enthusiastic,

to say the least.

The

Au~horityls

first mistake was to keep the

report a secret for. two years, a decision compatible with its pen-

lll~

chant for

au~onomous

and exclusive actions, bu.t of no relief to

its sagging public relations image.

The firm which prepared the

study had obviously been well instructed, for it dutifully, but
withQut further explanation, reported in its Letter of Transmittal,
We have prooeeded cautiously with the minimum of local cOntacts . • • the total involvement of
the Port Authority in the Political, Social and
Economic environment of the Greater Boston and New
England Regional Community requires such a course." l6
It • • •

With the report made public, all Massport's Executive

Direc~or

could offer critics as a justification for the delay was that,
II • • •

there was no need to alarm anyone.,,17

The general public was indifferent to the disclosure, except
in East Boston which had long suffered with the nefarious Logan
Airport for a neighbor and was more than slightly paranoid about
Massport.

~hese

residents saw it as the usual plot to impose

another Port Authority project upon the de.fenseless citizenry,
despite Massport's insistence that there were five local communi~ies

that had expressed interest in the refinery.

The proposal was

opposed by many elected officials, especially the ecology-minded
state senator who chaired the powerful Special LegiSlative Committee
on Marine Boundaries and Resources.

He did not mince words, brand-

ing the proposal
" . • • an ambitious plan replete with its own
se~s of contradictions, non ~equitors and rationali'zations so steeped in its own self-interest
that it failed to consider . . . factors such as
national ay~ regional economic and energy
policies. " '
The Governor, a

long-~ime

simply ignor·ed the study.

conservationist and no fan of Massport,
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A~d

rt

~as

so the grandiose proposal never really got off the ground.

put aside to await a more receptive atmosphere.

This new

climate was to be assured by two developments. At tbe time a new
national policy toward oil transport was being implemented which,
hastened by an impending energy crisis which Massport so opportunely
forecast in 1969, was to revive the concept of an off-shore terminal
for Boston.
Despite recent conservation efforts, increased exploration
for new domestic sources and intensified Rand 0 for alternative
sources with no major breakthrough in sight, national energy
self-sufficiency is in the far future.

General consensus seems

to be that to meet growing demands, The U. S. will have to significantly increase foreign oil imports (Figure 2).

Some estimates

set imports at 7.5 million bbl/day in 1975, 9.3 million in 1980
and 11.6 million in 1985, 65% of the total U. S. supply.19

As the

Caribbean basin dries up, U. S. imports wiLl come more and more
from North Africa and the Middle East, not withstanding current
political difficulties, necessitating round trip voyages of 8,400
and 24,000 nautical miles respectively.

Since at present, U.

s.

flag tankers carry only 5% of the total U. S. oil imports, the
U. S. has had to embark on a crash construction program of VLCC's.
Some experts predict that by 1985, it will

~equire

112--80,000 dwt

and 284--250,000 dwt tankers to transport all foreign oil imports
on U. S. flag vessels. 20

The benefits of using such a system to

meet current and projected energy needs until at least 1980 are
obvious.

Not only would the necessary volumes by more assured, but

the economics of VLCC" s would result in significant:: savings.

On

\
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'the Pers,ian Gulf to the Atlantic Coas't run, th-e pe,r barrel costs
for a 50,000 dwt tanker are $,.89 and $.40 for a tanker of
200,000 dwt. 21

In 1985, the cost savings to the U. S. would be

approximately $6 million per day or almost $2 billion per year.
Other advahtages to such a program would be an improved balance
of trade, strengthened national security in times of emergencies,
and the supplemental benefits of increased shipyard employment
and a general boost to the economy.
This new approach to the U. S. tanker fleet was indicated in
the Merchant Marine Act of 1970.

In that year the U. S. had 301

bankers totalling 7,835, 000 dwt compared to a world fleet of 4,144,
tankers totalling 142,652,000 dwt. 22

Enabling legislation, spon-

sored by the Nixon Administration with overwhelming bipartisan
endoresernent, launched the U. S. on a new

~aritime

program.

While

the prime purpose was the private construction of a modern, balanced fleet which would meet the country's needs in both peace and
war, i 1: was significant that, for the firs,t time, tankers were to
come under the subsidy program.
This new policy was soon implemented by the Fed,era.! Maritime
Administration (MARAD) through its program of Construction Differential Subsidy and Operating Differeneial Subsidy.

ThQugh at fir,st

it was difficulc to attract the necessarily large capital investmencs for tanker construction, MARAD soon recognized that vessel
opera~ors

were convinced that the economies inherent in the use of

VLCC's would dictate their use in all possible erades.
felt that building large numbers Of "handy"

Investors

(35,000 dwt) and

115.
"intermediate"
them by

(85,000 dwt) tankers would economically penalize

restric~ing

oil imports to smaller vessels.

Despite any

contrary advantages of flexibility of operation and schedule,
especially in the coastal trade, MARAD's pOlicy is one of accommodation rather than

direction~

"The construction subsidy program is structurally
designed to be responsive to the private interests
who will own and loperate the vessels and invest
60 to 65 percent of the vessel's cost in their own
capital. since operators always have the opeion
of bU~lding and registering their ships abroad, the
government's influence over the number and types of
ships they build with construction subsidy is
cons,tra,ined. 11 23
This increasing commitment to VLCC's is indicated in recent
construction statistics.

Only three tankers were built in U. S.

shipyards in 1973, but ohe was 225,000 dwt and another 190,385 dwt. 24
Of the tankers under contract for construction, eight are greater
than 200,000 dwt and 16 are in the 90,000 dwt class. 25

Const.ruction

applications for 65 additional tankers are pending before the
Maritime Subsidy Board; of these, 42 are greater than 200,000 dwt,
17 are within the 80,000 dwt class and only six are less than
40 rOOD dwt. 26

even

fur~her

This emphasis on larger tankers is 1ik'ely to increase
if a bill pending in Congress to require 30% of oil

imports; to be carried by u. S. flag vessels by 1977 is passed.

A

similar bill requiring a 50% carriage was defeated in the Senate
last year, however.
As the trend toward VLCC' s. intensifies there' is increasing
pressure to construct off-shore terminals to accommodate them.
Most existing

u. s.

ports are limited to 50,000 dwt tankers with a
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few able. to handle th.e intermediate size in the 90,000 dwt. cla'$s.
Since no U. S. port at present can handle VLCC's above 200,000 dwt
(Table 2), off-shore facilities are a necessity if the U. S. is to
satisfy future demands wit.h huge quantities of oil and realize the
economies of size of large tankers.

Since private investors are

determined to utilize VLCC's, to the greatest possible extent, the

u.

S., in effect, has no choice but to receive them in deep-water

terminals.
Currently there are about a dozen off-sbore oil facilities
in the U. S., virtually all of them On the West Coast.

Generally

they are of the monobuoy type in depths of 50 to 60 feet of water.
MOre terminals in deeper water, especially along the other U. S.
coasts are imperative.

Some experts, however, feel that such a

facility will not be located in the Gulf of Mexico until sometime
after 197"5 and on the East Coast only after 1980. 27

Even before

the fuel shortage the. urgency of the situa'tion was expressed by
Pr,esident Nixon:
"Given these considerations, I believe we must move
forward in an ambitious program to create new
deep-wate;r ports for receiving petroleum imports. ,,28
This conviction is shared by MARAD in its Environmental Impact
Statement for itB Tanker

Constructio~

Program which also considers

the impact of off-shore facilities which it views as inevitable
adjuncts.to VLCC utilization.

It concludes that the primary pres-

sure for the construction of such facilities
"

• .comes from both industry and government sources
the very sizeable economic savings
J.n"olved.

~nterested in
1I29
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It predicts that the development of these terminals will alter
the historic port, terminal and petroleum distribution patterns in
the

u.

s~

This national commitment to deep-water terminals has

resulted in the High Seas Oil PQrt Act (H.R. 5898) which should
pass Congress this year, after initial difficulties over the choice
of a lead agency.

The bill basically provides for the licensing

of construction and operation and the establishment of rules and
regulations.

Conceding that f'oreign oil imports will constitute

a substantial part of U. S. energy sources till at least the end
of the century, the House Committee on Me+chant Marine and Fisheries in its report on the bill stated that:
"Based upon the economic and environmental considerations involved, the Committee believes that the need
for off-shore oil ports is clearly demonstrated . • • there
is, therefore, need for the creation of a license system
related to high seas oil ports if the nation is to be
able to take advantage of this transportation system. ,,30
The only stumbling block on the road to unbridled enthusiasm
for the VLCC--off-shore terminal system has been the key issue of
environmental protection.

The Qriginal Harris Study for Massport

identified environmental opposition as a "psychological barrier"
that especially afflicted New Englanders who valued

~heir

scenic

and recreational resources, fought against off-shore oil drilling
on George 'I'.s Bank, ini tia ted quixotic law sui ts such as u. S •

~.

Ma i ne

and rejected refineries of De red by benevolent foreign capitalists.
An inc"re,ased concentration of public attention on environmental
problems and oil spLl1s since the first report led Harris to feel
it necessary to prepare a Supplemental Report one year later on
the potential environment.al impact of its proposed off-shore terminal
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complex.

It put forth the usual contention that such a project

would not interfere with ·the adjacent community environment and
that there would be minimum detrimental effect on the on-shore and
off-shore ecology.

The heart of the a.rgurnent was one which has

now become standard for deep-water terminal proponents, that one
could actually expect
n • • • a reduction in o·il pollution from oil delivered
to a single, ultra-modern terminal designed under
the strictest environmental safeguards to accommodate
larger shipments from deep draft tankers, as opposed
to the present arrangement of deliverin~loil in smaller ships to twa dozen older terminals. 1I -

A high-quality terminal, concentrating all the oil companies
efforts and operated by the Port Authority would not only reduce
the chance of an oil spill, but located off-shore with better
equipment and trained personnel, it would permit a faster and more
efficient containment and collection of any oil if there were a
spill.

Massport later projected the reduction in traffic in 1985

to be from 1 / 140-""35,000 dwt tankers without an off-shore terminal
to 252--35,000 dwt 'tankers and 114--30,0,000 dwt tankers with a
terminal. 32
The envirorunental conc.l.usions reached by ·the Harris Report
and Massport are not isolated.

They have been

substanti~through

extens i ve s'tudie s by the In tergovernmental Maritime Con su 1 t a'tive
Organization (IMCO), the Coast Guard, MARAD, the Army Corps of
Engineers, the Council on Environmental Quality, the University of
Maryland and

prestigi~ consultants

such as Soros Associates, Inc.;

Robert Nathan Associates, Inc., and Arthur D. Little, Inc.

All

these major studies have shown that the risk factor for oil pollution
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is much less with the utilization of VLCC's and off-shore terminals than with the present arrangement of older, smaller tankers
and inner harbor terminals.

In the fine print, however, most of

then admit not considering a VLCC catastrophic spill, a
ation 'which would Itseriously a1 ter" their results.

consider~

MARAD went

so far as to say that
" • . . the chances of all these circumstances being
exactly right for maximum damage and resulting irrevers ib Ie 310n sequences are in "the s ta f f I s opinion,
remote. II
The basic reasoning behiBd these conclusions is convincing.
Even the ChairJllan of the Council on Environmental Quality was. led
to cormneht that
n.In sum, then, the United StateS is go'ing to need
increasing amounts of imported oil. This oil will
be imported in small ships--at greater risk of oil
spills--if deep wate P orts are not available to
serve supertankers."

34

It has been estimated that oil transport accounts for about

1.457 million metric tons or 30% Of the total 4.897 million metric
-eons o,f annual oil pollution in the oceans.

This contribution is

made thrQugh either casualty discharges or operational discharges.
Of casualty discharges, structural failures, groundings and collisions account for over 86% of the total outflow, and with the
exception of structural failures, occur predominantly in the
coastal waters, harbors and entranceways; and at piers.

VLCC1s

and off-shore terminals would dramatically reduce these occurrences
in s'everal ways.

VLCe' s, based on the most. advanced t.echnologica,l

designs, would be far less susceptible to structural failures than
older and smaller tankers.

Since transfers would take place in

deep off-shore ~aters, groundings would be practically eliminated.
The use of a few large ships would also greatly reduce the collisions presently unavoidable in congested, narrow inner harbor
channels.

Thus it can be concluded that supertankers are less

prone to accidents, and that accident proneness is more closely
a function of age than of size.

Furthermore, a spill at an off-

shore terminal would be less damaging than one in an ecologically
fragi.le coastal

marine area.

The end result of these advantages

is that
" . . Tankers 80,000 dwt and larger can transport
a given quantity of oil over a given distance
some seven times safer than tankers below 80,000 dwt,
from a viewpoint of tanker casualties and subsequent
pollution. ,,35
Operational discharges are even more important, however,
since they account for about 82% of total oil outfall from oil
transport, with the following breakdown:
Tank Cleaning
Ballast and Other Oischarges
Terminal Transfers
But both

casua~ty

70%
7%
5%

and operational discharges in the VLCC--off-shore

terminal system are minimized by design, construction, equipment
and operational standards, rules and regulations incorporating the
latest technological advances for safety and pollution prevention,
abatement and clean-up.

These safeguards are established under a

variety of laws and implemented by a plethora of agencies.

These

include: IMCO Conventions and its Subcommittee on Ship Design and
Equipment and Subcommittee on Standards of Training and Wacchkeeping,
the Environmental Protection Agency, The Coast Guard Rules and
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Regulations on Pollution Prevention, Vessel and Oil Transfer
Facilities, the Port and Waterways Safety Act of 1572, the MARAD
Standard Specifications far Merchant Ship Construction, and the
pending High Seas oil Port Act.

MARAD1s more rigid standards

under Section 10 on Pollution Abatement Systems and Equipment
ar'e tactfully urged, but not required because of the present
policy of avoiding affecting a vessel's economic viability in
foreign trade.
The alternatives to such an appealing arrangement are neither
economically nor environmentally attractive for the nation, for.
New England, or for Boston.

Reten~ion

of the present system would

not lower the cost of oil transportation and greater use of Canadian
and Caribbean deep water ports would only increase traffic and
consequently pollution.

Dredging is expensive and would still

limi t a port to 80,000 dwt ships i it pr,esents a dredge-spoil disposal problem and would only increase traffic and pollution.
Furthermore, there has been mounting opposition from both Maine
and Canada to using Eastport, hitherto, the most probable site,
because of the ecological perils to a pristine coastline that the
concomitant traffic of mammoth tankers would entail.

One of the

few pilots now licensed to guide large Ships into Eastport,
Captain Amos Hills, testified at public environmental he,arings:
"The only thing that Eastport has going for it
is deep water; and when that is balanced against
the fog and the currents, there is little to
recommend the place for ta_nke r tr a f f ic. " 36
So in the end, it has begun to appear that the on11 w~y out of their
respective dilemmas for both the nation and Boston is the rising
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tide of Vr.CC's and off-s.hore oil terminals.

More people are

starting to share the perplexity of a leading industry spokesman:
111 am astonished that we are still talking and
doing little for the off-shore systems we will
require, that we are allowing a few objectors to
de~ay actiDn on something that is so important
to the nation."3?

The climate in Boston seems to have mellowed to such a proposal since its initial indifference in the fall of 1972.

The

"psychological barriers ll have been noticeably weakened by the
well extolled economic and environmental virtues of a VLCC--offshore terminal system and the inconvenience of long gas lines and
the discomfort af lowered thermostats.
called for a final $500,000
neers at Harris.

in~depth

In late 1973, Massport

study by the consulting engi-

Shortly thereafter, Massport's Executive Director

bermed an off-shore terminal " • • • More important than ever now
that the nation is in the throes of an energy crisis.,,38
unexpected supporters.

He found

The Massachusetts Congressional delegation

telegramed their endors e ment, calling the plan ". .
vative and deserving of further complete study.,,39

• timely, irmoEven the

Governor1s Secretaries of Transportation and Environmental Affairs
nOw approved it as a "worthwhile venture.,n.40

Eventually, even Ule

unregenerate Chairman of the Special Legislative Committee on
Marine Resources and Boundaries made a proposaL

s~rikingly

similar

to the Port Authority's except, viewing Massport1s state plan as
inefficient and uneconomic, he, along with the governor's most
recent appointee to the Authority's Board, favored a more regional
approach. 41
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In the end, however, it was the Governor
his original indifference, proved the tone

~ho,

overcoming

bell-wnethe~~

In

December, 1973, while his own Energy Emergency Program was being
cut to pieces by a special session of the Legislature, he issued
a "major policy statement on oil refineries" to assure that
Massachusetts was not left out of the planning for terminal complexes then go,ing on for Sanford and Eastport, Maine and Durham,
New Hampshire.
ter~inals

His proposal called for:

1) one or two deep water

owned and regulated by a public agency which would receive

all the crude oil for New England; 2) a regionally owned or regulated pipeline system; 3) environmentally designed inland refineries;
and 4) a public voice in what kinds of petroleum products are
dueed. 42

Since, with

pro~

a few embellisnments, his plan was curiously

similar to the Harris recommendations, the Governor, to his credit,
said his proposal was based in lar,ge part on what Massport had

ori~

ginally suggested.
So now, with bi-partisan encouragement, a second and more
serious and ,expensive study has been undertaken as to the feasibility of an off-shore oil terminal complex for the Port of Boston.
Whether Boston's traditional technological lag will prove its
undoing as the major oil port for New England has yet to be seen.
Petroleum traffic has played a critical role in the Port's recent
history and Gould play an even more important role in the future.
The outcome, decided by necessity, politics or passions, is problem-

atic.
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Part 3

Port Facilities

In Boston, as with many ports, waterfront facilities can be
divided into two broad categories.

First there are the privately

owned and operated facill. ties for handling bulk cargoes.

Whil,e

petroleum berminals were discussed earlier, dry bulk traffic, of
relatively less importance, will not be treated with any depth.
Public general cargo facilities, however, deserve more attention.
Although the condition of terminal facilities and cargo handling
eqUipment has rarely been .a decisive factor in a shipper's decision
to

~se

a port other than Boston, until recently, these important

components of

~he

PortIs image have been a negative influence and a

needless financial drain.
Besides its petroleum facilities, Boston has 9 other private
facilities for bulk commodities, inclUding 2 for scrap metal, 2 for
bulk cement, 2 for salt, 1 for gypsum, 1 for sugar and 1 for mixed
products.

While adequate at present with water depthS of about 43

feet, these facilities face imminent problems similar to those of
the Port's petroleum terminals.

As dry bulk carriers undergo a

parallel rapid increase in size, they will greatly exceed the capability
of the available bulk-off-loading facilities in Boston.

This

in~

compatability will eventually evolve as another unavoidable
predicament fOr the Port.
General cargo facil!i:'ties, however, are of much mOre importance
to any port.

"The capacity and efficiency of the marine terminals

represent the major investment of a seaport in providing for present
cargo needs and also developing its future potential for an expanded
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flow of commerce."l

In light of this, Boston would seem to have

certain advantages.

Its facilities are generally well maintained and

are adequate for the present and foreseeable volume of cargo moving
through the port.

It has an excellent natural harbor and is the

closest U.S. port to Northern Europe.

Its waterfront piers are only

5 to 7 miles from the open ocean, compared to 103 for Philadelphia
and 150 for Baltimore.

New York is also close to the ocean, within

about 20 miles, but Boston has easier navigation due to less congestion.
in

Boston's three major channels can handle all ships engaged

or,~lanned

for general world trade.

It has 259 piers or wharves

along 158,646 lineal feet (30 miles) of berthing space with about 30
active berths for ships up to 800 feet with drafts of 39 feet.
~ort

The

offers more than sufficient related maritime services such as

freight forwarders, commercial banking services, consular services,
and relevant government agencies, i.e.

u.s.

Customs, Dept. of

Agriculture, Food and Drug Administration, Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Despite these advantages, except for specialized operations,
steamship companies don't lease or own any facilities because of the
declining status of the Port and the low tonnage volume it offers.
Boston is not alone in this situation.

Over the last 50 years, the

inability of terminals to operate profitably has resulted, especially
in the North Atlantic ports, in facilities being turned over from
private to public interests for operation, often with the aid of
public funds.

This process has given Massport the ownership of all

but one of the regularly used general cargo berths in East Boston,
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Charlestown and South Boston, which it either operates itself or
leases.

The irrefutable evidence that recent advances in seaport

technology can significantly lower the cost of port operations, makes
this stewardship all the more critical.
Undermining this apparently acceptable situation is the Port's
vast excess of obsolete, inefficient facilities.

In 1968, the Port

Director explained that property expansion projects were deferred
because Boston was operating at only 6% of its potential efficiency.
Rather than lacking pier facilities,
efficiency.2
facilities.

it was 15th among U.S. ports in

A later study more clearly demonstrated this excess of
It found that even with regular container service,

Boston would average only 6 ships per day in port through 1990.

The

probability of more than 7 ships in port at anyone time was set at
less than 5%, and the probability of more than 9 "would conceivably
only occur as a result of strikes or acts of GOd.,,3
Added to this burden of over-abundance was the obsolete condition of most facilities.

Before they were permanently shut down in

1966, Boston's last two grain elevators were antiquated and undersized with a combined capacity of less than 2 million bushels.

As

a result, the loading of a 400,000 bushel cargo, which averaged 12
hours in Baltimore and Norfolk, required 28 hours in Boston. 4

A

more serious liability was the new railroad piers built after World
War II that were soon obsolete in a port where trucks serviced 85%
of the cargo traffic.

Terminals designed essentially for rail

freight are only with difficulty adapted to truck freight and therefore contribute to thehigh cost of cargo handling.
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Another detriment to Boston'$ development has been an extensive
and inefficient dispersion of small size facilities that prevent
consolidation and coordination.

Land transfers are slow and difficult

due to this broad scattering of activities, many of which have
extremely limited and confined access and are remote from cargo consolidation points and junctions of other transportation systems such
as major arteries and feeder lines.

Furthermore, the Port suffers

from lack of cargo security, insufficient truck marshalling and apron
space, and inadequate pier cargo handling facilities.
Given these obstacles to development, Massport has been the
target of two major lines of criticism.

The first of these is that

it has ignored Port investments while lavishing funds upon Logan
Airport.

The Boston Shipping Association, with no love lost between

it and the Port Authority, was constantly flinging such accusations
as "The Massachusetts Port Authority has used twice as much money for
improving an airport restaurant as it has allocated for improving
all pier properties in the port."S
until only recently.

Such charges were well justified

An example of this was the bond issue Massport

floated in 1964, from which $31,088,468 went for airport improvements
while only $1,040,000 went for port improvements.

By its own

reckoning, between 1959 and 1967, Massport invested over $100 million
for capital improvements in Logan Airport while less than $10 million
went for the "rehabilitation" of the Seaport. 6
This policy of reconditioning the Port lent itself to the other
major criticism that the Port Authority was improvidently expending
funds to repair andmainUlin' an excess of obsolete and inefficient
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facili ties while not inieiating any new development projlects.

Some

investments were warrant,ed, such as the million dollar dockside
freezer at Commonwealth
via Boston.

O~hers,

~ier

to stimulate shipments of frozen foods

however, were disastrous, such as the $448,000

reconstruction of Pier 3 in East Boston to accommodate the Challenger
class vessels of the United States Lines, which shortly thereafter
closed its Boston office.

The worst example, however, was the millions

of dollars Massport spent rebuilding its rail terminals, for which
it was justifiably accused of perpetuating inefficiency.

While 58%

of :aos ton's port expend i tur,es went for the repa ir of old f aci I i tie s ,
its rival ports on the North Atlantic averaged only 21%.

While they

had all begun construction programs averaging $50 million in each
port, Boston had not even a plan for such projects.
1960's, Massport was deservingly rebuked:
Authority is the only agency on the North

Till the Late

"The Massachusetts Port
At~antic

Range which has

yet to undertake any significant building program aimed at providing
new facilities for the effioient flow of commerce through the port.,,7
In defense of Massport on the first count, its disproportionate
investment in Logan Airport and relative negligence of the Port should
have been reasonably anticipated given the business ethic the new
Authority was established to pursue.

Because of the nature of its

independent revenue bond financial structure, Massport, with the insight of a good merchant, felt it had to be ce-rtain that its initial
investments were of high quality and promised significant returns in
Qrder to develop a commercial reputation that wou_ld guarantee i t a
receptive market for future bond issues.

As Massport perceived this
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scheme, the critical importance of bondholders and the sensitivity
of the bond market forced it to appear highly attentive to the
interests of its investors while seemingly callous toward any consideration of a countervailing public interest.

Furthermore, as a

later study pointed out, there was a collateral motivation for such
a policy:

"Statutory provisions requiring port profits to return to

the Commonwealth to repay outstanding debts, coupled with the uncertain economic future of the port, have simply made it unattractive
for the Massachusetts Port Authority to allocate large resources to
the Port's improvement.

lta

Because of this complex of encouraging

and discouraging factors, all indications for sensible investments
pointed to airport runways rather than waterfront piers.
Since Massport receives no external financing as do the public
agencies in Philadelphia, Baltimore and Norfolk, it is dependent
entirely on internal resources.
Bridge for a credit base.

Initially it had only the Mystic

Later, however, selective investments

added Logan Airport to this secure base and allowed for additional
bond issues to fund new and more ambitious capital projects.
made good, if not unanimously appreciated, business sense.

It all
Many

attacks on Massport's fiscal behavior as being inconsistent with the
public interest and a just ordering of social priorities are selfadmittedly valid only as an " ex tremely broad critique of the inherent
nature of independent public authorities and the 'revenue bond
cycle' .,,9

The Authority has set out to do what it was intended to

do and its approach so far has been fairly successful.

In its first

ten years of existence it was able to float $204.2 million worth of
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bonds.

Revenues in fiscal 1973 amounted to $24,920,000 from the air-

port, $5,424,000 from the bridge, and $6,796 from the port.

10

Port

expenditures, however, exceeded revenues, as usual, so Massport paid
nothing to the Commonwealth.

In fact, it has run small deficits most

years, which, added to the total port debt, have actually increased
the amount Massport owes the state from $16,752,021 in 1959 to
$17,584,000 in 1973.

In contrast, both the Bridge and Logan have

become more profitable ventures, as a direct result, in the case of
the airport, of capital improvements:
Fiscal Year 1960
Hystic River Bridge
Total Motor Vehicle Traffic

20,744,116

Logan Airport
Total Domestic & International Traffic
Flights
Passengers
Cargo (lbs . )

114,070
2,932,231
57,436,000

Fiscal Year 1973
Tobin Memorial Bridge (AKA Mystic River Bridge)
Total Motor Vehicle Traffic

25,444,559

Logan Airport
Total Domestic & !nternational Traffic
Flights
Passengers
Cargo (lbs.)
Source:

250,000
10,757,000
331,766,000

Massachusetts Port Authority Annual Reports 1960 and 1973.

Not only have Massport's efforts made Logan the world's eighth busiest
airport, but it has turned it into a community asset, one of the
principal factors attracting new business to the area. ll
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As for the early lack of new port programs and the wasteful
maintenance-repair syndrome, Massport was surely remiss.

A new

Executive Director, both for the reasons cited above and for personal
convictions, initiated a policy for immediate airport improvement
with no comprehensive development plan for the Port.

In fact, there

appeared to be little genuine enthusiasm for Boston's future with
either grain or break-bulk cargoes.

Still it seems unwise, in retro-

spect, to spend large amounts of money to simply shore up existing
facilities and half-heartedly try to keep the Port from falling too
far behind its competitors.

Eventually, in the late 1960's, atti-

tudes and actions changed with the adoption of a policy of total
containerizatkm0~ the

Seaport.

Though more progress might have

been made if Massport had assumed an earlier and more aggressive
development program, there seemed to be little sense of urgency until
the Authority, prompted by outside pressures, saw Boston's first
real opportunity to escape its long-time stagnation threatened by
faster adaptation to the new technology of inter-modal transport by
its rival North Atlantic Ports.

Since then, Massport has invested

$2 million in a Castle Island container crane, $25 million in the
Mystic Container Terminal and has plans for an additional $40-47
million container terminal.

The direction of the Port towards con-

tainerization will be discussed more fully in a separate section.
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Part 4

Cost Structure

The main reason for

e~aluating

the Port of Boston's cost structure

is its significance to the campaign to lure local shippers and consignees presently using New York to shift their business to Boston.
Since 85% of the exports and 50% of the imports of the New England
region move through New York, this i.5 no mean task..

The actual cost

per ton of cargo as determined by port efficiency, labor productivity
and vessel turnaround time enters to a varying degree decisions to
reroute.

In the North Atlantic zone, the proximity of several major

ports makes a transfer of traffic based on cost experience to an
alternate port all that much easier.

Studies have shown that the

lack of frequent steamship sohedules, a high pilferag-e and damage
rate, and low labor productivity at Boston constitute the prime
rationale behind the diversion of New England traffic through New
York.

Terminal charges, in this perspective, are not of decisive

import, but they nonetheless are taken into consideration by shippers,
consignees and vessels as to which port can be most economically
patronized.
The most important terminal charges are those for dockage,
loading and unloading, usage, wharfage and demurrage.
levied against a vessel for the us,e of berthing space.

Dockage is
At 25¢ per

ton, Boston's rate is as low or lower than those at the other 4 major
North Atlantic ports.

A relatively low cost item charged to steam-

ship operators, it has little effect on cargo movements or ship
scheduling.

Moreover, Boston's method of assessment based on tons

of cargo loaded and/or discharged is advantageous to a port handling
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comparatively low volumes of cargo per vessel.

New York's system of

assessing about 3¢ per gross registered ton of the vessel, on the
other hand, favors a port where more cargo is loaded per sailing.
An example of this difference would be a vessel of 10,000 gross
registered tons with 500 tons of cargo handled.

The cost in Boston

would be $125 or $.25 per ton at 500 tons, while at New York it would
be $300 or $.60 per ton. l
Loading and unloading charges are for moving cargo from a pier
to a rail car or truck and in some instances includes placing the
cargo inside of the rail car or truck.

The rate of $2.80 per ton

at Massport operated piers is lower than any other North Atlantic
port except Hampton Roads where it is $2.40 per ton at Newport News
and $1.40 at Norfolk.

Prior to Massport's control, the charges of

independent contractors were the highest of all 5 North Atlantic
ports. 2

The complete benefits of this favorable situation, however,

are not realized.

While truckers have either absorbed these charges

in their line haul rate or passed them on to shippers or consignees,
the railroads had always absorbed them.

In 1965, however, the New

York Central and the Boston & Maine stopped absorbing car loading
and unloading charges and began publishing tariffs which covered the
cost of this service.

Boston is the only major North Atlantic port

where rail lines do not absorb these charges on rail line haul
traffic.

Even in New York, these services, along with lighterage,

are absorbed by the railroads and not passed on to the shipper or
consignee.

The refusal of the Boston rail lines to continue this

practice results in the diversion of rail traffic to other ports and
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the displacement of freight from rail carriers to truck lines.
A usage charge is levied against land carriers, especially
truckers, who choose not to use the Port Authority's handling services
and elect to perform their own loading or unloading using the equipment and labor of independent companies.

At $1.25 per ton, Boston

has the highest usage cost of all North Atlantic ports and for a
seemingly self-defeating purpose.

It's believed such charges will

act as an incentive to use the new terminal handling services and
thus give local waterfrontlabor more work.
scheme.

There is irony in this

While Boston's longshoremen must appreciate this solicitous

gesture, it encourages the very situation, i.e. the use of local
labor, which most shippers justifiably avoid like the plague.
Wharfage is a charge against cargo passing over or onto terminal
facilities.

Up to 1966, at Massport and all other piers, this was a

uniform charge to shipper or consignee based on the tonnage volume
of cargo.

This proved to be "a discriminatory and undesirable

practice,,,3 however, since terminal operators, still influenced by
the original ownership and operation of these facilities by the railroads, didn't assess or collect wharfage charges from the rail lines,
while truckers had to bear the fUll freight cost.

With 85 to 90%

of Boston's traffic handled by trucks, this was a glaring inequity.
Massport, with the responsibility to take the initiative in such
situations, devised a new approach to shift the traditional ways and
require full rates for all services performed.

In 1966, under a

new system, Massport facilities began a charge of $1 per ton of
cargo against the

ves~

for both rail and truck carriage.

Other
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operators continued to charge $'1..7'5 per ton against shippers and con=
signees for truck freight but not for rail fre1ght.

Boston has been

the only port to attempt a more equitable distribution of this
charge, a procedure 'Vociferously protested by the Boston Shipping
Association (BSA) , the local trade agency representing shipping
.

~nteres

t s. 4

Establishing tfie-highest

wharfage charges against vessels

of all North Atlantic ports, Massport's new policy ignited an
"ungentlemanly and even childish exchange of accusations."S

It was

feared that such a charge when assessed against the water carrier
might, depending upon the amount of the charge relative to other
port costs and

~olume

of cargo, influence the scheduling of vessels

at Boston and possibly lead to the elimination of Boston as a port
of call.

This has not been the case, however, for since the new

arrangement was inslti tuted, general ca,rgo traffic has incr'eased
rather than decreased.

This was the first vigorous action taken by

Massport in the realm of terminal charges, and in retrospect, it has
been both equitable and successful.
The final charge, demurrage, is a penalty assessed for the
failure to moVe cargo from a pier within a given period.

In Boston,

it is a modest two and one-half cents per hundred weight per day,
but there has been insistent criticism from shippers and consignees
that the five day

free~time

period, the shortest of all North

Atlantic ports, works an unreasonable and costly hardship.
All in dill, port terminal charges in Boston have been brought
to a reasonable level and do not appreC'iably weaken, in themselves,
the Port's competitive position.

Massport has exerted effective
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leadership in this area and deserves the credit for a viable cost
structure at the Port's terminals.
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Part 5

Labor

Labor is a critical factor in any port's development or decline.
Its cost and productivity are the major ingredients in a port's
total cost structure.

Moreover, the quality, consistency and re-

liability of waterfront labor can either maintain existing shipping
or instigate its transfer to an alternate port, and either attract
additional traffic or discourage it.

Though all North Atlantic ports

have experienced labor problems, Boston's troubles have been magnified and traditionally supplemented by certain unique and injurious
labor practices.

Its reputation in the trade as a high cost "dog

port" to be avoided if possible, has persisted and proven difficult
to shake.
Boston has had more than its share of labor problems and their
impact on the Port has been regrettable.

Longshore labor cost is

the primary expense associated with cargo operation.

As such, it

and related costs compose the major consideration in assessing the
comparative costs of shipping cargo through the various North Atlantic
ports.

The use of waterfront labor as a criterion has become even

more decisive since the already high and still increasing costs, both
direct and in-direct, associated with it at all East Coast ports are
prompting steamship lines to consolidate traffic at fewer ports,
and, if possible, solely at New York.

This trend is even more

noticeable among container lines.
At first glance, standard labor costs among North Atlantic ports
would seem natural, given the existing system of labor contracts.
New York is the center of labor-management activity, and the "master
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contracts" negotiated there are adopted by the local branches of the
International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) at all other North
Atlantic ports.

These agreements involve wagGs, hours, pension and

welfare funds, and contract duration and cover longshoremen, terminal
clerks, checkers, tallymen and watchmen.

Local issues are left to

be resolved at individual ports, but most are Ultimately patterned
after similar settlements in New York.

It is the great disparity

among local labor rules, customs and practices, however, that gives
rise to varying levels of productivity and stevedore and longshoremen costs at each port.

As the traditionally bottom rung on this

ladder of efficiency, Boston has maintained the lowest labor productivity and consequently the highest actual labor costs, in most
instances, of all East Coast ports (Tables I and 2).
There are other factors, moreover, which aggravate this situationa

General cargo vessels calling on Boston load or unload

relatively small average shipments.

The tasks of preparing and

finishing a ship, when spread over the entire total cargo, result
in only a slight increase in expense per ton.

When they are required

for a small cargo, however, as in Boston, the increase in expense
per ton is significant.

Boston's traffic also consists of mixed

cargoes of many small shipments.

This entails time consuming changes

in commodity handling techniques and reduced productivity.

Finally,

cargo destined for Boston is stowed differently than New York bound
cargo.

The larger New York shipments are usually stowed in the

center of a hold, where they are quickly and easily reached.

Boston's

shipments, on the other hand, are stowed in the back or on the sides
of a hold, from which unloading requires more time. l
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'TABL,E 1
TONS PER HOUR AND UNITS PER DRAFT
SELECTED COMMODITY TYPES
Discharge Cargo only
Tons Per Hour
Conunodity

Boston

New
York

Philadelphia

Baltimore

Hampton
Roads

General Cargo

13

20

NA

26

28

Burlap bales

26

35

35

38

45

Wool-raw, Aust.
bales

19

NA*

26

NA*

35

Tapioca flour
bags

16

25

23

NA*

36

Lumber

16

29

28

35

NA*

Sugar bags

19

NA*

25

42

36

Avg. discharge/hr.

18.2

27.3

27.4

35.3

36

Source:

Arthur D. Little, Inc., North Atlantic Port Survey: Report
to the Boston Shipping Association (1966).

*Commodity not dLscharged at that port or figure not available.

145.
TABLE 2
STEVEDORE COSTS PER REVENUE TON
($)

Average of Loading Costs - 18-Month Sample Survey
Accessorial
Costs

Port
Boston

Longshore
Costs

Total

6.58

16.54

12.99·
9.52
5.77

5.45
5.0 5
10.01

18.44
14.57
15.78

Philadelphia

9'.74

4.26

14.00

Baltimore

6.00

3.58

9.58

6.24
5.21

3.59
4.14

9.83
9.35

New York
North River (old piers)
North River (new piers)
Brooklyn

1

Hampton Roads
Newport News
Norfolk

Average of DischargiRg Costs - l8-Month Sample Survey
Stevedoring
Costs

Port

Longshore
Costs

Total

7.55

5.36

13.01

12.94
12.50

5.20
5.46

18.14
17.96

Philadelphia

7.97

3.48

11. 45

Baltimore

3.54

3.18

6.72

2.61
2.32

3.91

6 •. 52

2.8 15

5.17

Boston
New York
North River (old piers)
North River (pew piers)

Hampton Roads
Newport News
Norfolk
Source:

A.D. Little Port Survey.
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These elements constitute only a minor contribution to Boston's
unfavorable labor conditions.

It has been the high labor costs and

low productivity that have created the problems with which the steamship lines cannot profitably live.

Vessels costing $4,000 a day to

operate can no longer endure being idle due to labor troubles.

In

1967 alone, 62 ships were lost to Boston and 183 landings cancelled
due to labor difficulties. 2

As conventional vessels are phased out

in favor of container ships, labor inconveniences will be even more
intolerable:

"Ships will continue to be diverted from Boston because

they encounter delays and uncertainties, miss sailing dates and lose
business in other ports. 1I3
This process of attrition would seem especially relevant to
local business lost to New York.

Many observers feel that if Boston's

stevedoring costs were equal to or lower than New York's, Boston
would soon be sought as a port for all the traffic of its natural
hinterland that has customarily used New York.

This is not necessarily

true, for although Philadelphia, Baltimore and Hampton Roads have
lower per ton labor charges than New York, they all lose much cargo
to New York for other reasons.

Nevertheless, in the long run, reduced

labor costs will aid Boston in its efforts to maintain present ship
services, attract new ones and increase its volume of general cargo
freight.
Furthermore, even without an exclusive corollation between labor
cost and cargo diversion, a survey of local importers and exporters
revealed that 3 of the 4 major reasons they use New York are laborrelated. 4

Boston has the worst record on pilferage of all

u.s.
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ports, and since the steamship companies usually pay for these losses,
their increased reluctance to calIon Boston is easily understandable.
Local shippers blame government officials and port management for
low labor productivity and efficiency.

Finally, careless cargo

handling by longshoremen has been both irritating and costly.

It

has been common for them to use grappling hooks indiscriminately on
furniture and damage 20 to 25% of a cargo of special paper by using
crowbars on the rolls.

Such cavalier attitudes are an additional

reason New York seems more attractive a port than Boston, notwithstanding extra land carrier charges often amounting to $2.38 a
hundred weight and $250,000 a year.
Behind this ruinous set of waterfront circumstances lies

~a

long history of labor difficulties, many of which stem from union
efforts to maintain outmoded practices out of a fear of losing wages.
Labor conservatism takes the form of overly restrictive work rules
and general resistance to technological innovation.~5 The most
important of these rules and practices that have historically engendered the underutilization of manpower in the Port of Boston are:
1) Featherbedding - the use of excess personnel, especially
clerks.
2) Shape-ups - a procedure by which dock workers were hired
and gangs formed at eight o'clock each morning. Usually
entailing a delay of up till two hours before actual work
began and resulting in chronic gang shortages.
3) Refusal of longshoremen to work until a full gang was
present. In most other ports, regular gangs worked short
until they were filled through their hiring systems.

4) Practice of leaving work uncompleted on one ship to go to
work on another that offered work of longer duration.
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5) Limited flexibility in job assignments - gangs could not
be shifted from one location or task to another demanding
more immediate attention.
6) Lapping - an ingenius system of continuous work breaks
which kept at least two men missing from a gang at all times.
7) Refusal to palletize goods, although prepalletized cargo
would be handled. Unnecessary break-bulk resulted in extra
time consumption during loading and unloading.
8) Sling loads had been restricted to one ton, whereas one
and one-half to two tons is accepted practice in other ports.
9) The esteemed prerogative of individual members to pick
and choose their hours, the amount of work to be done and
what cargoes theY would and would not handle. No punitive
action was ever taken by the union.
10) Pilferage - highest rate of all U.S. ports.
Local longshoremen consider it an established fringe benefit. Security
has been lax, especially when a shipment of good scotch
whiskey arrives. Further delays result from the customary
walk-out or work-stoppage when an indignant violator is
apprehended.

11) Wildcat strikes - Boston labor has strategically relied
on "quickies ll of about 30 minutes rather than the general
strike which attracts bad publicity. The precipitating issue
is usually over the classification of cargo to make possible
extra wages. Work-stoppages on loaded piers, given the tight
economics of shipping, are usually successful.
With this great a choice of topics to clash over, labor-management
relations in Boston have been understandably rocky.

In 1946, the

Boston Shipping Association (BSA) was established to represent the
carriers in negotiations with the lLA.

By 1954, a new, rational

approach was perceptible on the part of management in contrast to
its prior crusty and stubborn pomposity.

The BSA was gradually

realizing that certain union claims were valid and, could be equitably
granted.

In the end, however, it has not been very much more

successful than its predecessors.

Traditional labor rules and

practices have been grudgingly and superficially modified, but no
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genuine, permanent or comprehensive improvements in Boston's labor
structure have been attained.

Day-to-day operations belie optimistic

waterfront rhetoric.
The relations between management, labor and Massport have not
been as amicable as would be desired.

Massport has charged that the

weak management of the BSA has allowed the unions to perpetuate outmoded work practices. 6

Concurrently lashing out in the other

direction, the Authority's Port Director, convinced labor is
strangling the Port, bluntly stated that "Labor is featherbedding
in every possible way.

Union leaders believe they have a God-given

obligation to put as many men on a job as possible."

To which the

New England Vice President of the ILA smartly retorted:
liar.

If anything, we do better than anybody.

cry all the way to the bank, ,,7

"He's a

They (management)

Meanwhile, all factions have been

roundly criticized on the same controversy by the press:
cat days of the 1950's are over.

"The fat-

No longer can the port, the steam-

ship companies or labor afford the luxury of excessive manning
tables for gangs working ships."8
Two basic issues have hampered cooperative labor-management
relations:

wages and automation.

Wage disputes have been historically

founded upon the dilemma of providing reasonable and adequate income to individual laborers while minimizing employer costs.

The

spiralling cost of living has necessitated periodic consultation and
conflict between management and union leaders.

with automation,

labor's goal of maximum employment is incompatible with management's
efforts to reduce costs by utilizing new technological developments.
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Unilateral attempts to impose

capital~intensive

operations on dock

workers desperately clinging to labor-intensive procedures inevitably
increases tension and strife.
Though some settlements have been reached, a "pattern of noncooperativeness" has persisted that appears to have two historical
roots.

One is the long struggle for existence that longshoremen

unions had to endure, breeding a bitterness toward shipping management that still exists.

The second source is the conservatism of

the shipping industry, which, until recently, has allowed archaic
traditions on the part of both labor and management to harden as in
no other business.

Innovations have generally never been well re-

ceived in the maritime community.
There have also been secondary factors which have abetted poor
labor-management relations in Boston.

The Port's union is considered

I1clos e d" with limited membership cards passed down to members of the
family.

No other North Atlantic port has such a strict barrier to

enrollment.

An inadequate number of union members has, in the past,

necessitated a high dependence on the time consuming recruitment of
"casual" labor.

The average age of union members is 58, with men

of 50-75 years predominating.

Not only can't these men efficiently

work a full day, but their years tend to focus their attention on
their own short-term interests rather than the future welfare of
the Port.

Longshoremen in Boston tend to be more independent and

undisciplined than most, often not honoring the agreements negotiated
by their own representatives and accepted by a vote of all union

members.

Union leadership, meanwhile, sensitive to its constituents,

has protected labor rolls from interference and reduction.
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Despite all these obstacles, some agreements have been consumated formally, if not in practice.

In 1954, the first workable

grievance procedure was established which, through the conscientious
actions of both the BSA and the ILA, has somewhat limited "quickie"
strikes.

In 1966, the traditional shape-up was abandoned and a

central hiring system was adopted.

Under this procedure, longshore-

men would begin work at a scheduled time because of day-before
hiring.

Thirty permanent gangs of 22 men each would commence work

at 8:00 am even if short and a longshoreman would not be allowed to
move on to a more favorable ship.

Union rolls would be opened and

regular gangs with allegiance to a particular stevedore would
eliminate "casualization" of the labor force.

In exchange for these

concessions, longshoremen were guaranteed 1600 hours of pay a year.
All port interests were optimistic that this new arrangement would
result in steadier work and increased productivity.

Soon, however,

management claimed that the union was deliberately understaffing
gangs, and lack of discipline and confusion among the new gangs
actually reduced labor productivity.
In 1969, after more hopeful bargaining and a 104 day strike, a
new agreement was reached.

It was touted as the first modernization

in the Port's labor contracts since 1935, and insuring higher labor
productivity, it was taken as proof that Boston was assuming a
stability of seaport operations which it had not enjoyed in many
years.

Both the BSA and ILA were to be congratulated:

"With the

firm footing of a workable labor contract, they are erasing the myths
of the old Boston, and concentrating on bringing as much additional
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business as possible into the Port of Boston."

g

Behind this opti-

mistic 3 year contract was the conviction of John F. "Red" Moran,
International Vice President and President of Boston's local ILA.
Moran finally decided that the lot of the dock workers could only
be improved by a truce with management that would allow the revival
of the Port.

Thus he conceded not to fight containerization and

agreed that his men would work on the same basis as those in New
York's container terminal at Port Elizabeth, New Jersey.
The 1969 contract largely lifted work restrictions.

It abolished

all artificial sling-load requirements, allowed the full utilization
of pallets and the handling of containers with the use of ship's
gear, reduced the size of gangs and eliminated the minimum manning
requirement.

It gave management more latitude in the numbers and

uses of clerks and gave it the right to shift gangs from one ship to
another or from one hatch to another.

Furthermore, it prohibited

strikes, walk-outs and lockouts, opened the union register to
additional men and allowed management participation in the hiring
hall to insure that all available men were assigned where they were
needed the most.

In exchange for these improvements and limited

cooperation with automation, the ILA's demands were met for 2,080
guaranteed hours of work per year at more than twice the previous
hourly wage.
Unfortunately this progressive, comprehensive agreement has been
undermined by the continuation of the infamous work habits of Boston's
waterfront labor.

Gangs of unspecified number report for work late

and/or short of men.

A gang will still leave a ship without

153.
permission for another that offers longer work und will often leave
a ship before a job is completed.

Inevitably, resort to the "quickie"

strike has been neither abolished nor even abated.
waterfront settlement was even more discouraging.

The last major
In November 1971,

a 58 day strike, during which numerous ships were diverted to
Canadian ports, was ended by a court order.

Its most important

accomplishments were to raise wages to $5.50 an hour and make it
evident that an optimum solution to Boston's labor-management problems
was yet to be found.
The Port's labor future rests upon meeting two requirements:
the employment of the labor force at a level of efficiency which will
ensure economic use of valuable port equipment; and the satisfaction
of the needs of the Boston longshoremen so that the labor unions
will accept such a policy.lO

The unions must exercise wise leader-

ship and impress upon their members the self-defeating consequences
of a vicious cycle in which inefficiency leads to greater costs and
hence reduced traffic.
in port operations.

The rank and file must abide more discipline

Boston labor should follow the example of the

West Coast, where as early as 1960 a Mechanization and Modernization
Agreement was reached due to the progressive union leadership of
Harry Bridges of the Pacific Maritime Association who recognized that
port efficiency can benefit the unions as well as management.

As

for Boston management, in order to make port modernization viable,
it must recognize the right of labor to jobs or monetary compensation, although this approach may be repugnant to traditional business
disciples.
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Opportunities for specific reforms abound in Boston's labor
picture.

Some recommendations which have been put forward include

genuine changes in work rules and practices to permit decasua1ization, labor flexibility and better use of manpower.

An open union

and an intensive training program would stabilize employment,
improve wage practices and working conditions, and increase productivity.

Labor morale could be advanced by steady work conditions,

appropriate pier equipment and productivity bonuses.

Finally, a

mandatory retirement age and generous pension benefits for longshoremen and clerks would enhance the character of Boston's labor
force.

Though inumerable suggestions could be offered within this

general outline of the Port's labor predicament, a few more precise
issues will await mention till a later section on containerization.
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Part 6

New York: Competition & Control

The Port of New York has played nearly as important a role in
Boston's maritime history as any of the Port's various indigenous
cOmponents.

It has been a competitor, model and threat to Boston

for well over a century.

Its influence, both visible and invisible,

proper and improper, has been increasing recently.
of late

for the first time

New York, though

losing ground relative to other

u.s.

ports, may be as decisive a determinant of the future- of the Port of
Boston as any other single factor.
The futility of Boston's struggle with New York began with the
opening of the Erie Canal which initiated the concentration of
traffiC' for ehe western hinterland in the larger port.

This trend

continued and has been recently accelerated as few trades are
sufficient enough to support scheduled, regular sailings and service
must increasingly be on a regional basis.

The spread of containeri-

zation will exacerbate this situation even further.

Along the U.S.

NOJrth Atlantic, Boston, along with Philadelphia, Baltimore and
Hampton R0ads, is an out-port or a fringe-port and New York is the
premier regional and national port.

It enjoys international stature

as a focus of commercial activity and as such attracts huge volumes
of diversified cargo and a multitude of vessels from every corner
of the globe.

Boston, meanwhile, fights for its survival as the

major port for New England and competes with its voracious neighbor
which threatens to deprive it of even this local business.
New York has always been more mature than Boston and, in a
more advanced developmental stage, better prepared to adapt to
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innovations, both technological and institutional.

In contrast to

Boston's belated and bumbling exertions, it had the capacity to
promptly and advantageously exploit the railroad, the steamship,
containerization and a new concept of port administration.

The Port

of New York Authority, a joint venture of the states of New York and
New Jersey, was established in- 1921 and has successfully operated
the port without interruption since then.

It has had 53 years to

acquire expertise and experience, develop organization and policy,
and learn to effectively exercise increased responsibility and power.
During the same period, the Port of Boston has been administered by
5 different agencies, the present one, Massport, the only truly
autonomous, corporate authority modeled after the Port of New York
Authority, still an adolescent.

The Port of New York Authority,

blessed with great internal revenues, has been able to maintain, with
no external funding, a General Reserve Fund equal to at least 10%
of its total debt for continuous capital investment.

Massport, on

the other hand, has had to rely on revenue bonds for investment
capital and only recently has undertaken a major port improvement
program.

Even with this, the scales of respective projects are

almost embarrassing in comparison, as the Mystic Container Terminal
pales before its counterpart, the immense Port Elizabeth

l

N·J'

I

complex.
It is not difficult to understand why New York has been able
to successfully capture and maintain 80% of

N~w

England's general

cargo outbound traffic and 50% of its inbound traffic, which should
naturally flow through Boston.

There are numerous and varied reasons
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that make New York a more attractive port than Boston.

Boston has

a reputation of labor difficulties, the highest loss and pilferage
rates of any major U.S. port, andthe highest cost structure and
lowest labor productivity of any East Coast port.

The port consists

of a proliferation of facilities, most outmoded and decrepit,
scattered over miles of waterfront with congested and narrow access
roads.

While New York's railroads absorb the.- costs of loading and

unloading and the portis excellent lighterage service, the Boston
carriers are the only lines in the North Atlantic that pass these
costs on to shipper or. consigI).ee.

Moreover, New York, as the hub of
sus~

U.S. foreign and domestic waterborne commerce, is more able to
tain a higher level of charges without

affect~ng

position than is a secondary port like

BQstOn~

its competitive

Port costs in Boston

are so close to those in New York that any advantage it might otherwise enjoy has been largely negated.
Many feel that Boston can only compete if it can offer a more
favorable cost structure and better waterfront services than New York.
This is true to an extent.

Recent M'as.sport solicitation efforts

centering around the lower tariffs offered by non-conference general
cargo ships calling at the Port have met with moderate success in
luring local firms from New York.

Variations in cost, however, are

not of major significance to most shippers and receivers in selecting
a port.

Steamship service is the sllqle most important reason among

New England manufacturers for choosing New York over Boston.

Though

able to realize considerable savings by using Boston, local businesses
route their cargoes through New York because of the

advan~ageS'

of
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frequent and regular steamship schedules, an asset largely lacking
in the home port.

With the same price quoted Free Alongside Ship

(F.A.S.} New York or Boston, a customer deciding a routing will ulso
be influenced by these advantages in New York despite higher inland
freight rates.

Another advantage in New York is traffic to and

from infrequently served ports, such as several in South Africa with
which New England firms are doing increasingly more business.

Since

Boston is customarily the first port of call and New York the last,
Boston can compete for imports but not for those exports which it
is always

50

sorely wanting.

This is based upon the time elapsed

between the date of readiness of cargo and the date of departure of
that cargo on the overseas leg.

Boston is in a relatively more

favorable position with respect to elapsed time on inbound services
with an average 7.9 days compared to 2.4 days for New York, than on
outbound services, with 15.8 days to 2.0 days for New York. l
Despite New York's disadvantages of truck congestion at piers and
increased "lead" time for the movement of- cargo, New England shippers
will continue to use the port even if the extra land carrier charge
is raised.

It is possible that, ultimately, the total volume of

New England trade will pass through New York unless drastic improvements are quickly and permanently actualized in the Port of
Boston.
Beneath this not-so-friendly rivalry, has been Boston's
traditional xenophobia towards both Washington and especially New
York.

The local conviction that President Jefferson was out to

destroy New England is paralleled today by Massport officials who
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have considered the Port's principal menace to be "a national maritime policy which dictated abandonment of the Boston Port in favor
of concentrating shipping activities in other areas." 2

But the

most intense suspicion is reserved for New York, whose supreme
financial structure has always evoked parochial resentment and
defensive condecension on the part of proper Bostonians.

Earlier,

the Port had watched helplessly as its shipping lines and railroads
gradually came under foreign domination if not control.

This

indignity was recently resurrected when New York flaunted the
Shipping Act of 1916

and'~he

Merchant Marine Act of 1920 which for-

bid the diversion of cargo from a natural tributary port to another.
With dubious legality, several steamship companies and conferences
began to absorb the additional overland freight charges for transporting cargo to and from New York, thus cutting even further into
Boston's business.

The strategy was ended only after a series of

complaints by Massport to the Federal Maritime Commission in
Washington and the U.S. Federal District Court in Boston. 3
Beneath such surface manifestations, however, lie more
clandestine and invidious efforts to frustrate and even destroy the
Boston

~eaport.

There is a general conviction that the pressure and

control of New York shipping interests has been one of the main contributions to the Port's decline:
"The objective of the New York complex is to concentrate all major shipping activity in the New York
area by forcing Boston out of the picture. New York
shipping interests directly control most of the local
factions which affect the maritime industry in Boston.
They have total control over freight forwarders, a~ents,
stevedores, ship scheduling and routing, labor POa1CY
or the lack of it, rail charges and other costs."
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When Boston's potential as a port threatened to infringe on
New York's convenient and profitable hegemony, the "big squeeze"
was applied.

This took the form of a program of diversions, delays,

cancellations and labor disputes that Boston's Port Director
described as " a cycle of unfortunate conditions generated by New
York maritime interests." S

All Boston shipping companies are based

in New York and many believe that the BSA is dominated by New York
interests and that local labor is manipulated in accordance with
New York's rather than Boston's ambitions.

Under these conditions,

New York shipping companies are felt to have a powerful if not controlling voice in Boston's labor-management pacts.

As objective an

observer as the Federal Maritime Commission has noted that:
"Many of the stevedores, steamship agents and freight
forwarders in the Port of Boston are owned, operated
or in some fashion controlled by firms in the Port of
New York. New York control tends to affect managerial
decisions in favor of the Port of New York, but the
ultimate effects on the utilizat~on of the Port of
Boston has not been determined."
Whether all this is an exaggerated neurosis or a naive understatement, the ultimate effects on Boston may well be decisive.

The

conviction that the decision making processes in the Port are not
entirely independent would tend to dampen impulses toward imaginative
and agressive policies.

Above all, this state of affairs would tend

to further demoralize the already insecure Boston maritime community.
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Part 7

Containerization

Containerization is one of the few relatively revolutionary
concepts adopted by the archly conservative shipping industry since
the Phoenicians.

It takes a simple but novel approach to ocean

conveyance as one integer in a rational and efficienc system of
transporting goods to and from inland sites making

op~imal

the inherent advantages of several modes of transport.

use of

Marine trans-

portation is now considered one phase of production and marketing
with a premium on an integrated scheme of production, overland transport, port terminal transfer and sea-borne carriage.

This inter-

modal method was first looked to as the miraculous, all-in-one
solution to the stagnation of the Port of Boston.

This view may

ultimately be justified; but as containerization takes root in
Boston it not only benefits from the Port's traditional assets and
newly rediscovered enthusiasm, but must also confront its notorious
liabilities and entrenched disposition.

As such, the int.roduction

of intermodal transport in Boston approximates a fairly accurate
microcosm of the PortIs total character.
Containerization, like all industrial or institutional innovations makes demands which not all can meet and offer benefi~s which
not all may enjoy.

The Boston shipping community, despairingly

willing to grasp at any straw, believed the new technology to be the
Portts panacea.

Nhile this pe~spective was myopically unrealistic,

there are many aspects of containerization which appear attractively
applicable to some of the PortIs dilemmas.

with an emphasis on

speed, Boston was favorably located 200 miles closer to Europe than
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any other U.S. North Atlantic port and could afford shippers a
$.30 per ton differential on sea carriage.

The local industrial

products of high value/low bulk, especially small electrical and
machinery components, were easily and advantageously containerized.
Containerization would hopefully improve Boston's inadequate flow of
exports by attracting both new shippers and those New England firms
which customarily use New York.

Its minimization of cargo loss,

damage, and pilferage was ideal for Boston where such incidents were
rampant, and

~ ffiID~t =

lowering of insurance rates would

ameliorate the Port's high cost reputation among shipping lines.
Most importantly, containerization could revive the Port by
attracting new steamship lines with frequent and regular schedules.
It might even break tradition and make Boston a last port of call,
thus offering exporters more direct outbound service.

Furthermore,

containerization would reduce the number of ships in port because
of the more regular service, shorter port time and larger cargo load
per ship call.

This would eliminate more quickly redundant and

obsolete facilities which have yielded little utility while absorbing
considerable funds for rehabilitation and maintenance.

Intermodal

transportation also promised to reduce freight rates by almost 50%
primarily by its inherent technology and the minimal use of Boston's
low productive labor force.

The Port Director estimated that the

unloading of 2000 tons of break-bulk cargo would occupy 5 gangs for
4 days.

With containers, the

~'cost

could be as low as 1/6 that

with conventional methods since the same unloading would require
only 2 gangs and 2 cranes for 8 hours. 1

Potential through billing
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and documentation could be expected to lower administrative costs.
Finally, Boston's arrangement of inland transportation
suited to the intermodal system.

was well

Boston had come to rely on the

motor carrier as its primary means of 'overland transport because of
its speed, dependability, flexibility and reasonable freight charges.
Though efficiency could have been improved, there was sufficient
truck service to satisfy any future demand and superhighways connect
the Port with thruways to virtually all points in the U.S. and
Canada.

Though underutilized, Boston's three railroads offered

equally good service to all sections of the

u.s.

and Canada.

While all these obvious benefits from containerization were
justifiably enticing to Port management, there was little initial
discussion of these facets of containerization which could be incompatible with Boston's defective maritime condition and even
threatening to its development.

These conspicuous disadvantages

were as equally impressive and abundant as the presumed advantages of
intermodal transportation.

First of all, containerization would

accelerate the concentration of shipping in large regional ports,
such as neighboring New York, as enlarged service areas are needed
to generate sufficient cargoes ~)a~e

a more stable cargo flow.

This process is inherent in the intermodal system:

"The introduction

of container ships, capable of carrying twice the cargo each sailing
and of making two to three times as many sailings each year, will
exacerbate the problem (insufficient freight) and emphasize the
need in a very high proportion of theworld's trades to approach
scheduling regionally rather than on a

b~"1 atera 1

b as~s.
.
..2

Though

166.
many feel there is a need for several major container ports on the
East Coast to account for labor closings, congestion and alternate
ports for military use, developments have shown that such ports
evolve into secondary, supporting facilities for a large primary
port.

So, Boston still finds itself in combat with its New York

Goliath with even a possible increase in the vigor of the competition
as an over-capacity in container port facilities seems certain.

This

competition is intensified by the magnified importance of exports,
a rude fact Boston has hopelessly faced for years, since container
ships are highly capital-intensive and demand full bottoms on both
legs of a voyage.

Since container cargoes ar8 concentrated in larger

lots, moreover, small shippers, who constitute the majority of local
concerns using the Port of Boston, are placed at a disadvantage.
Furthermore, consolidation and competition have resulted in a few
very large container shipping lines with more power and control
vested in fewer decision-makers located in a handful of premier
international ports, again such as New York.
A more internal disadvantage was Massport's seemingly inflexible
policy of immediate development of Logan Airport with minimal capital investment in the Port, with most of it appropriated for the
rehabilitation of obsolete facilities.

Large scale containerization

would confront this investment pattern with a demand for an extraordinary and direct application of funds, prodigious compared to
prior Bbrt projects, in order to install the attendant sophisticated
and specialized handling equipment.

Equally important for the new

intermodal scheme is that such specialization required optimization
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of the total transport system.

Though Boston had sufficient truck

and rail services at hand and occupied a central location as to
major highways, its important feeder lines were inefficient due to
narrow and confined access roads, many remote from major arteries
and consolidation areas.

Furthermore, Boston did not have the

advanced control mechanism which is an absolute prerequisite for a
profitable container operation.

Port activities were accustomed to

lumbering along with no coordination of facilities and an inadequate
organization and separation of cargo and vehicular flow.
The most obvious incompatibility, however, was between Boston's
waterfront labor with its notoriety for rock-bottom productivity,
delaying tactics and time-consumption and container ships which demanded an ultra-rapid turn-around time in order to justify their
large capital investment and operating costs.

An efficient, pro-

ductive, reliant, semi-skilled labor force was mandatory for
successful intermodal operation, and Boston could not even assume
pretenses on any of these counts.
Despite these shortcomings, the ball of containerization did
eventually get rolling in Boston, although tardily, as is customary
with the Port's adoption of technological developments.

Massport,

possibly just testing the water for the feasibility of total containerization of the Port, made a small-scale initial venture that
proved ill-advised, frustrating and self-defeating.
it completed construction of a $1.25 million,
at Castle Island.

27~

In June, 1966,

ton gantry crane

It leased the crane, one berth and 10 acres of

land to Sea Land Inc. for 25 years for over $2.4 million.

This move
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was expected to give impetus to a revitalization of the Seaport.

At

first, this seemed to be the case, spurring other companies to
improve their service to Boston and plan for their own container
operations in the Port.
New

~ork

U.S. Lines quickly leased space from the

Central Railroad in front of Pier 1 in East Boston for

container handling and storage.
The promise, however,

~urned

into a fiasco, with inevitable

labor difficulties as the catalyst.

The scheduled inauguration of

container services at Boston was postponed because OI differences
between the ILA and the BSA.

The union demanded 7 clerks as at"Port

Elizabeth and the shippers would concede only

3~

Finally, the issue

was resolved along with several others in the 1966 agreement
described earlier.
No sooner had the dust settled, however, than the local teamsters
entered on the scene and demanded the right to move trailers between
the marshalling area and ship side and insisted on two additional
teamsters employed as mechanics inside the terminal, both functions
normally performed by the ILA in New York.

This jurisdictional

dispute proved impossible to resolve at the local level and the
controversy was sent to higher headquarters in New York in the fall
of 1967.
Not long after lLA President Thomas W. Gleason and Teamster
President James Hoffa reached an accord over these differences, Boston
was plunged into a nationwide strike.

On Ap~il 2, 1969, the 104 day

strike, the longest and costliest ever, was settled.
the Port of

Bos~on

It had cost

about $15 million in diverted shipping and lost
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labor time.

Behind the subsequent 1969 labor-management pact, the

only modernized agreement in the Port for years, was ILA President
John Moran's eventual conviction that labor, for its own long term
sake, must cooperate with technological advances in port operations.
It was an expensive lesson for all side's, but seemed auspicious for
further containerization.
Boston lost more than port revenues because of these labor
tribulations.

They prompted many European lines that had initially

been attracted by the prospect of containerization, such as Isbrandsten,
to turn to New York where extensive container development was proceeding quickly and with no labor problems.

A further blow to the

Port in its competition with New York was the consolidation of four
major European lines - Holland-American, Swedish-American, Cunard
and Wallenius - into the giant Atlantic Container Line headquartered
at Port Elizabeth.

The Port's labor difficulties along with a

general retrenchment among American container companies led

u.s.

Lines to close its Boston office and, after unsuccessfully attempting
to get out of the container business altogether, concentrate on
operations focusing around New York and Norfolk.
Throughout this burlesque of progress, Sea Land insistently
professed that the two principal reasons for its postponing operations
at Castle Island were labor problems and its shortage of available
ships due to the logistics of the Vietnam conflict.

The veracity of

both rationalizations was impaired, however, after the labor situation was stabilized and U.S. Far Eastern activities began to wind
down~

Sea Land still, inexplicably, gave no indication of initiating
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operations.

Finally, in July, 1970, the Castle Island terminal be-

gan service, four long years after its completion.

Soon, one ship

arrived weekly to unload and load 200 to 250 containers for the
North Atlantic, Puerto Rican and intercoastal trades.

Not long

thereafter, however, Sea Land announced the closing of its Castle
Island terminal.

The company claimed the $1 per container surcharge

it was required to contribute to the longshoreman's

pension fund made

Boston more expensive to operate in than other North Atlantic ports.
It took three weeks of negotiation among Sea Land, the lLA, and the
BSA before an agreement was reached whereby Sea Land could assess
a usage fee to offset the surcharge.
These shipping antics, while amusing to a detached observer,
had serious consequences, as container traffic was increasingly
diverted from Boston to New York and a concentration, which although
possibly unavoidable, was accelerated.

Many in Boston's shipping

community saw these developments less as a confluence of natural
forces and more as the habitual machinations of its gluttonous rival
to the south.

They felt that the Port could have established itself

as a leading container center if not for "foreign" instigation of
delays, labor troubles and frustrations.

Some felt containers were

induced to move through New York. by the "questionably legal means"
of absorbing the higher overland freight charges to New York for
New England cargoes. 3

Others hinted that the President of the BSA,

a branch manager of the New York based U.S. Lines, was "somehow
responsible" for the Portis labor

d~sputes

and delayed settlement.

Finally, even Sea Land was exposed as a villian.

One explanation
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that gained local favor as to why the Castle Island terminal was not
used was that Sea Land was protecting its real interests in its
major container facilities in New York.

By retaining exclusive

rights to Bos.ton "s only container t.erminal w'i th no cQmIl\i tm.ent to use
it., the company could in effect control, at least temporarily,
competition to it.s New York operations from the Port of Boston.

This

design was enhanced by the fact that the Boston facility was built
to a size module that would not fit containers of other shipping
companies. 4
Despite these

frustrat~ons,

Massport was convinced more

~han

ever t.hat the Port's future lay in increased oontainerization.
Amidst mounting public support for an alternative utilization of
harbour resources for urban renewal and recreat.ion, Massport took a
calculated risk to develop a modern seaport while minimizing damage
to other harbor developments.

With the 1969 labor contract on port

modernization, which seemed to assure a dependable labor force, and
the prospect of expanded

containeri~ation of

the Port, many of the

shipping lines which had earlier abandoned Boston were once again
attracted to it.
~pe"

Four container lines began regular service from

the Meditteranean and

~he

Far East and a fifth planned

service from Australia and New Zealand as soon as expanded facilities
were offered.

Meanwhile, Massport's conseruction of a new container

t:erminal in Charlestown erupted in a public row wit.h the Bos·ton
Redevelopment Authority (BRA).

The BRA claimed Massport was operating

in an urban renewal area and" was endangering a latrg·er development
plan without coordinating or clearing its plans with the BRA. S
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Although the BRA's indignation and opposition were predestined to
futility given the Port Authority's autonomy and indifference, the
incident nevertheless tarnished Massport's already mottled public
relations image.
Antici.pation over the new project cont.inued unabated, however,
and hopes for Port rejluvenation abounded.

In the early summer of

19'71, Massport could confidently state: "Although general cargo has
been declining, it got worse more slowly in 1970.
the turning point.

The opening of

~

world's

This year will be

largest container

crane in early July will produce a dramatic increase in tonnage." 6
Soon thereafter, Massport's first major capital investment in the
Port came to fruition.

In July, 1971, the Boston-Mystic Public

Container Terminal (later redesignated

~he

John F. Moran Terminal

in honor of the deceased ILA President) began operations under Massport.

The $25 million, 45 acre terminal has 1100 ft. of berth space.

The 70 ton Hi-tachi crane is th.e world's largest capacity dockside
general purpose and container crane and is supplemented by a 45 ton
capacity Paceco container crane.

Together the cranes can move up

to 60 containers an hour from one or two vessels.

The exultant greeting

of this new Port addition can only be compared with the hollow
rhetoric that followed the lifting of the railroad rate
in 1963.

different~al

John Larkin Thompson, former Port Authority Chairman saw

Boston facing "probably the single greatest maritime opportunity in
50 years."?

Edward Dalton, New England Vice President of the ILA,

more prosaically stat:ed, "We're back in the ball game. uS
So far, these claims do not appear to have been overly exagerrated ,
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as the dramatic increase in container traffic in Table 1 indicates.
The trend in fact seems to be accelerating; the Moran Terminal
handled 59,000 tons of cargo in the first two months of 1974, more
than double than was handled by the facility in the same period last
year.

More promising, export cargo, long scarce in Boston, climbed

to 153,000 tons in 1973, compared with 89,000 tons in 1972. 9

All

North Atlantic ports have shared this rise in exports due to a marked
increase in the demand for American products overseas which stems
from the devaluation of the dollar in mid-1973.
patterns is reflected in the 1973

u.s.

This shift in trade

$1.7 billion surplus in its

import-export balance, thereby reversing a trend of several years. 10
This abundance of exports also results from domestic price controls
which make exports more attractive and have induced many American
firms to open overseas offices to escape these restraints.

In Boston

these factors have produced the unique situation of export cargo
growing at a pace faster than the shipping lines can cope with it.
The president of a leading Boston shipping agency has said, "We are
at the point now where you cannot get space on some runs for six
weeks.

There just are not enough ships to handle the growth of

cargo."ll
This abundance of freight must also be accredited to the success
of Massport extensive solicitation efforts.

While it has concen-

trated on enticing New England shippers back from New York, it has
also made inroads in New York State.

Massport is also developing a

consolidation system for Less than Container Loads (LCL's) to offer
the many, small local shippers the maximum benefits of containerization.
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TABLE 1

CONTAINER TRAFFIC IN THE PORT OF BOSTON
CONTAINERS HANDLED
(Expressed in Twenty-foot Equivalent Units)
Imported

E:x:porbed

1971

22,704

19,768

42,472

1972

35·,170

24,424

59,594

1973*

41,178

32,192

73,970

Total

CONTAINER 'TONNAGE
(Expre'ssed in Short T'ons)
Imported

Exported

1971

211,519

144,799

356,318

1972

298,139

159,664

457,803

1973*

340,864

201,288

542,152

Source:

Total

Massachusetts Port Authority '1973 Annual Report.

*Estimated, based onnine months' figures.
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It is also proffering to local liquor and bottling cOncerns an
imaginative method of containerizing scotch whiskey and European
wines to the disgruntlement of thirsty dockworkers.

Massport has

been rewarded for its efforts by a marked improvement of steamship
service to the Port.

A total of 24 regularly scheduled lines call

on Boston, 5 carriers of which are on a weekly basis.
are attracted to the

~ort

Other ships,

as an "inducement basis" dependent on the

needs of local shippers.
Less encouraging has been the local labor reaction which has
not been as stable as was hoped.

There has been one major strike

and productivity is not yet optimum as the longshoremen have not
completely abandoned their old work habits.

Boston is developing a

more reliable, semi-skilled labor force, however, which has even
been willing to work nights for the first time in the Port's history
when cargo volume demanded it.
The Terminal itself has already been operationally improved.
A control tower similar to those at airports has been erected to
coordinate activities through a communications system linked to the
ships, the cranes and the marshalling carriers.

A fully computerized

inventory control system is scheduled for June, 1974, to 'maximize
efficiency, speed of handling and security.
The new Container Terminal has not been without its problems,
however.

Having

r~hed

its capacity three years earlier than

expected, it is now hampered by congestion difficulties including
inadequate access and truck marshalling and storage areaS.

Recently

the Authority voted to expand the Terminal's back-Up or storage area
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for containers by 19 more acres through the reacquisition of 8 acres
from a scrap steel exporter and the purchase of 11 acres from the
Boston and Maine Railroad.
an

anticipa~ed

This expansion is designed to accomodate

growth in container traffic through 1978.

Trucking

problems have also become apparent with a great need for more chassis
and pre-mounted containers and improved compatability of truckers'
hours and terminal operational hours.

Trucking rates, moreOver,

remain structured for New York and local carriers are working to
expand the Container Rate Concept.

The Terminal has also experienced

equipment failur-e stenuning from overuse and there is
ment that it lacks

adequa~e

management personnel.

gener~l

agree-

Lastly, an excess

of paper-work has resulted in inefficiency a"nd costly delays.

Hope-

fully, the passage of the Intermodal Bill (H.R. 15465) presently
pending before Congress will alleviate this situation through the
licensing" of inte-rmodal carriers by the Federal Maritime Commission
and the establishment of single-factor rates under a through bill of
lading.
The Boston shipping community is very optimistic about the Port's
containeri~ed

future.

It foresees increased North Atlantic trade

and with Yankee pragmatism views the satura-eion of these trade routes
by 1975 as a good opportunity to establish new container routes to
Brazil and South Africa, areas with which Boston is developing increased trade.

MeanwhLle, Massport's second container terminal is

now in the planning stages and has stirred up an unexpected controversy.

Originally, the $30 million, 35 acre facility was to be

located in East Boston, then considered the last and only deep water
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stretch of waterfront left in the Port suitable for such future
plans.

Predictably hailed by labor as "the salvation of the J?ortf!

it was labeled by the news media as "almost a certainty." 12

Mass-

port, however, had to turn to its old sparring partner the BRA to
reqtiest a delay in their plans for a $3.1 million housing
for the elderly and a new

~oo.

projec~

Soon however, opponents of the

terminal's proposed location gained powerful editorial support
repelled by the Massport plan: "East Boston has been battered enough.
already by its huge neighbor.

'!'O impose a container t·erminal,

for

whatever practical reasons, on this piece of waterfront would be
humanly shameful and aesthetically destruotive.,,13

Protest arose

from the East Boston Community which feared, among other things,
increased truck traffic and further encroachment by the Port
Authorit:y.
Massport strategically retreated and sQon produced a controv€rsial
supplemental study which now recommended the South Boston Naval
Annex as a better site than the East Boston location originally
suggested by Ehe primary study.

By an overwhelming vote, the Port

Authority authorized its Executive Director to seek the 220 acre
South Boston site for a container facility.
state and federal officials
to be disposed of as

a~e

mili~ary

Negotiations with city,

necessary since the Annex is soon

surplus.

Massport, with its cherished

independence of action, is neither familiar nor comfortable with such
an approach.

Although Massport has become more than willing to

trade the city its East Boston property for the South Boston location, a proposed shipyard in South Boston promises the 'greater
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inducement of increased employment and property taxes.

Furthermore,

a Special Legislative Commission on Boston Harbor, headed by the
same state senator who instinctively opposes Massport at every turn,
will soon be moving into the area of development control modeled
after the San Francisco Bay Commission.

All in all, despite the

commercial attractions, it does not appear a very opportune time for
Massport to push its policy of total containerization.
Nonetheless, Massport will stubbornly persevere irregardless of
local friction, increasingly concentrated competition from New York,
and the problematic future of the over-capitalized and over-capacitized
container trade.

It has made its decision over the development of

the Port of Boston and has publicly committed itself to it.

Given

the Port Authority's past history, its structure and its character
it will require more concerted effort, more immediate rivalry and

more concrete evidence to dissuade it from its course.
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Part 8

Massport

Boston is one of the most fragmented ports in the U.S. with a
p~olifcration

of associations, agencies and trade organizations.

Amid this crowded community however, the Massachusetts Port Authority
has maintained the highest profile and been the center of Port
activity since its inception in 1959.

It has been and will continue

to be embroiled in controversies, both petty and significant.

More-

over, Massport, in and of itself, has become a controversy, periodically
evoking proposals for its replacement by a Waterfront Oommission, a
Metropolitan Port Commission, a New England Port Authority or some
such renovated body.

This section shall briefly survey some of the

Port Authority's more consequential actions or inactions and suggest
rationales

b~

which to justify approval or disapproval.

It will be

assumed that Massport will weather the storm of criticism fairly
intact, though probably modified in response to external pressures,
and will continue to guide the Port into the foresee·able future.
For a proper perspective, one should appreciate the veritable
credibility chasm between Massport's self-image and its public image
among its steadfast opponents, both in relief against a general background of indifference shared by the greater part of the populace.
Massport's staff

see~

itself as a small, dedicated group of honest,

hardworking, professionals expertly carry~ out the responsibilities
charged them.

In contrast, the impression of the Port Authority

among many local citizens is that it is powerful, arrogant and selfserving, does not care about people or communities, cannot be trusted
and seldom, if ever, acts in the public interest.
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To properly assess this contradiction, it will be useful to
approach it within the framework of a rough categorization of the
three major channels of criticism.

These are really only the more

obvious facets of a complex web and are almost always interrelated,
but they do offer a semblance of simplified delineation.

The three

channels are:
1) The Authority's administration of the Port.
2)

Its structural character.

3) The concepts underlying its establishment and operations.
Administration.
Massport's administrative record elicits two general opinions
prevalent among Boston's shipping community.

One view is that the

Port Authority's administrative excellence has generated substantial
economic growth and made it the most efficient and profitable public
agency in the state.

A differing estimation is that Massport's

neglectful management has been inefficient and ineffective and has
endangered the Port's very existence.
Along this line of criticism is the valid accusation that Massport has never attempted to design and implement a comprehensive
long-range plan for the Port's revival and

develo~t.

"The port

management's piecemeal, haphazard approach to operations has encouraged
inefficient work practices by the longshoremen, induced pessimism in
the shippers and operators, and endangered long term profits."l
Massport has certainly been deficient in this respect, not just with
the Seaport, but with Logan Airport as well.

It may be that the

Authority is more comfortable with this approach so it can keep its
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opponents off-balance not knowing what, when, or where the next project to do battle over will be.

Unfortunately, Massport, with its

present leadership and disposition, cannot be expected to change its
character and devise and publicize a concrete, coherent plan for the
Port's future.
Containerization, which has recently been so vigorously introduced
in the Port, does not necessarily denote a meaningful implementation
of a long-term developmental scheme, as seen in the miscalculated
undercapacity of the Moran Terminal and the bumbling efforts to locate
a new terminal.

While containers may not indicate a master-plan for

the Port, they do, however, represent a constructive and consistent
direction to which Massport has committed the Port and may bode well
for the future.

Meanwhile, barring any unforeseen political, financial

or legal rearrangements, Massport will continue in its piecemeal
fashion to the detri.rrent of the Port and its factions, the local
communities and their residents, and the state and its transportation
system.
Another administrative target of criticism has been the persistent conviction that Massport has neglected the Seaport in its
concentration on the development of Logan Airport.

This early neglect

cannot be denied, but in perspective it was predictable and probably
inevitable given the Authority's fiscal structure and objectives.
As explained in Chapter II on Port Administrations, the absence of
supplementary funding, the statutory requirements for the diversion
of profits in Massport's enabling legislation and the nature of
revenue bond financing made capital investments for Port development
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difficult and unattractive.

Massport's interim program of rehabili-

tating obsolete, decrepit, redundant facilities, however, was an
inexcusable waste of money and an obviously ill-conceived makeshift
exercise.
In recent years, however, there have been increasing investments
in the Port, culminating with the $25 million Moran Terminal and
future continuance and even acceleration indicated with Massport's
plan for a larger second public container facility and an offshore
oil terminal.

This constructive change may be based on a new atti-

tude on the part of Massport towards its revenue bond system.

The

general premise has been that Massport felt its primary responsibility
to be towards its bondholders and consequently avoided any investment
project, especially in the Port, that entailed risk.

This new

approach to hitherto unacceptably insecure Port investments may reflect a new realization by the Authority:

ltConcern for bondholders

in itself is not a bad thing; in fact, it is salutory insofar as it
motivates careful planning and sober judgement.

However, since bond-

holders receive fixed returns on their investment, it is improbable
that they would strenuously oppose any coherent plan for development
which assures sufficient revenue to meet interest and principal
obligations.

Satisfying bondholders or investors is an integral part

.
t e conservatlsm.
.
11 2
o f any d eve I opmen t program an d nee d not necesslta

General criticism has also been levelled at Massport's program
of Port modernization.

Successful managament in this and other areas

is dependent upon making the correct decisions at appropriate times
and following them with vigorous implementation.

Until recently,
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Massport has demonstrated consumat€ skill in evading making any Port
decision at anytime, thus eliminating any need for implementation.
More progress Vlould certainly have been made with a more aggressive
program for Port development.

The belated adoption of

containeri~a

tion was long indicative of the Port Authority's damaging passivity.
While it did make a small investment in the crane for Sea Land's
Castle Island operation, this was not until 1966, by which time other
~orth

Atlantic ports were well along with dynamic and extensive con-

tainerization programs.

It then sat back for three years; while the

Sea Land operation showed no indication of materializing, making no
apparent effort to investigate the interests of other container firms
in the ,facility.

The BSA and other Port interests clamored for Mass-

port to initiate facilities as they saw rival ports consolidating
most of the container trade.

Even Massport's Executive Director,

as late as 1967, was voicing the necessity to get in on the container
movement before the steamship companies established their routes,
but doing little about it.

All the Authority was prepared to do at

that late date was to "stand ready to supply operational talents if
needed or financial means where circumstances and a responsible leasee
so warrant. ,,3
take action.

It was not until 1969 that Massport was convinced to
The "resolution" of two longstanding problems prompted

the Authority to praise the year as "one of the most significant in
the long history of the Port of Boston and certainly the most
important year in the last two decades. 11 4

Not only was a new labor

contract signed, but "the decision was made to proceed with the
planning and development of a major public container and general cargo
complex to be located on the Mystic River. nS
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Whether Boston jumped on the container band wagon in time to
realize the full complement of potential benefits the intermodal
revolution could provide, it is still too early to say.

If nothing

else, however, the first container terminal, admittedly belated, may
in retrospect mark a watershed.

Massport seems to have taken on a

more aggressive stance since then.

Plans for a larger public terminal

and an off-shore oil complex, while not tactfully presented and pursued, may hopefully signify the assumption of a more consistent and
aggressive Port development program.
The final two points of management criticism involve labor and
solicitation.

One of the most glaring weaknesses in the Port's

structure is the inability to genuinely resolve for an extended
period of time the labor difficulties arising from the discomposure
accompanying Port modernization.

Though Massport has been scored

for this situation, in fact it has no statutory authority under its
enabling act to negotiate with labor, even though many feel it would
be the more appropriate agency for this because of the BSA's close
ties with New York.

Massport justifiably claims, however, that

officially its hands are tied.
Until the last few years, Massport's solicitation efforts have
been validly assessed uS insufficient and ineffective.

Though this

partly resulted from conditions over which Massport had no control,
other incidents, such as the perfunctory solicitation of Midwest
grain after the rate differential was lifted, illustrated the
Authority!s deficiency in this respect.

Efforts were inadequate,

fragmented, uncoordinated and did little to present a consistent,
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positive image.

This too, however, has greatly improved since Mass-

port has acquired a saleable product in containerization.

It has

launched a full-scale, integrated and sustained Port promotion program.

Branch offices have been improved or newly opened in Washington

D.C., New York, Chicago, Brussels and Tokyo, and solicitation for
cargo has been especially productive in New England and even New York
State.

Again, containerization may be ushering in a new era for

Massport.
Structure.
The administrative, financial and political structure of Massport
has probably been more controversial than its Port operations and has
certainly been more imposing and, in some cases, even threatening.
More often than not it elicits a strong reaction such as intimidation,
admiration or acrimony from those that confront it.

It has been

appropriately likened to a fiefdom with a "closed system" style of
internal operation with little or no external interference or direction.
The Board of Directors of the Authority are part-time and unpaid, and
none is a professional port administrator.

This arrangement has

allowed effective power to devolve to the staff, with a high degree
of centralization of that power around the Executive Director.

The

present director, appointed in 1963, is the highest paid public
official in the Commonwealth at $54,500 per year, besting even the
governor and the U.S. senators.

He is revered by the business community

and depicted as "power-hungry" by his critics.

Massport is indeed a

self-contained entity often justly accused of a narrow, self-serving
perspective.
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Massport's broad power base is firmly rooted in Boston's
commercial establishment.

The Authority is important to financial

and business leaders, for it was they who were responsible for Massportis creation when a crumbling transportation system endangered
their profits.

Massportls revenue structure and its accountability

to bondholders give it much in common with private enterprise.

The

composition of its seven-man board, always consisting primarily of
leading businessmen, serves to further strengthen this affinity.
Along with striving for business-like efficiency, Massport also
respects the motivation for political reform that was crucial to its
establishment.

It was hoped that such a quasi-independent body,

devoted to the public interest, would be thus removed from the
possibility of political corruption and petty local interests.

Mass-

port has taken this responsibility seriously and values its untainted
reputation in this respect.

One writer has described it· as such:

liThe Authority has developed and maintained this 'good government'
image in a state alleged to have widespread municipal corruption,
where scandals are almost a way of life.

Nothing in our research

has led us to dispute the prevailing belief that the MPA is remarkably
free from the crasser forms of venality that seems to plague so many
other public bodies. 106
of the coin.

The writer later enunciates the other side

It is an unsettling exercise to speculate on the power

and influence Massport could wield, for better or worse, if it were
so inclined.

It could draw on such impressive resources as its

multi-million dollar finance system, its official and unofficial ties
with commercial potentates, and the control it exerts over numerous
employment opportunities and lucrative construction contracts.
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This potential may be unavoidable with any large pUblic authority
which is fiscally autonomous and functions much like a private enterprise.

Massachusetts, as with any other state, cannot have the best

of both worlds.

It has gotten to a fair extent the improved trans-

portation facilities it had originally wanted, but now finds a
behemoth in its backyard that makes it very uncomfortable.

Massport

has not yet abused its status but has rather policed itself much more
effectively than most public agencies.

While this is a situation

the pUblic should expect rather than applaud, realistically the
Commonwealth has little complaint with Massport's conscious
incorruptibility.
While Massport has chosen not to unethically flex its muscles,
it has had no reservations, despite the naive hopes of many of its
initial advocates, to amassing socially acceptable, legitimate political
power.

It is considered by many as the most powerful public organi-

zation and most effective political force in the Commonwealth.

Mass-

port has learned to play politics like a pro with three paid lobbyists,
an extensive patronage list and the judicial dispensation of jobs,
Christmas gifts, harbor cruises and airplane accommodations.

There

is often political motivation behind its board appointees and it has
been observed that "a combination of business savvy and politics has
never proved to be an obstacle to appointment.,,7

Massport has more

than enough political clout to take the offensive for a good cause.
The Authority's defensive ability has proven equally potent,
and has earned it the reputation of being politically untouchable.
Several hundred bills have been introduced to the state legislature
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to change Massport or make it more responsive to local communities,
only to die from lack of support.

Most of these measures originate

in the immediate Boston area, provoked by airport expansion, noise,
air and water pollution, waterfront decay and traffic congestion.
Massport dismisses these as "special interest n bills that don't
merit general support, as it also dismisses a legislator's intemperate
remarks as a political gesture necessitated by an election campaign
in an embittered neighborhood.

Massport feels no great threat from

these sourceSi it sagaciously realizes that the vast majority of the
populace is perfectly content with or indifferent to its operations
as long as taxes are not affected.

Consequently it is fairly well

immune from outside interference:

uIn some, the main channel that

the MPA's enabling legislation leaves open for reforming the
Authority is blocked by the majority of the General Court that is
not concerned with the MPA unless it affects their constituency
directly.u8
Many people, with little confidence in the legislature, feel
that Massport should be more responsive to the governor.

The

governor himself has stated, " ... when the actions of the Port
(Authority) have major impact beyond the boundaries of the airport
and affect many other interests of our people, then the public must
be involved in those decisions, and I

as governor will insist that

the people have a say in those decisions. n9

The governor, however,

has failed to acquire a significant voice in shaping the policies
and direction of Massport.

Several attempts to give his office veto

power over major Massport projects have suffered defeat in the
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legislature.

After the latest defeat, the bill's sponsor, a senator

from East Boston, conceded:

"The only explanation is that the bond-

holders (banks) just had too much clout with the Republicans and
Ed King (of the P.A.) and the lobbyists with many of the Democrats. 1I10
The governor has also looked to board appointments as a means of
controlling Massport and integrating it into a state-wide, balanced
transportation program.

Despite the fact that five of the present

seven man board are his appointees, the governor has yet to gain a
handle on the Port Authority.

He can only muse:

"It seems that any

person appointed to that board is mesmerized by its power and
strength ... once they get into the clutches of that power, they forget about this office."ll
The governor is not alone in feeling isolated from the Port
Authority, which has appeared to deliberately minimize its contacts
with all other state agencies.

Mas~port's

structural independence

has also meant an inconsistent relationship with the City of Boston,
the level and sincerity of communications frequently dependent on
the attitudes and policies of whoever is mayor at a given time.
Massport has also neglected to coordinate its land development plans
and activities with those of other agencies, especially the Boston
Redevelopment Authority, with which the Authority has had consistently
strained relations.
If Massport's studied and cherished autonomy resulted only in
bureaucratic frustrations, it could be dismissed as simply an
instigation to typical political infighting.
much more serious consequences.

Regrettably, it has

Massport's abstention from the
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development of a comprehensive and coordinated transportation package
for the entire state has a damaging effect beyond its own dominion.
The Authority's indirect refusal to cooperate with other agencies
severely hampers the planning and implementation of this much needed
program.

The intense passenger car and truck traffic generated by the

airport and seaport would make attempts at even a revised metropolitan
transportation system futile without the collaboration of the Port
Authority.

Massport claims it will study any "realistic plan ll coming

from the state Department of Transportation, but success
necessitate a more active participation.

would

Massport's parochial

reluctance to consider any framework other than its own sphere of
influence was also demonstrated in its proposal for an off-shore oil
terminal.

The recent fuel shortage, if nothing else, has pointed

out New England's unique dilemma when it comes to energy production,
distribution and consumption.

In this perspective, anything but a

regional plan entailing massive capital investments for terminal,
refinery and distribution complexes and considerable environmental
dangers to the entire coastline would be unwise and self-defeating.
Nonetheless, Massport stubbornly retains its singular planning and
operational philosophy.
Unexpectedly, in the spring of 1973, Massport's obstinacy
precipitated a confrontation that snow-balled into the first real
infringement on the Authority's autonomy.

Massport's Board had held

a midnight session to authorize a final bond issue to finance a
$13.5 million, 2700 car parking garage at Logan Airport.

In April,

1973, Dr. William J. Bicknell, Commissioner of the Massachusetts
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Department of Public Health, advised Massport that its plans and
specifications for the South Terminal project were required to be
submitted bo the Department's Bureau of Air Quality Control for review and approval under the state's Air Pollution Control Law.
Por~

The

Authority held it was exempt from such regulations by the

exclusionary provision in its enabling act.

When asked his opinion,

the Attorney General agreed with Masspo.rt' s contention.

The City of

Boston ended up taking Massport to Superior Court which held that the
legislative intent was that such bodies would not be subject to such
regulations.
Soon thereafter, the Commonwealth was notified by the federal
Environmental Protection Agency that " ... it appears that .Massachusetts
does not have the legal authority ... to prevent the construction,
modification or operation of State entities which will permit

attain~

men-e or maintenance of a national standard" and that if this "legal
deficiency" wa.s not corrected by September 1, 19'73, over $1 million
in federal grants will be cancelled. 12

The case was appealed to the

Supreme Judicial Court, and in March, 1974, the Court rejected Massport's argument:

"The consequence of tha tlefendant I s

(Massport' s)

interpretation ... of the (Port) Authority's enabling act would be that
a small group of state authorities would have a unique exemption
from the regulatory power of the state, an exemption available to
no person or legal entity, public or private."l3
This landmark dec.ision not only makes Massport accountable to
the Department of Fublic Health, but also under the state's little
NEPA, the

Authori~y

must

no~

join the ranks of all other state agencies

193.
in assessing the environmental impact of any project it plans to
undertake.

Under this statute adopted in 1972, Massport will be

required to submit an impact report to "all reviewing agencies, and
any state agency, department, board, commission, division or authority
which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to
any environmental impact involved" for their written comments, ineluding the secretary of environmental affairs, who will indicate
if the report adequately and properly complies with the law. 14
So Massport's first line of structural defense has been breached
and its privileged independence is no longer absolute.

It will now

be accountable to both its bondholders and the environment.

It's

far too early to tell what effect this will have on the structure,
policies, and operations of the Authority.

Hopefully, instead of

begrudgingly cooperating with other state bodies, Massport will
finally realize that it has to be integrated into the broader
governmental framework.

The ruling will not so much affect the

Authority's efficiency and effectiveness as it will its self-image
and philosophy as a body more corporate than public.

Massport may

even discover that there are valuable contributions to make and receive through interaction and collaboration with other public
organizations.
Concepts.
(Much of the following is based on the public opposition to the Port
Authority aroused by its operations at Logan Airport and not necessarily
at the Seaport.
It is instructive nonetheless, as it reveals Massport's basic approach and the reaction of many of its critics.)
The final area of controversy revolves around the basic concepts
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underlying Massport's establishment and subsequent performance.
There is widespread agreement and documentation that Massport's legacy
has been a commercial orientation and its philosophy the business
ethic.

In different perspectives, the Authority's either main asset

or liability is its " ... overriding emphasis on efficiency and
profit-making with respect to the facilities it was given to operate,
which leads MPA management to function more like a private corporation than a public-regarding agency of government. illS

There is a

certain mystique about Massport which justifies anything it does because of its past record of commercial success, but it is this same
image that elicits protests that the Authority has little regard for
community interests and is primarily interested in commercial
prosperity.

It is this contrary distinction between MassportTs

evident interest and the conception of the public interest that lies
at the root of most conflicts.
The Port Authority has to a large extent ignored the burden
it has imposed on citizens, especially in the form of airport noise
and the truck traffic and scenic degradation that would accompany
its proposed port developments.

It has been accused by even its

partner in maritime commerce, the BSA, of having more allegiance to
its bondholders than to the public. 16

A public relations study pre-

pared for Massport cautioned that it " ... cannot be immune from a
constructive response to growing public insistence that it be more
concerned with the quality of life at its doorstep ... while continuing
to improve the performance of its basic economic functions." 17
It is believed by many that Massport takes no account of the
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wide.r range of public needs and must be forced to adopt a more
"holistic C'oncept fl of' the publi-c interest.

Admitting' to an

inheretlt bias against lithe nature of independent pUblic authorities," one perceptive critic has not-eo.:

"By the nature of

its financial operatio.ns and political s-tructure, the MPA is
employing valuable public power

=

eminent domaLn (albeit

restricted), the ability to sell tax-free bonds, exemption
from local property taxes for mos,t of its properties, appropriatdon of money collected from the publiC' - in a wa¥ that
might not be consistent with the public interest nor with a
more rational and just ordering of social priorities. IlIB

The

primary aspects of the pUblic interest Obscured by Massport's
s,tructural independence are the general distribution of costs
and benefits - financial and social - of Port Authority operations, the effects of these operations on nearby users of land,
and the role of these operations within the framework of an
integrated metropolitan transportation strategy.
Massport finds itself in an enviable position.

As a

quasi-public body it does enjoy many of the advantages of a
public agency.

Moveover, not subject to periodic elections,

it is not directly accountable t,o the general
further, its autonomous structure

a~lQws

citi~enrYj

it to be equally un-

accountable to any other sector of the state government,
legislative or executive and hence strengthens its immunity
to most of the various restraints of democratic processes.

On

the other hand, the advantages it possesses at a quasi-private
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body have ,to be differentiated between the Bridge
and the Seaport.

~nd

Airport,

Massport operates the Bridqe and Airport as

monopolies with no compet'ition and a guaranteed market due te·
the absence of any feasible alternative services.

The Seaport,

however, is the only transport unit that, with stiff New York
competition, needs to be marketed and, as such, the development
and promotion of its

marke~abili~y ~ust

be predicated upon the

requirements, preferences and decisions of its users.
The ethic behind the Bridge and Airport seems to mor,e
accurately reflect the Port authorities predilection
polyed services.

fo~

mono-

With t.he Seaport, however, Massport mus;t

not only be responsive to its Dond holders, as it must with all
its facilitLes but also to the Port.'s present and potential
"consurners ll

-

shippers and consignees.

This

no~

only makes

good, basic business sense, but was also a focus of the original legislative intent.

As manifested in Port activities,

this approach seems -eo be at the basis of Massport's consistent. interpretation of the
of its facility users.

lI

p ublic intere·st ll as the intere,st.

It is at this point that a judgement

may be appropriate as to whether the ideal of a "body politic
and corporate" is revealed as a naive contradictory concept or
as a progmatic complementary nechanism.
be original intent and

u~~imate

The criteria might

achievements en the one hand,

and on the other, the Authority's alleged insufEicient

sensi~

tivity ~o a broader and equally deservi~g ~public" and its
inadequateconside~a~ionof

its programs.

the direct and indirect effects of
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Another deficiency is that Massport's business orientation has allowed and even encouraged it to ignore bath the
social and 'environmental costs of its activi ties, such as
water, noise and air pollution, the removal of recreational
land, and the effect on nearby property taxes.

Again, it may

be the City of Boston's suit that may at leaat partially
rectify this.

If Massport is forced to recognize, assess and

justify the impact of its activities on both the communal
and ecological environment it may eventually lead to the incorporation of these considerations in its overall orientation
and end the predictably defensive reaction to protests on a
piecemeal basis that has so far prevailed.
In fairness, the pUblic must also appreciate the mandate
Massport was given, to tak.e deteriorating transportat.ion facilities and develop them into a system capable of meeting the
demands of a dynamic commercial, industrial and urban sector.
It was both blessed and cursed with the only major international airport located in such close proximity to a large metropolitan center, and from this predicament have sprung many
controversies.

All in all, Massport cannot be condemned for

what it was established to do and what to a good extent it
has done, but rather for the way it has done it.

The indivi-

dual bias of critie. or advocate will determine the relative
evaluation.
As for the Port, pUblic interest may have called for
earlier capital investm.ents and more aggressive programs, or,
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if ·oneis inclined, to a

comp~ete

,abandonmen.t of the harbor

to res·i'dential and recreational usage.

But at present, there

is nothing really obnoxious about the Port's, operation.
Massport, of cours.e, must' be· 'more tactful in its public relations, more strategic in its site locations, and more environmentally conscious in any plans, especially those involving
the waterborne transport of petroleum.

It is ironic that

only after Massport partially shed its low profile in regards
to the Port, that it became a target of criticism from outside
the shipping community.

It may be that Massport wLll eventually

be much improved by the judicial imposition of integrat-ion
and cooperation and the Qnwelcome dictate of systematic environmental consciousness.

It ma'y yet be that in the end, as

was planned in the beginning, all will benefit.
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CHAPTER IV
FUTURE OF THE PORT
Introduction
As a conclusion to this survey, it would seem appropriate to
conject upon the more conspicuous ingredients of Boston's maritime
prospects.

The future of the Seaport is predictable only within

broad parameters which are defined by two major directions and influenced by a number of elements.

The two primary directions are

the modernization of the Port's petroleum reception facilities and
the further containerizati6n of its general cargo handling facilities.

The components of these potential developments are so

numerous, varied and interrelated as to pose contingencies that
probably preclude any reasonable analysis at this time, although
the more obvious, such as Massport's future role, subsequent labor
agreements and the need for the integration and cooperation of all
port factions, are easily recognized.

Both these directions and

contributory factors, however, present more of the dilemmas with
which the Port has long been
these

i~ues

accus~omed

to wrestle.

Certain of

are deserving of final note or reiteration as funda-

mental determinants of the future of the Seaport.
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The development of an off-shore oil terminal and refinery-industrial complex poses a serious quandary in a locale acutely
sensitive to the preservation and protection of its natural
environment.

It might prove a thankless task to replace a tradi-

tional supply system which was responsible for only a few oil spills
beyond the inner harbor with one that would introduce carriers of
such dimensions as to arouse· anxieties of potential disasters of
awesome magnitUde and extent.

Yet in perspective, this fear may

be illusory, as intensive research has shown that the use of

VLCC~s

and off-shore facilities is superior, both economically and environmentally, to the present mode of operation.

In this liqht, Massport

exhibited poor judgement in delaying for two years, while awaiting
a more opportune moment, the presentation of its original off-shore
terminal s.tudy.

It should have assumed the responsibility of imme-

diately publicizing the proposal as a high-priority issue for all
of

Ne~

England and undertaken an energetic campaign to recruit as

much public,

gov~rnment

and industry support as possible.

construction time of four
pleted by 1975.

year~,

With a

the project could have been com-

Now, with the added requirement of Massport's pre-

paring a state Environmental Impact Report and coordinating its
actions with thQ$e of other state agencies, Boston may once again
hold up the rear of

technologi~al

adoption while the initiative will

fall to any Qne of several plans for similar developments in Maine.
Also, the Harris report was only preliminary, with such flaws as
loca~ing

both product and crude terminal much to close to shore to

minimize pollution of coastal waters as recent studies have indicated.
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AS such, the more intensive scrutiny now' being given the proposal
was necessary, but now there is the additional danger of the concept's being studied to death.
Realistically, economic and environmental efficiencies and
coses allow no acceptable alternative to such a development somewhere in the New England region.

Continued reliance upon Caribbean,

and to a lesser degree, Canadian petroleum products is not only
expensive, but also necessi tat,es using the smaller and obsolete
tanker fleet that poses the greater environmental danger, and is
in any case shortsighted as the dwindling resources of the
Caribbean basin will be no longer available in the near future
and Canadian generosity can not be counted on forever.

Foreign

imports refined and transshipped from the Gulf of Mexico also
entail the same high costs both economic and environmental.

The

use of feeder systems off-shore, either stationary or moving, as
the Navy has customarily done, could only be an interim measure
and involves a high pollution risK with multiple transfers and/or
inclemeht weather.

The anticipation of the development of a

fleet of i'pudgy" tankers with shallower drafts is unrealis,tic since
they are really still in the planning stage, and even if practicable, would not be available for some years.

To locate a complex

elsewhere in New England, probably in Maine, is also unsatisfactory
for Massachusetts since such a development would primarily supply
northern New England and would otherwise necessitate a high cost
distribution system utilizing environmentally unsuitable small
tankers ahd ocean-going barges.
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~!i thin

this restricted range of choice, Massport. I s terminal

proposal appears the most favorable for Massachusetts.

The Port

of Boston, strategically located as the sea access of the Eastern
Ma,~I3'achusett.s

population concentration, is the logical and viable

site for the terminus and distribution center of a modernized fuel
transport System.

This is substantiated by the $25 million Liqui-

fied Natural Gas terminal in Everett, the only reception
facility
of its kind in the
since 1971.

u.

S., operat.ed by the Discrigas Corporation

Because of this development, LNG ships are bec.oming

a pnrt of the Massachusetts fuel picture.

At present, 14 arrivals

a year are scheduled from Algeria, each carrying 23,000 tonS of
liquid, the equivalent of one billion cubic feet of gas.

This

supplies 5 - 7% of the New England gas demand and plans call for
increasing traffic.
The major deficiency in Massportrs proposal is its failure
to consider a comprehensive, well integrated energy plan for the
entire New England region.

Regional planning must be an absolute

prerequisite for any project of such moment, magnitude and impact.
Massport must swallow the bitter pill of externalizing its plans
and operations and must be required to cooperate and coordinate
not just

wi~h

local interests, but with any related project in the

entire region, such as those contemplated for Maine.

Massport's

proposal would also be enhanced if it advocated ~hat the facility,
operated by the Authority, would be owned by a public corporation
with a regional pipeline distribution system constructed, owned
and controlled by all the participating New England states.

The

High Seas Oil Port Act now pending in Congress provides for the
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application of states or public corporations for construction and
operational licenses for off-shore terminals.
could be

e~en

further

served

The public interest

if any agreement with an oil company

to establish a refinery provided for the public having a voice in
determining what types of petroleum products would be produced.
Massport may resent this direct intrusion of the public interes't
into its dealings with private enterprise, but if it is to

success~

fully and faithfully serve its mandate and if a rational and efficient energy supply and distribution system is to be achieved, new
approaches are indicated.
The second direction in which the Port of Boston is being led
is that of containerization.

This mode of fast and convenient cargo

transportation, along with the jet plane, improved overseas communications services and expanding

multi~national

are rapidly forging a global economy.

commercial interests

Viewed with maximum optimism,

containerization may offer Boston its first opportunity in decades
to assume the role of an important world port.

On the other hand

a more realistic assessment would have to recognize that the P'ort's
belated and faltering introduction to containerization along with
its legacy of stagnation might prove its recent

investmen~s

futile

in the face o£ earlier and more concentrated developments elsewhere.
It is generally accepted that the North Atlantic container routes
will be saturated by 1975 and that by 1980 all additional major container trade routes will have been established.

Within this time

frame, expeditious execution may be the decisive factor in determining Boston's future; time has been

los~

in adopting the new
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technology and short time is left to secure a. significant participation for the Port in the global web of the intermodal transportat.ion system.
In addition Boston's shipping business, even more so than in
other ports, is facing increasing and serious competition from air
carriers and land bridge systems.

'I'he trend towards air frei ht,

despi te its expense, is based on its. attraction when sea borne transportation

ge~s

mired in high handling costs,

problems" or en route delays.

pi~ferage

and damage

The recent: introduction of Lower Deck

Containers carried in the bellies of new wide-body passenger jets
and the widespread use by 1975 of all cargo jumbo jets, will siphon
even more business away from steamships and, in particular, container
ships.

It has been projected that by 1975-6 to 7% of all liner cargo

will be carried by air and that by 1980, this figure could reach
15%~

1

These developmehts are especially ominous for the Boston

Seaport because of the convenient location and excellent services
of Logan International Airport and the availability of many local
high-value low bulk manufactur,es that are ideally suited to air transport, which generally calculates freight rates from volume rather
than weight.

Indicative of this situation is that in 1973, Logan

handled oVer 330 million pounds of cargo.
'The

l.and~bridge

concept, however, has recently lost. its edge

as the serious threat to traffic in the Port that it was once predieted to be.

Although it is estimated that a "mini-land-bridge"

from the Far East cost Boston 72,000 tons of cargo last year, it is
unlikely to repeat this darnage. 2

For various reasons, many of the

I
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some two dozen steamship lines engaged in the mini-land-bridge route
are abandQning it and three Japanese lines have already notified

their customers that they are ending the service.
Despite this relie.f, Boston's greatest obstacle to

con~a.inerized

regeneration continues to be the increased concentration of the container trade in other North Atlantic ports.

This concentration is

following the familiar pattern in New York, which many lines are
atbempting to establish as the one regional port serving their entire
North Atlantic traffic.

Little attention, however, has been paid

to the fact. that an equally important antagonist for the Port in
the arena of containerization is Baltimore, a dynamic port that
rapidly adopted the new technology, has willingly made huge capital
investments in the most advanced facilities available, and has pursued an extensive and effective solicitation campaign.

Not handi-

capped by the congestion already experienced in New York, Baltimore
has made great progress in establishing itself as a major service
port for the voluminous trade of the Midwest hi.nterland. to which
it enjoys proximity.

As this trade becomes more and more container-

ized, Baltimore will more and more consolidate its position as a
major container port.

Furthermore, recent Middle East oil shenani-

gans have affected an increase in bunker prices that in some areas
is four to five time.s the previous levels,.

This in turn is fbrcing

steamship lines, through basic fuel economics, to slow their transit
speed to reduce fuel consumption and call on only one, if possible,
or at least a minimum number of ports in each region.

Thus another

impulse towards concentration seems to be working against Boston.
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Against this background, Massport's proposed $40 million
second public container terminal offers another dilemma.

It may

be a risky, foredoomed investment which will not realize any appreciable expansion of Boston's container trade, and if the concentration in New York and Baltimore continues, it may loom as a much
unneeded white elephant.

On the other hand if containerization is

truly a rare opportunity for Boston to better itself, a heavy financial commitment may be well-advised to better prepare the Port for
its renaissance.

Other considerations enter the picture, however.

While there has been a loud cry of extreme congestion at the .Moran
Terminal, t.he cited need is usually for additionalf:.ruck marshalling
and storage areas.

There has also been criticis.m that the facility

is actually operating at only about one-half its equipment handling
capacity.

This would obviate the need for an entirely new terminal

and focus attention solely on expanded landspace, a probl.em which
might have been avoided with more provident planning.

Furthermore,

why hasn't Massport investigated the innovative system of vertica.l
container storage proposed for the Port of Galveston?3

Containers

stored ten high using this method would result in increased storage
capaci ty and a considerable savings in land space.

Moreov·er, the

number of people required to operate such a facility is mHch smaller
than for a marshalling area, thus therefore allowing part of the
labor force to be channeled into other port operations.

A final

question is why the Port Authority has not exploited the advantages
railroads have over trucks for long haul container carriage?

The

Moran Terminal has sorely inadequate rail facili~ies, requiring a
switch at a private crossing to reach the two wrong-sized tracks
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under the existing cranes, a result of not even inquiring from the
local lines priQr to construction as. to what would be the

appro~

priate rail facilities for such an operation.
In 1973 the Boston & Maine handled over 6500 containers, of
which less than a thousand were shipped through Boston and only
then when the primary ports of Halifax and St. John suffered
gency conditions, such as an overflow or a work stoppage.

emer~

In the

future, when the Canadian ports reach their capac! ty of container.s
from the Midwest, the .railroad plans to absorb the cost of a
regular ocean "feeder

line~

to carry the excess containers to

Boston for overseas departure.

4

Boston should be availing itself

more directly of the greate-r carrying capacity and lower costs of
rail service from the Midwest, as Baltimore has so efficiently done.
While railroads have their greatest advantage over trucks for

long

hauls, the Boston & Maine feel that Boston could even compete with
New York for short hauls despite the $25 to $30 rate differential,
because of the long waiting time and delays that beset the larger
port.

Railroad carriage also has the potential to turn the

land-bridge concept into a benefit for the Port of Boston by forming
the land link fO:t" the transpo·rt of Far Eastern products to Boston
for final transshipment to Europe or even Africa and South America.
While the intermodal system has been working small wonders in the
long stagnant Port of Boston, all these elements indicate that, if
nothing else, there is more than meets the eye in the Port's current,
imperceptive romance with the container.
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In regards the contributory factors to these two general

directions of the Port, they share the quality of not having
straightforward prospects and have each incorporated some sort of
quandary.
Authority.

The most obvious of these is the Massachusetts Port
Pre~iminary

to its legislative enactment, it was

reco9'nized that
~Without bold, even radical steps Boston never
can expect to assume its proper p~ace as a thriving metropolitan center. us

This self-evident truth was expected to be rectified and the pUblic
interest served by the establishment of a dynamic, independent Port
Authority.

But the newly created agency was endowed with a fiscal

structure -that required its initial interest and investment be in
a more promising airport rather than a risk-laden seaport.

Concur-

rently, its quasi-corporate identity led it to develop an inherent
conservatism that, as with any newly

laun~hed

private enterprise,

discouraged capital expenditures in precarious projects, such as
the losing cause the Port of Boston represented.
Massport may just be getting over this hide-bound approach
and in fact might possLbly be bordering on intemperance
planned implementation of further containerization.

w~th

its

Though this

intrinsic contradiction between its original purpose and its structural character may be less marked in the future, the resolution
of its more fundamental dilemma, insistently stimulating animosity
aver the- iss'Ue and interpretation of the public interest, r-emains
uncertain.

Though ies existence seems fairly secure, barring any

catastrophic political or ethical blunder, its future policies,
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investments, operations and orientation remain in doubt.

Subsequent

to recent developments, Massport may surprise many observers by
becoming more reasonably receptive t.o cooperation and c.ollaboration
within a broader perspective, and to meritorious external influences
and considerations.

Undoubtedly, the Portis development will be

acutely affected by the Port Authorityls attitude, whether

intran~

sigent or enlightened, and only time will tell.
One. of Massport's present weaknesses is its inability or unwillingness to more actively participate in labor negotiations.
it's true that it

doesn~t

have such statutory authority, its

While
not

insignificant influence with the BSA, the representative management
organization, does not seem to be exercised to the maximum possible
extent.

Though labor-management relationships are not one of Mass-

port's official responsibilities, a more vigorous interest on the
Port Authority's part could possibly inject an equitable and dispassionate element into what are certainly going to
be delicate yet tempestuous negotiations.

continue to

Labor itself faces a

dilemma unsettling to the customary pursuit of its own self-interest.
It has been forced to recognize that the Portis survival requires
its cooperation,

wi~h

attempts at modernization, the very process

which ironically dictates the decimation of its Own ranks.

Labor

has had to accept a demoralizing reduction in the man-hours of its
efforts needed in the Port from 1.7 million in 1968-69 to an estimated 900,000 in 1973-74.

Management, too, however has had to make

a difficult adjustment in recognizing that in return for mode'rnization, labor has an intrinsic right to either a guaranteed employment
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level or commensurate compensation.

There is one peculiar mecha-

nism of unplanned self-adjustment in Boston's labor pioEuxe to be
grateful for, however.
"closed shop"

The Port is fortunate that the intractable

union practice is allowing a natural attrition of the

labor rolls without a comparable or even greater enrollment of
dockworkers.

Boston thus escapes to an extent the

vola~ile

labor

problems being experienced by other NQrth Atlantic ports as an
increasing work force accustomed to labor-intensive pTactices conde~

fronts capital-intensive technology founded on the premise of
creasing labor

needs~

The Fort's labor-management prospects, however, are not deserving of unqualified thanksgiving.

Some observers uneasily predict

a damaging general strike when the present labor contract runs out
at the end of September, 1974.

In an effort to develop a mQre

unified Port structure which might possibly prevent or at least
minimize such self-defeating tactics, a proposal has recently been
presented for a new Port organization. 6

The new agency WQuld be a

three tier arrangement with a board of directors made up of top
executives·, a working level group of
factions and an independent staf£.

repre~entatives

of all Port

Eight major Port interests would

constitute the organization, including Massport, the BSA, the ILA
and Teamsters UniQn, the Freight Forwarders Association and U. S.
CUS~oms

Brokers ASsociation, the truck carriers, the railroads,

the banks, and shippers and consignees.

The research findings and

policies emanating from the organization would be the official voice
of the

en~ire

shipping industry in the Port.

Such a coordinated

effort has never before been at~empted and is long overdue.

It would

I
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not only serve as a vehicle to facilitate a planned and integrated
development of the Port as agreed upon by all Port interests, but
would also serve to breakdown s.ome of the traditional barriers long
presumed to exist between conflicting

Port segments.

Energies

previously consumed by often petty and debilitative differences.
could more readily be focused into constructive channels.

Conse-

quently, these improvements would allow Boston to present the much
more saleable posture of a dynamic

r

consolidated Port with a

promis~

ing future before it.
Another invaluable service such an organization could perform
would be to

a~eliorate

ation and education.

the almost total absence of public inform-

The public relations study cited earlier

discovered through polls that among the total Massachusetts population,
the bulk of criticism of the Port Authority was concerned with the
alleged decline of the Boston Seaport.

Unfortunately; the majority

of the populace is sadly ill-informed about Port activities and the
significant achievements realized in recent years that truly do
serve the public interest.

Those critics who propose radical changes

in the Authorityls structure after it has so obviously improved airport and port operations, have been described as

11 • • •

those who are

willing to risk the goose in order to grab the golden egg~1l7

Not

just the politically attuned Port AuthQrity, but all Boston shipping
interests would decidedly benefit from a comprehensively and accurately informed general public that could appreciate the SeapoFt's
long struggle and the admirable efforts being expended for its much
hoped for revival.

In this perspective, unfounded criticism may be

I
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minimized and a civic pride may materialize that would sympathize
with and support the labors of all factions involved for the future
of the Port of Boston.
In final conclusion, the Port of Boston has been almost tragically beset by a confluence of

dilemmas that most ports only

experience partially at anyone time.

There has been no miracle,

not even that of containerization; that has yet been able to lift
this persistent burden.

Such technological developments, however,

offer the Port a range of choices not previously available.

The

Port, as any functional unit, may abandon the new technology, endure
it without exploitation, or apply ingenuity and effort to advance
on its crest.

Consequent decisions will be crucial.

Nevertheless,

the POJ;t has exhi.>bited a stubborn courage that in the end, -gaining
valuable time, may allow the evolution of answers to some of its
compounded problems.

If not, its demise would be felt only in the

Commonwealth, or at most in New England, with little impact on the
national oceanborne trade.

Yet if only as a regional outport, its

history would demand its survival.

Be that as it may, the Port has

recently made progress, though its management, labor force, and
shipping concerns are not fr.ee of justified criticism, and may truly
be better prepared to re-solve its dilemmas and regain its stature
as a respeGted cen"ter of maritime commerce.
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